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For more than a century, a wide variety of tools, techniques, and strategies 
have been deployed in attempts to control Human African Trypanosomiasis 
with mixed success. However, the recent development of more simple and 
cost-effective diagnostic devices, drug candidates, and vector control 
methods have culminated in renewed political commitments toward 
eliminating the disease. 
 
This thesis draws on ethnographic case studies of these ‘contemporary and 
emerging strategies’ (Steinmann et al. 2015) at a critical moment between 
implementation and scale; where technologies form relationships and take on 
social connotations, and where policy struggles to become practice. These 
multi-sited studies provide empirical examples of how technologies of global 
health become commodities of governance, and objects of expertise, 
controversy, and advocacy. 
 
This study critiques the global health community’s fixation on technology as 
the harbinger of progress in sleeping sickness control, and argues that 
solutions continue to be overly simplistic and attentive to discrete devices. In 
doing so, programmes overlook the dynamic systems that govern 
technologies’ social proximity to people.  
 
Case studies on diagnostics and tsetse control illustrate how socially 
embedded technologies can become tools of advocacy by promoting 
horizontal forms of knowledge production and exchange. The social proximity 
of interventions are key drivers of sustainability, as more community 
embedded technologies take on, and persist through social lives of their own. 
Examining diagnostic capacity in the passive surveillance system reveals 
how infrastructures are relational as well as material, thus technology alone 
cannot address infrastructural paucity. 
 
Global commitments to collaborative ‘One Health’ approaches to eliminating 
HAT disentangle in practice and become fragmented at the point of 
implementation. Decentralised and under-resourced district offices struggle 
to maintain operational cohesion, as a precarious network of health workers, 
entomologists, and veterinarians struggle to align vertical programmes with 
local priorities.  
 
In summary, this study reveals HAT control as a fragile assemblage of actors 
operating in environments of uncertainty, and explores how introducing new 
technologies into these socio-technical ecosystems can disrupt and 
transform them in unpredictable ways. Due to the dominance of top-down 
technocratic approaches in global health, anthropological contributions to 
HAT programmes are widely underutilised (Bardosh, 2014). This thesis 
advocates critical, multidisciplinary approaches for developing adaptive, 




This thesis examines the implementation and integration of contemporary 
technological strategies for controlling Human African Trypanosomiasis 
(HAT), and some of the prevailing challenges they highlight in tackling a 
complex and neglected tropical disease with closely interrelated social, 
environmental, and political histories amidst the present-day landscape of 
elimination. 
 
The empirical body of work draws on case studies in Uganda, where two 
strains of HAT with different epidemiological profiles and lifecycles are being 
targeted for elimination by a ‘One Health’ coalition of international institutions 
and private partners. Examples focus on the introduction of a rapid 
diagnostic test-based passive surveillance strategy, the material laboratory 
infrastructures in the Ugandan primary healthcare system, the management 
of HAT patients and the implications of a revolutionary new oral drug 
treatment, and the implementation and scaling up of novel tsetse fly control 
methods. 
 
The introduction of new rapid tests for gambiense HAT show how differently 
programmes imagine the pathways that people navigate to receive diagnosis 
and treatment, and the additional work that must be done by patients and 
health workers to make devices function in local, often resource poor 
contexts. The fixation on point of care tests and overall neglect of central 
laboratory infrastructure has dismantled HAT diagnostic workflows by 
undermining routine microscopy performance in referral laboratories. 
Meanwhile, new oral drug candidates propose to undercut this problem by 
removing the need for microscopies altogether, but may not fully appreciate 
the complex culture of expectations of care into which they will be 
implemented. 
 
A concurrent challenge to all of these innovations is how they can be scaled, 
maintained, and their impact sustained to achieve their objectives. Sustaining 
pressure on the tsetse fly vector and on surveillance is critical to reaching 
‘the last mile’ to elimination targets. However, as the case studies set out in 
this thesis illustrates, the social proximity of innovations is as important to 
their acceptability and sustainability as the physical attributes and cost-
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The history of Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT), or ‘sleeping sickness’, 
has come to be defined by moments of discovery and hubris. Decades of 
elegant scientific papers with “lofty notions of continent-wide tsetse 
eradication” (Bardosh, 2016:347), and periods where imminent elimination 
was proclaimed on a regular basis have been punctuated by resurgence and 
the repeated failure of technology to deliver the promise of conquering 
nature. Epidemics of HAT, both a symptom and result of the social, 
ecological, and demographic upheaval caused by colonial expansion at the 
turn of the 20th Century, spurred the establishment of Tropical Medicine, and 
the earliest examples of what might today be described as ‘Public Private 
Partnerships’ (Lachenal, 2017). In a bid to manage what was anything but a 
‘neglected disease’ at the time, governments and researchers scrambled to 
characterise and control what came to be known as 'the colonial disease' 
(Lyons, 2002; Maudlin, 2006). 
 
Conventional disease control approaches tend to adopt a blanket approach, 
overlooking complex socio-ecologies in rapidly-changing landscapes 
(Scoones 2014; Cunningham et al. 2017).  Regimes launched centralised 
and coercive militarized campaigns; apparatus to govern African populations 
as objects of biomedical investigation, experimentation, and intervention. 
Consensus on the topic of control has been controversial, ‘subject to the 
tides of fashion and politics’ (Maudlin, 2006). Over time, targets of 
intervention have varied from tsetse, animal reservoirs, and population 
movements, to the parasite itself through chemotherapeutics. Approaches 
were often seated in the institutional politics of trypanosomiasis control, with 
colonial authorities evolving different positions between Francophone, 
Belgian, and Anglophone Africa, via their respective research institutions 
such as Institute of Tropical Medicine Antwerp (ITM) and the Liverpool 
School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM); one investing largely in medical 
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interventions such as diagnostics and drugs, while the latter focused on the 
tsetse vector (Scoones, 2014). 
 
Yet after more than a century of efforts, the tendency of HAT to exhibit long 
periods of endemicity followed by large-scale epidemics led to the control 
and management of HAT being dubbed a “failure of both science and public 
health” (Molyneux, Ndung’u, and Maudlin 2010:2), reflecting a sea change in 
the global health community’s attitude toward conventional control 
approaches. Prolonged periods of neglect in disease management during 
endemic periods, with little or no response until human cases reached 
alarming levels would no longer be acceptable now that the tools to prevent it 
were to hand (Welburn et al., 2016; Acup et al. 2017). Now came the time for 
partnerships and political commitments to ‘stamp out sleeping sickness’. 
Control strategies are driven by various professional and institutional 
interests; people have built careers on HAT control after all. Thus research 
and intervention programmes are inherently “deeply political, and socially 
embedded in long histories” that reflect how scientists frame problems and 
their solutions (Scoones, 2014). 
 
The idea that researchers should emerge from their siloes and work in 
collaboration has significantly reconfigured medical research. Driven by 
scientific developments and major funding initiatives, such as those of the 
powerful and influential Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the scale and 
scope of global health research has proliferated in response to calls for more 
efficient and collaborative knowledge production (Parker and Kingori, 2016). 
As part of this response, the One Health framework emerged as part of an 
assemblage of international institutions and policy initiatives that have 
coalesced to “promote particular ways of conceptualising, and doing, global 
health” (Smith, Taylor, and Kingsley, 2014:1). Today, Public-Private 
Partnerships are the ‘flavour of the month’ (Scoones, 2006), and so too the 
tides of fashion and politic have swelled, buoying a new moment of ‘historical 
opportunity’ (Jamonneau et al. 2014); the London Declaration and a 
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commitment to ‘elimination’. The culmination of public-private partnerships to 
develop “simpler and more cost-effective tools and strategies […] including 
diagnostics, treatment and vector control” (Welburn, Maudlin, and Simarro, 
2009) have brought together “all the political, financial, and technical 
ingredients […] to “make HAT elimination a success story” (Jamonneau and 
Bucheton. 2014).  With these ‘contemporary and emerging strategies’ 
(Steinmann et al. 2015) on the horizon, it’s hard not to feel we are once again 
riding the crest of technological progress and promise toward “putting 
sleeping sickness to sleep forever” (Scholtabers, 2018).  
 
Uganda, where this study takes place, faces the unique challenge of being 
the only country where both forms of human African trypanosomiasis coexist 
(HAT platform, 2018). Despite this, Uganda may be the next success story in 
line to ‘consign sleeping sickness to the dustbin of history’ (ibid), an 
achievement widely attributed to the advancement of technology in diagnosis 
and vector control. But somewhere between the idealism of elimination and 
its achievement there is a gap to be traversed. This is the moment between 
implementation and uptake, where technologies form relationships and take 
on social connotations, where policy struggles to become practice, and 
where global assemblages (Ong and Collier, 2008) are rendered locally 
through the immutable mobiles of global health technologies (Latour, 1987; 
Law and Mol, 2001; Mol, 2003). This study tends to the ‘unintended gap 
between theory and practice’ (Mosse, 2004: 640), between the design of that 
“troublesome word” ‘intervention’ (Redfield, 2018) and its implementation. It 
aims to provide “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973) of HAT control, 
addressing a gap in the literature with empirical examples of how 
technologies of global health become commodities of governance, and 
objects of expertise, controversy, and advocacy (Lachenal, 2017).  
 
This is not a study of sleeping sickness per se, nor the political economy of 
sleeping sickness control and its tangled history with colonialism from which 
it was borne and bound to. Rather, it is a study of how, against the back drop 
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of this troubled history, technology continues to be centralised as the 
harbinger of progress in sleeping sickness control. It explores how global 
health tools, focused on singular, discrete problems are conceived, framed, 
and deployed to intervene upon a disease which has multiple ontologies 
(Mol, 2003); comprised of two strains with distinct epidemiologies separated 
by a ‘thin line between two fatal diseases’ (Picozzi, 2005); one shrinking to 
the brink of elimination, while the other threatens to expand its reach. A 
disease of both biological and social framings; of humans, livestock, tsetse 
flies, as well as of poverty, neglect, and politics. This thesis uses 
technologies as departure points from which to examine and unpick the 
entangled socio-material relationships embedded in the diagnosis, treatment, 
and prevention of HAT.  
New technologies from ‘m-health’ decision support or data collection tools, to 
rapid point of care tests are often posed as overcoming ‘dysfunctional 
infrastructure’ and ‘weak health systems’ because they allow surveillance or 
testing without relying on transportation, laboratory capacity and well-staffed 
clinics (Sariola et al., 2017). But the global health communities’ fixation on 
innovating around these gaps has distracted and marginalised efforts to 
address these structural issues, diverting investment toward developing 
discrete devices (Street, 2018). 
Resisting these “conceptualizing projects” as singular interventions 
transported from the ‘outside’ to change their singular target (Adams et al., 
2014), I use case studies as vehicles to advocate a socio-ecological 
approach and press the case for adaptive, locally specific solutions (Booth 
and Clements, 2018). This approach incorporates historical formations of 
HAT interventions, and how local ecologies and biologies (Lock and Nguyen, 
2010) of HAT are both constituted “through multiple transactions and 
exchanges of resources, knowledge, and experience that have been formed 
over many years” (Adams et al., 2014: 184). This research contributes to a 
growing body of literature in Critical Global Health studies and Science and 
Technology Studies (STS), addressing the role of technology for health and 
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development, and seeks to appeal to scholars and practitioners of these 
disciplines.  
Additionally, I hope that this work can also contribute to a small body of 
growing literature working to develop the concept of a ‘critical epidemiology’ 
(Krieger, 2000; 2011; Edelman, 2018). By this I refer to epidemiological 
approaches that give critical attention to research practices and knowledge 
production, and employs ‘criticality’ in its analysis of structural factors and 
relationships of power in epidemiological research and interventions, 
particularly as explanations of behaviour and health outcomes (Murray 2014, 
in Edelman 2018). Such an approach promotes participatory methods, such 
as participatory modelling (Grant et al. 2016) and locally-tailored 
interventions (Booth and Clements, 2018) informed by ‘slow research’ 
(Adams et al, 2014) and more nuanced modes of ‘community engagement’ 
and ‘participation’ (Rifkin, 2003; George et al., 2015). Despite the value of 
integrating these kinds of anthropological perspectives into HAT 
programmes, due to the dominance of top-down technocratic approaches in 
global health their contribution is widely underutilised (Bardosh, 2014; Brown 
and Kelly, 2014). A critical approach seeks to integrate social inquiry into the 
planning, monitoring and evaluating process of epidemiological research, 
ensuring “flexibility and adaptability to local realities are built into 
interventions” (Bardosh, 2014:1). 
Furthermore, I address this work and the practical value that can be gleaned 
from its conclusions to the “serene entrepreneurs of contemporary global 
health” in their endeavour to solve complex and politically entangled 
problems with technological ‘simple solutions’ (Lachenal, 2017:16). The 
empirical body of the thesis aims to set out a detailed, critical ethnographic 
account of how global health interventions and policy play out at the local 
level, through selected case studies of technologically-oriented interventions 
in HAT control and elimination in Uganda. From these case studies, I argue 
several key empirical contributions to the literature can be made: 
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1) Infrastructures are relational as well as material, thus technology alone 
cannot address infrastructural paucity, nor the relational aspects of 
infrastructure that shape the epidemiological landscape of HAT. Devices like 
rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) and mobile data reporting tools are designed to 
circumvent gaps in health infrastructures, however they often require more 
work, bureaucracy, and resources to work than envisaged. 
 
2) Global commitments to ‘One Health’ approaches are not reflected in 
local practice. The HAT network encapsulates the ‘one health’ paradigm in 
successfully advocating collaborative interdisciplinary relationships and 
discourses which may hold at an international research and policy level, but 
this collaboration rarely plays out in practice at the ground level. In Uganda, 
collaboration and knowledge exchange is rarely replicated at district level 
between veterinary, entomological, or public health actors. The experience 
and expertise of community health, animal health, and entomological workers 
tend to go overlooked by programmes. 
 
3) The social proximity of technology is a key driver of intervention 
sustainability. Technologies that have local community buy-in and 
participation are more socially embedded, and therefore have sustainability 
built into them through social networks and practices. Meanwhile, relatively 
aloof, expensive, and large scale vertical interventions that lack this social 
proximity to communities inspire little public awareness, understanding, or 
trust. 
 
4) Technologies can become tools of advocacy for HAT awareness and 
control. Where new tools and interventions become socially embedded and 
take on their own social lives among local ecologies, they can promote 
awareness about HAT through more organic and horizontal forms of 
knowledge production and exchange. The HAT RDT for example is a socially 
distant technology and largely invisible intervention, and therefore does little 
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to promote awareness of HAT or HAT diagnosis in the areas it has been 
introduced. The tsetse control ‘Tiny Targets’ devices on the other hand have 
been a highly visible technology, both in terms of their physical appearance 
and geographical positioning, but have also co-opted participation from local 
people who have encountered them and have shared knowledge about the 
programme, transmission, risk, and signs and symptoms of HAT through 
their social networks.  
 
5) HAT control is comprised of a fragile assemblage of local socio-
technical ecosystems, and introducing new technologies into these 
landscape disrupts and transforms them in unpredictable ways. 
Technologies are often conceived as though they will be introduced into 
static systems comprised of a passive network of actors (‘communities’). But 
tracing their implementation shows that this is rarely the case. HAT patients 
or suspects for example do not navigate the same imagined landscapes as 
HAT programmes envisage, and do not behave as their models presume. 
RDTs have impacted on laboratory HAT diagnostic practice, while discordant 
test results between HAT RDTs and microscopies affect trust in health 
workers referral structures. Elsewhere, negative experiences of large-scale 
vertical interventions such as the Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness campaign 
can leave negative feelings and intervention fatigue among populations and 
affect the uptake of livestock spraying. Populations are not passive recipients 






Given the different epidemiological profiles and challenges posed by the two 
strains of HAT in Uganda, I conducted this research in two main sites in 
Uganda to understand how the various components of HAT control work 
together in each. In the West Nile, the elimination context requires that 
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intervention efforts focus on detecting very few cases. The region is endemic 
for mainly the human strain of HAT, thus my investigations focused on case 
detection and vector control. In central northern Uganda, there were many 
more cases and an animal reservoir to take into consideration, and so my 
investigations focused not only on the above, but also treatment (and post-
treatment follow-up) as well as tending to the connections and 
entanglements with the animal health system (regarding both disease 
surveillance and vector control).  
 
 
An enhanced RDT-based passive surveillance strategy  
 
The first half of this thesis describes the conditions whereby HAT can be 
‘seen’ by biomedicine and opened-up to clinical and epidemiological 
intervention, and more prominently, the ways in which it evades surveillance 
as bodies remain opaque to biomedical inquiry. This first chapter describes 
how HAT is diagnosed at the point of care, and the extent to which diagnostic 
devices form part of this performance, examining the implementation and use 
of Rapid Diagnostic Tests to passively screen for T.b. gambiense HAT. This 
is explored via two avenues of surveillance breakdown. The first concerns 
the challenges of detecting and identifying HAT cases in the first instance 
(i.e. symptomatic patients being found and recognised as a syndromic or 
serological ‘suspects’). The second concerns the retention of suspected 
cases in referral until they are confirmed as a ‘true’ case through 
parasitological demonstration and molecular confirmation, or until they are no 
longer seropositive. A key challenge facing HAT control programmes and the 
prospect of elimination is case detection, a problem frequently owed to the 
similarity of symptoms to other endemic febrile illnesses and poor laboratory 
capacity at the primary healthcare level. 
 
As HAT is pushed toward elimination, passive detection will become an 
increasingly important part of control strategies of gambiense HAT, yet it has 
received relatively little attention in the study of HAT epidemiology (Checchi 
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et al, 2018). The coverage of passive surveillance relies heavily on potential 
cases being recognised at the community level, and whether patients are 
referred to HAT treatment centres by other health facilities and are able to 
spontaneously present to them. Potential barriers may arise at each of these 
steps, however published evidence on these barriers are largely absent, with 
the exception of studies from western Democratic Republic of Congo and 
neighbouring Republic of Congo (ibid). This thesis contributes important 
evidence to this literature, by describing some of the structural and financial 
barriers that also feature prominently in treatment seeking decisions. 
 
A new RDT introduced across peripheral (level II and III) facilities purports to 
close the gap in laboratory infrastructure by allowing health workers to easily 
test for HAT on suspicion of symptoms where tests for malaria are negative. 
This chapter presents findings from a patient-based study I conducted on 
referral non-completion among RDT-positive serological suspects in the 
West Nile region of north western Uganda. Here, HAT is traced along the 
treatment seeking pathways of seropositive suspects as they navigate the 
new RDT-based passive surveillance and referral system. Vignettes from 
mobile screening and microscopy examination focus on the moments leading 
up to diagnosis as the starting point of this enquiry, before HAT is re-
inscribed as a biological entity by diagnostic technologies. Interviews with 
serological suspects in the West Nile reveal the collective memories of past 
control campaigns, which for a long time were “the most visual expression of 
the state” (Lachenal, 2017:7) and their legacy in the present day elimination 
setting on HAT awareness and perceptions of risk (Kovacic et al., 2016). 
These describe the diagnostic landscape and pathways to treatment 
navigated before being tested; from self-treatment and religious prayer, to 
consulting informal health providers such as drugs shops and natural 
herbalists, and how the social proximity of these practices and services 
influence these choices. These highlight the multiple ontologies and ways in 




From this point of detection, the chapter then goes on to consider the 
relational position of rapid diagnostic tests in the HAT assemblage as it 
positions the body, or ‘case’ within the referral apparatus that must be 
repeatedly enacted through diagnostic alignment (between symptoms, RDT, 
microscopy, LAMP, lumbar puncture etc.) through follow-up to sustain the 
stability of the surveillance network (Law and Singleton, 2014). Confirmed 
case detection beyond seropositive suspects remains elusive as a small but 
significant proportion of RDT-positive cases do not attend follow-up 
examinations or complete referral, thus destabilising this network. 
Testimonies highlight multiple socio-economic challenges to attending follow-
up; financial costs, limited access to transport, difficulties in getting social 
support and hospital care. It also reveals how receiving discordant results 
between testing positive by RDT and negative by microscopy can have 
detrimental effects on trust in health workers expertise and a case 
management system that expects suspects to return for repeated follow-ups 
with no prospect of treatment or alternative diagnosis. These occurrences 
destabilise the fragile assemblage of HAT management, and highlight the 
importance of patient-health worker relationships, communication, while 
managing expectations and uncertainty at the point of testing.  
 
This chapter argues that far from simplifying diagnosis, introducing new 
technologies can destabilise local ecologies of testing (Umlauf, 2017) with 
potentially iatrogenic effects on the health system. It shows how RDTs are 
ultimately social objects, entangled and embedded in social practices, and 
argues that the agency of diagnostic technologies is determined not only by 
their physical accessibility in terms of mobility and cost, but also by their 
social proximity to target populations and the diagnostic cultures that govern 
their positionality within local ecologies. Furthermore, I argue that RDTs are 
paradoxical, in that they fail to solve the problem that they claim to; namely 
eliminating the need for a laboratory, requiring corroboration and 
legitimisation from more sophisticated tools and laboratory infrastructures. 
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This raises questions of ‘where’ exactly diagnosis occurs in the structural 
apparatus of surveillance, and queries the concept of ‘infrastructure’, which I 
turn to in the following chapter. 
 
Work from this chapter on integrating the RDT-based referral system into the 
Ugandan gambiense HAT elimination programme has been published in the 
journal Infectious Diseases of Poverty (Lee and Palmer, 2018). 
 
Re-imaging the laboratory and infrastructures of surveillance 
 
From detecting HAT in the community using RDTs, this chapter shifts to 
where HAT is brought into the clinic and ‘counted’ using the ‘gold standard’ 
microscopy (Umlauf and Beisel, 2016), and characterises the material 
spaces, or ‘infrastructures of surveillance’ as I describe them, in which HAT 
is brought in from the natural world and re-constituted through diagnostic 
enactments. This chapter draws on testimonies from health workers to 
establish what defines the clinical space, and how this is understood in terms 
of infrastructure. This departs from the trope of infrastructural systems being 
tightly bound to modernist notions of progress and development (Smith, 
2009). Instead analysis will expand on Paul Farmer’s ‘staff, stuff, space, and 
systems’ interpretation (2014), by conceptualising the Ugandan clinic in 
terms of complex and complicated infrastructures as described by Harvey et 
al. (2016). 
 
This chapter also moves from the T.b. gambiense elimination setting, to a 
region where zoonotic T.b. rhodesiense is reportedly spreading. While 
different in their epidemiological profiles, case detection remains challenging 
for both strains of HAT for different reasons. Here, HAT is new and 
unanticipated. Drawing on survey and interview data collected from 13 health 
centres across the Teso sub-region, this chapter documents how biomedical 
practitioners in Uganda’s health facilities struggle amid severe resource 
shortages to make the HAT infected body visible and knowable to the clinical 
gaze. This struggle is entangled with attempts to negotiate access to 
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resources in order to make themselves more visible to others in positons of 
power—to clinicians, scientists, politicians, and international organisations or 
control programmes (Street, 2014).  
 
At the beginning of this chapter we meet Serena, a clinician working in 
Dokolo Health Centre IV, one of two treatment centres operating in the 
region. Her struggle to keep the HAT network stable demonstrates the 
difficult circumstances health workers face to make HAT policy work on the 
ground. Here there are few staff, little training, and no one to support or 
replace Serena when she’s called away, preventing her from leaving to 
further her studies and medical career. Her experience highlights the 
precarity of the HAT assemblage, made up of informal connections between 
people like Serena and Frederick (a local veterinarian), who keep each other 
informed on human and animal trypanosomiasis cases in the region. The 
poor communication between lower health facilities with larger regional 
hospitals or district veterinary services means information is not shared, and 
this fragile assemblage relies on the continual communication and 
performance of an informal network of actors in order to function. Here, the 
‘one health’ network breaks down, with a disconnection between national and 
local policy, and between district departments where there is no formalised 
systems of sharing and reporting information between health, veterinary, or 
entomological departments or personnel locally.  
 
This is a place where many health centre laboratories are well equipped with 
working microscopes, but few have trained staff to operate them. Few have 
received any form of formal training for identifying or dealing with HAT cases 
in fact, and even where staff are trained, few feel they have time or 
confidence to perform microscopies for HAT, and are uncertain whether 
suspect referrals should be followed up or reported beyond the district level. 
While no RDT is currently available to screen for rhodesiense HAT, this is 
also a place where the introduction of RDTs for other endemic diseases such 
as malaria have nevertheless impacted drastically on the HAT diagnostic 
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ecosystem, by reducing performance of microscopies and thus weakening 
passive HAT case detection for T.b. rhodesiense. Malaria RDTs have 
created a diagnostic ecosystem whereby microscopy is now rarely 
performed, thus case detection for rhodesiense HAT is dependent on the 
suspicion index of trained health workers and referral to high level treatment 
centres in Lwala, Dokolo or Lira. Here there is no history of epidemics or 
active screening, and thus no lasting awareness among the community. Few 
health workers regard HAT to be a problem in the region but acknowledge 
that data on this could be skewed due to low microscopy performance. 
Surveillance relies on the awareness and training of health workers, and the 
resources to act on clinical suspicion where potential cases present 
themselves to the clinic. Under-staffing and high turnover of staff and 
infrequent or limited training has resulted in a lower index of suspicion among 
health workers and likelihood of microscopy being performed. These 
testimonies draw attention to the flaws of passive surveillance as in the 
previous chapter, where the implications of this in a setting where HAT may 
be spreading into new territories are significant.  
 
Through enactments of HAT diagnosis, hospital infrastructures emerge as 
relational assemblages that, while on the whole appear large and monolithic, 
remain fundamentally fragile. The testimonies of health staff offer a different 
perspective of the diagnostic ecosystem to that described by the algorithms 
mapped out by the national control programme (see Wamboga et al, 2017); 
One that encounters the restraints of a decentralised healthcare system, the 
demands of target driven vertical programmes, and struggles of delivering 
care with little resources or structural support. Decentralisation of the health 
system has put HAT on a low priority setting for districts where it is not 
perceived to be a risk, therefore little training or resources are mobilised to 
these areas. Many wish their facilities to be upgraded to a higher-level to 
receive more resources and support for the district.  Here, the presence of 
material diagnostic technologies such as microscopes however does not 
infer increased capacity for case-detection, where lack of staff (or lack of 
 24 
training), and diagnostic cultures introduced by RDTs create disincentives to 
perform microscopy and find cases in frontline peripheral health facilities. 
 
Given the emphasis on case detection as the primary challenge in 
contemporary HAT control efforts, it is reasonable to assume that once a 
case is correctly identified and diagnosed, that treatment and discharge is a 
relatively straightforward and stable process. However, as the following 
chapter illustrates, this too is a fragile and complex part of the HAT 
ecosystem subject to disruption from new technologies. 
 
 
Treatment experiences and managing expectations of Fexinidazole  
 
While remaining in the clinical space, this chapter shifts from HAT 
surveillance to management. Here, patients have been re-configured from 
suspects to confirmed cases through the alignment of diagnostic practices 
(parasitological and molecular demonstration) (Mol, 2003; Law and 
Singleton, 2014; Street, 2014). The infected body is transformed and 
subjected to biomedical intervention with drugs and monitored thereafter to 
confirm the success of treatment. This monitoring requires patients who have 
been discharged to return for quarterly follow-up tests, however patient 
experiences during treatment and logistical challenges have rendered this 
impractical to the point of being recently removed from clinical guidelines.  
This chapter draws on data from a referral non-completion study I conducted 
among treated T.b. rhodesiense patients discharged from Lwala and Dokolo 
treatment centres, and explores the social, economic, logistical, and material 
challenges of treatment, including completing post-treatment follow-up. It 
reveals the financial and social strains of long periods of hospital admission 
required for current HAT treatment, and asks how potential novel oral drug 
regimens could alter and potentially disrupt this landscape. Combining 
testimonies from patients and health workers, this study reveals the fragility 
of the HAT assemblage, and raises questions over how the introduction of 
new drugs could further destabilise the referral ecosystem. 
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Early in this chapter Serena laments losing patients to follow-up and not 
being able to achieve ‘clinical closure’ on these cases who ‘drop off the 
radar’. Findings from my patient interviews go on to reveal the treatment 
seeking pathways that bring syndromic patients into contact with informal 
healthcare providers before going to hospital. They also describe the socio-
economic challenges of being admitted to hospital for treatment, as well as 
attending follow-up after being discharged. This included financial barriers, 
access to transport, arranging social support and hospital care for the 
duration of admission. Other reasons for not returning for post-treatment 
follow-up included fear of the lumbar puncture procedure, and a lack of 
urgency due to a recession of symptoms since treatment. While it is now 
recommended that patients need not return for follow up in the absence of 
symptoms, Serena expressed the environment of uncertainty this creates 
where known unknowns hang over her. This poses similar dilemmas for 
health workers trying to reconcile epidemiological certainty with clinical 
pragmatism in the passive surveillance system. Interviews with historically-
treated patients highlight the recent challenges patients have engaging with 
the programme for post-treatment follow-up. This is a unique contribution to 
the HAT literature, where the majority of studies focus on explaining delays 
until case detection, and echoes themes raised in the first empirical chapter. 
 
In this chapter we also meet David, a T.b. rhodesiense HAT inpatient at 
Dokolo HC IV. Whilst observing his treatment, Dr Akello (Serena) describes 
the procedure and discusses the negative side-effects of melarsoprol, but 
also the difficulties patients face in being admitted to hospital for long 
periods, even for early-stage Suramin treatment such as David’s. 
This foregrounds my inquiry into expectations and perceptions of a 
prospective oral treatment (i.e. Fexinidazole) that can be taken from home. 
Material from this sub-study and health worker interviews which also 
explored attitudes toward potential oral treatment for HAT suggest some 
interesting considerations for the introduction of Fexinidazole for early stage 
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HAT patients; long distances and time away from home makes admission to 
hospital problematic for most patients, however concern about home-
treatment with oral drugs is shared between patients and health workers 
alike. Also, concerns over the seriousness of HAT and the need for 
continuous clinical observation and monitoring raised concerns over 
treatment adherence and suggestions that an observed treatment protocol 
(similar to TB DOTS) could be observed, but there were reservations over 
this too. Furthermore, some concerns were raised by patients over whether 
they can administer their own treatment properly, as well as feeling brushed 
off by health workers, thus preferring to be kept in hospital and ‘seen’ by the 
doctor throughout this period of crisis and uncertainty.  
 
This chapter corroborates earlier arguments, that the landscapes of care 
imagined by the HAT programme are different to those navigated by patients. 
Many patients do not present at health centres for a long time, often after 
infection has progressed to late stage. It also suggests that introducing new 
drugs may address many problems with current case management, 
particularly if they can be administered without need for lumbar puncture, a 
painful procedure which deterred many patients from returning for follow-up. 
However, the introduction of Fexinidazole into the therapeutic assemblage 
will likely be disruptive in other ways in terms of how different types of 
treatments are perceived (i.e. between oral and injection administration), and 
how existing home-based drug taking practices may affect the safety and 
adherence of a new HAT drug.  
 
 
Tiny Targets and community spraying: breaking the chain of 
transmission through sustainable vector control strategies 
 
This chapter presents my final empirical case study on the communities 
involved in implementation of two tsetse control interventions; small 
insecticide impregnated nets called ‘Tiny Targets’, and mobile community 
sprayers, which have been implemented at scale in the West Nile, and Teso 
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and Lango sub-regions of Uganda respectively. Qualitative data was 
compiled from in-depth interviews with entomologists, veterinarians, and 
community animal health workers, community focus group discussions with 
smallholder subsistence farmers, alongside responses from interviews with 
HAT patients from my previous sub-studies (20 T.b. gambiense seropositive 
suspects and 25 T.b. rhodesiense treated survivors). These explored 
knowledge and awareness of HAT and transmission; local history and 
perspectives of tsetse control amid other human and animal health priorities; 
the definition of and collaboration between key stakeholders; and prospects 
of programme sustainability. 
 
The first half of the chapter draws on ethnographic material from a mass 
cattle treatment campaign, discussing the use of drugs to clear the parasite 
in the cattle reservoir and restricted application of pyrethroid spraying during 
a feasibility trial in 2014 for a proposed third phase of the Stamp Out 
Sleeping Sickness (‘SOS’) programme. This describes the style and 
approach of the vertical SOS programme (large, militarised in its organisation 
and implementation, technology and data-driven). Sweeping through rural 
communities with large ‘brigades’ while leaving little capacity or incentives to 
continue interventions after withdrawal meant few local farmers took up the 
regular spraying required to sustain the campaigns gains, beyond the 
lifespan of the intervention’s implementation phase. This helps to explain why 
previous phases of the SOS programme failed to capitalise on early gains 
and sustain prevalence reduction in the long-term.  
 
This foregrounds findings from a sub-study on the 3V vets and mobile spray 
networks that grew out of SOS in a bid to build a more socially embedded 
intervention on the animal reservoir of HAT. Here we follow Dr Frederick 
Odongo and two of his mobile sprayers as they mobilise their communities 
for spray days, describing the local village spray network system and how it 
has come to provide services to the community beyond the remit of 
preventing HAT through spraying. 
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This is presented alongside data collected during focus group discussions 
with local farmers, some of which have experienced T.b. rhodesiense 
outbreaks and large-scale responses (Dokolo, Kaberamaido) and some 
which have only recently been affected by cases (Lira, Alebtong, Kole). This 
sub-study explores the agency of intervention target populations, such as the 
prioritisation of diseases of concern for farmers, spraying and treatment 
practices of livestock, and how these are shaped by local knowledge and 
awareness of human and animal trypanosomiasis.  
 
The end of this chapter, and the last of my empirical material, ends where 
this journey began; with the Tiny Targets programme in the West Nile. It 
gives a detailed ethnographic account of target deployment in the field, and 
tsetse dissection in the lab. It describes how Tiny Targets were designed and 
field tested by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM) in localised 
settings and adapted throughout scale-up with co-operation of local 
communities as part of an anthropologically-informed, women-led vector 
control programme. This involved ownership and participation from local 
communities from the outset, establishing a socially embedded technological 
intervention. Data from my RDT referral study in the same region also 
revealed local perceptions of risk and awareness of HAT directly associated 
with the visibility of the Tiny Targets programme. Meanwhile, interviews with 
local district entomologists and entomology assistants showed there had 
been some mismatched priorities and expectations between district staff and 
the vertical programmes in terms of what data is useful and how it should be 
used. However, it also showed how transparency and inclusion with local 
district staff had facilitated a smooth transition period from a vertical to 
national programme. 
 
Finally, the findings also corroborate those of previous chapters and shows 
that despite successful national and international commitments to one health 
partnerships, collaboration between veterinary, entomological, and public 
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health staff at the district level is limited. Many local entomological assistants 
and Community Animal Health Workers claimed to feel overlooked as key 
stakeholders or important sources of knowledge by national control 
programmes but felt empowered by vertical projects like 3V vets and the 
resources and training they provided. Decentralised and under-resourced 
district offices often struggle to maintain operational cohesion, as a 
precarious assemblage of entomologists, veterinarians, and community 
animal health workers endeavour to align vertical programmes with fragile 
and fragmented control networks. Based on these findings, I make the 
argument that ‘community’ participation should expand to engaging 
implementation staff, whose agency is often overlooked as gatekeepers of 
local knowledge and trust. 
 
This final chapter finely illustrates some of the key tenets of this thesis; that 
technologies do not exist and operate in a vacuum, nor do they work on a 
passive static ecosystem. They are part of a dynamic HAT assemblage and 
rely on the interaction and agency of the population they are intervening on 
to adopt and continue to use them. They can be used as tools for advocacy, 
as highly visible and socially embedded interventions promote awareness 
and understandings of HAT among local populations. Conversely, relatively 
high tech but aloof interventions which shift responsibility of referral, or 
treatment, or of preventative spraying, onto poor communities in subsistence 
societies is evidently problematic. Introducing technologies and expecting 
vulnerable communities to continue their implementation long after with their 
own resources does little to promote trust or incentive and is potentially 
damaging to communities and health systems. Thus, while modest and 
incremental, locally adapted interventions which are more socially proximate 
and integrated with ‘local ecologies’ achieve greater sustainability than some 
of their more elaborate predecessors, as they take on, and persist through, 










































As a group, the Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) are not universally 
defined. The journal PLoS NTDs lists over 45 diseases, The Roadmap for 
Elimination gives 10, while the WHO lists 17 – which are split into "tool 
ready" and "tool deficient" NTDs (Fürst et al., 2017). Tool ready NTDs are 
generally subject to large scale, inexpensive donations of safe, single dose 
drugs with no need for individual diagnosis. For these reasons they are very 
attractive to donors, as “big bang for the development buck” (Cotton, 2014) 
can be achieved by mass treating NTDs like Schistosomiasis, Soil 
Transmitted Helminths, Onchocerciasis, Trachoma, and Lymphatic Filariasis 
(Vogel, 2006). 
 
Tool deficient NTDs on the other hand are complex and difficult (or costly) to 
diagnose or treat. They may involve several epidemiological factors, true for 
many vector-borne diseases such as HAT, which require more cross-cutting 
strategic approaches, requiring more sophisticated laboratory and hospital 
infrastructures, or zoonotic diseases (such as HAT) which must also address 
the animal reservoir. These NTDs are less attractive to donors as there is 
greater expense and risk involved, which has led to new kinds of financing 
models, such as Development Impact Bonds (DIBs), being devised to 
encourage donor investment (Welburn et al. 2016). 
 
Epidemiologically and socially, NTDs share some characteristics; they cause 
life-long disabilities, affect the most poor and rural populations, mostly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and are therefore widely underreported. More notably, 
NTDs are a product of lobbying, advocacy, and policy framing. Thus it is 
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important to think critically about the ways in which NTDs like HAT are 
framed politically and economically, as well as epidemiologically, when 
considering the global public health policy agendas, and how control and 
elimination programmes are designed and financed (Dry and Leach, 2010; 




Institutional architectures of contemporary HAT control in Uganda 
Despite extensive research into the biology of the trypanosome, barriers to 
achieving the prized goal of elimination up to now have been blamed on an 
“extremely small” diagnostic and treatment toolbox “plagued with difficulties” 
(Franco et al., 2014). By the beginning of the twenty-first century, decades of 
neglect had led to alarming numbers of reported new cases of HAT across 
Sub Saharan Africa, with an estimated 300,000 people infected. The 
resurgence of the disease was considered a public health calamity, and 
through an ambitious campaign led by WHO, many NGOs, and a public–
private partnership with Sanofi-Aventis and Bayer that donate the necessary 
drugs for distribution in affected countries this trend was successfully 
reversed (WHO, 2013). The global incidence of T.b. gambiense HAT had 
reduced to less than 3,000 cases in 2015. Based on this success, there are 
now plans to eliminate Gambiense HAT as a public health problem by 2020 
(Aksoy et al., 2017).  
 
Today, owing to its low caseload Uganda is deemed capable of managing its 
HAT programme without the need for external assistance, yet until recently 
this was not always the case. Initially entering the country to address a public 
health ‘emergency’ during a T.b. gambiense HAT epidemic that broke out in 
the late 1980s, the humanitarian NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
maintained an intermittent presence in the country over the course of two 
field missions to prevent an emergency of such proportions arising again by 
conductingactive active screening and treatment on a mass scale. Two MSF 
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branches assisted Uganda over the course of two field missions: MSF 
France (1986 - 2002) and MSF Spain (2010 – 2011). The NGO withdrew in 
July 2011 owing to low case numbers which made their presence in Uganda 
low “value for money” for donors (Smith et al., 2015: 16). Since then active 
screening has been replaced by an ‘enhanced passive surveillance system’ 
which relies on point of care rapid diagnostic tests in primary healthcare 
facilities (Wamboga et al, 2017). 
 
Meanwhile, between 1985 and 2005 the area of southeast Uganda affected 
by T. b. rhodesiense HAT increased 2.5 times (Smith et al., 2015). By 2005, 
the two forms of HAT were only 150 km apart, described alarmingly at the 
time as a “thin line between two fatal diseases” (Picozzi et al., 2005: 1238), 
thus posing a significant human and animal health concern requiring 
immediate intervention on the zoonotic reservoir. The Stamp out Sleeping 
Sickness (SOS) mass treatment of cattle campaign initiated in 2006 involved 
multiple public and private partners and, though initially successful, has since 
battled to ensure treatments are continued to the level required to sustain 
impact. Poor access to veterinary drugs and services to support the spraying 
and treatments have hampered the lifespan of the project beyond the 
intervention phase since shifting from a free treatment to a fee-paying model 
which underestimated the perceived value of the intervention and purchasing 
power of individual small-hold farmers in Uganda (Smith et al., 2015). 
 
Recent epidemics and the emergency narratives built around them have 
mobilized financial resources toward more applied research and the 
development of “new knowledge on parasite and tsetse vector physiology, 
genetics, and genomics and expanded the prospects for translational science 
for sustainable HAT control” (Aksoy et al., 2017: 2). Funds have also been 
provided to WHO to support national sleeping sickness control programmes 




National Coordination: COCTU and the ISSEP 
In Uganda the control of African Trypanosomiasis (AT) is overseen by the 
Coordinating Office for Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (COCTU), the 
statutory body and secretariat for control and research into Trypanosomiasis 
established by an Act of Parliament in 1992. Based in Uganda’s capital 
Kampala but seated within the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and 
Fisheries (MAAIF) (which is based in Entebbe), with a small team of just 
three technical staff, COCTU’s mandate is to coordinate the activities of all 
involved government departments, donors and non-governmental 
organisations, but has no direct role in implementation.  
 
MAAIF’s mandate includes regulating cattle movements and providing 
guidance on Animal African Trypanosomiasis (AAT) treatment. However, the 
out-dated nature of this legislation (which dates from 1918) coupled with the 
effects of decentralisation (discussed further below) mean that the state’s 
ability to directly control AAT is minimal. The day-to-day control of AAT in 
Uganda therefore is managed with a small budget by a handful of dedicated, 
centrally-based staff apportioned salaries to co-ordinate a country-wide 
programme. Consequently, the responsibility for AAT is otherwise on 
Uganda’s system of decentralised local government to implement control and 
surveillance activities, and private farmers even though evidence suggests 
that livestock owners are often unable to diagnose and treat AAT effectively 
(Welburn et al., 2006). Capacity of these local actors to carry out their roles 
has however been constrained by competing demands on district budgets, 
and the low prioritisation placed on AAT. 
 
The implementation of HAT control on the other hand falls under the remit of 
the National Control Programme within the Ministry of Health called the 
Intensified Sleeping Sickness Elimination Programme (ISSEP) at the time of 
study, consisting centrally of a single a programme manager. In keeping with 
the country's current policy of passive surveillance, Uganda has no 
surveillance staff in the field. The treatment of HAT is managed through 
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Uganda's decentralised healthcare delivery system, which, when HAT cases 
are positively diagnosed, issues free drugs donated through a WHO donation 
scheme (Smith et al., 215). The Ministry of Health has set up free HAT 
treatment at a number of health centres and hospitals in endemic areas 
(including Omugo hospital in Arua, Lwala hospital in Kamberamaido, and 
Dokolo HCIV in Dokolo where research for this study predominantly took 
place), 
 
The mobilisation of ‘emergency’ responses to HAT outbreaks, as 
demonstrated by vertical MSF and SOS campaigns typifies the brand of 
‘humantiarian biomedicine’ (Lakoff, 2010) that has come to characterise the 
international global heath community’s approach to the control of NTDs like 
HAT since the public health arms of colonial administrations have ended. In 
its place, resource flows of technical interventions which aim to target 
neglected populations and “avoid political entanglement” (ibid: 67) have 
taken shape as a global ‘One Health’ assemblage (Ong and Collier, 2005; 
Smith et al. 2015). As the main body of this thesis sets out through empirical 
examples, circumventing state political structures has also had the effect of 
“hollowing out” state capacity to manage disease control programmes locally 
(Madon et al, 2017) and prevented the kinds of entanglements necessary to 
operationalise One Health beyond academic discourse and partnership 
models (Smith et al., 2015). The resulting disconnects between these 
contemporary technological solutions and the people who need them is the 
focus of this thesis. 
 
 
Investigating Networks of Zoonosis Innovation 
My PhD research has been conducted as part of a five-year interdisciplinary 
European Research Council funded project called Investigating Networks of 
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Zoonosis Innovation (INZI)1.  The €1.7 million award involved collaboration 
across Veterinary Medicine, STIS, and African Studies departments at the 
University of Edinburgh. INZI proposed to analyse the complex interplay of 
actors, policies and projects that have shaped the research and control of 
Human African Trypanosomiasis to the present day.Previous work by INZI 
members on Trypanosomiasis in Uganda has included work on the global 
and domestic policy processes influencing control (Okello, Welburn and 
Smith, 2015) and the importance of a central domestic coordinating body 
(such as the Coordinating Office for Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda, 
COCTU) to negotiate these policy processes (Smith, Taylor and Kingsley, 
2015). It has also included consultancy work for the Foundation for 
Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND) in partnership with the Ministry of Health 
in Uganda to better understand and solve problems associated with the 
Intensified Sleeping Sickness Elimination Project (ISSEP) (Palmer, Robert 
and Kansiime, 2017).  
 
By systematically analysing the evolution of these international networks, and 
their national and local implementation and implications, the INZI project 
contributes to growing explorations of the relationship between science and 
development to build our understanding of how science can work better for 
development, using the example of HAT as a case study. This thesis takes 
forward research to empirically describe and examine a different part of the 
science/development relationship concerning HAT in Uganda: the 
implementation of technological global health interventions for HAT control 
and elimination, and the implications of how this plays out in the landscape of 
an under-resourced and pluralistic healthcare system. 
 
 
                                                 




The Ugandan State Healthcare System  
 
In the 1990s, the Ugandan government undertook major reforms designed to 
decentralise state activities, especially service delivery and governance, with 
wide-ranging consequences for local health and veterinary services (Smith, 
Taylor, and Kingsley, 2014). In 1995 the constitution was amended and the 
1997 Local Government Act delegated decision making to the district level. 
These reforms had wide-ranging consequences, including the neglect of 
‘soft’ services such as appropriate advice on agricultural technologies to the 
rural poor. Many officials argued that decentralisation had been key in 
degrading rural veterinary and pest control capacity. For healthcare, this 
meant that local authorities were able to plan, budget and implement their 
own health agendas. As such, the district health service could recruit their 
own staff and manage their own resources. With the majority of funds 
distributed to districts earmarked by donors and the Ministry of Health for 
specific uses however, decentralisation introduced its own set of obstacles to 
service provision. Consequently, unbudgeted and unforeseen disease 
outbreaks have often not been addressed owing to local systems being 
limited to static healthcare delivery (Acup, 2013; 2017). 
 
At the time of study, Uganda’s health system was comprised of decentralised 
healthcare services, overseen by district health teams across 112 districts 
and the central ministry of health.2 The decentralised district is the local level 
of decision-making for health services delivery, including the planning and 
implementation of human resources for health policies, budgeting for 
medicines, supplies, sundries, and infrastructural capacities such as 
electricity and water. District health teams and their managers are led by a 
District Health Officer (DHO) alongside other district departments and report 
to the Chief Administrative Officer. These technical departments are 
governed by the political arm of government headed by the Local Council 
                                                 
2  Mnistry of Local Government. List of Local Government Districts. Secondary List of Local 
Government Districts 2013. http://www.molg.go.ug/local-governments 
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chairperson, assisted by District Councillors. Each district has sub-districts, 
which are lower-levels of policy-making and monitoring of health services at 
the sub-county levels. 
 
Ugandan health facilities are graded at different levels depending upon the 
administrative zones that they serve and their capacity to deal with certain 
admissions. Each district often has a General Hospital, and referral level 
Health Centre IVs at the health sub-districts. Each Health Centre IV at the 
health sub-district supervises a number of Health Centre IIIs, which often 
have maternal health services in addition to ambulatory care. Below the 
Health Centre IIIs are dispensaries labelled Health Centre IIs. At the 
community level, are Village Health Teams who provide day-to-day referral of 
patients from the community.  
 
In Uganda’s rural settings, most healthcare services are provided by the 
public and the private not-for-profit sector, the latter involving mainly faith-
based organisations. Service delivery focuses on a defined minimum 
package of care which is delivered through a network of health units and a 
referral system. However, making the country’s health system functional in 
order to provide modern health services remains a challenge. Human 
resource problems impact on service delivery, with a health worker to 
population ratio of 1.49 core health workers per 1000 population, which is still 
the WHO recommended minimum of 2.3 health workers per 1000 population. 
While the Ugandan government has steadily increased its budget allocation 
of funds to the health sector, it still allocates less than 10% of its budget to 
health care. Meanwhile, private out-of-pocket expenditure on health is still 
high, and most donor aid is not harmonised and aligned to the sector plan 
and is managed off-budget (African Health Observatory, 2018). 
 
Even at relatively stable periods where the health service needs are relatively 
foreseeable, the distribution and frequency of funds and resources delivered 
to primary health care facilities is regularly cited as an on-going challenge to 
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delivering adequate care at the local level. Widespread disparities in the 
budgetary system have led to the ‘re-prioritising and re-rationing’ of available 
funds (Ssengooba, 2004), and health systems continue to struggle in 
epidemic situations where healthcare provision is limited to midwives or 




Tracing Trypanosomiasis: the lifecycle and epidemiology of HAT 
 
Human African Trypanosomiasis is the human form of the vector-borne 
disease caused by the protozoan trypanosoma brucei parasite. Human 
infective trypanosomes are transmitted, much like Animal African 
Trypansomasis (AAT), by the Glossina tsetse fly via an infected bite (figure 
1). Around 70 million people are estimated to be at risk (Cecchi et al, 2014), 
and rural populations living in regions where transmission occurs, and which 
depend on agriculture, fishing, animal husbandry or hunting are the most 
exposed to the tsetse fly and therefore to the disease. HAT is highly focal, 
developing in areas ranging from a single village to an entire region, and 
within an infected area the intensity of the disease can vary from one village 
to the next (WHO, 2014a). The remote geography of HAT foci is reflected in 
another name for HAT in Francophone Africa, ‘la maladie au bout de la piste’ 
(Riolon, 2017), which translates as ‘the sickness at the end of the track’ 
(Regnier, 2017). 
 
HAT is not a single disease but refers to two strains that present with distinct 
clinical features. Trypanosoma brucei gambiense (T.b. gambiense, 
Gambiense HAT, or gHAT) is the subspecies predominantly prevalent in the 
west and central regions of Sub-Saharan Africa that causes chronic sleeping 
sickness - its onset being notably gradual and asymptomatic in some cases. 
Gambiense HAT is transmitted between humans and therefore has a 
markedly different lifecycle and epidemiology to that of the zoonotic (a 
disease that exists in animals but can be transmitted to humans) T. b. 
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rhodesiense (Rhodesiense HAT, or rHAT), which is most commonly carried 
by cattle. The zoonotic nature of T. b. rhodesiense necessitates that control 
strategies should not focus solely upon the human host, as the disease will 
remain endemic within the animal reservoir, and therefore it is vital that any 




Figure 1: Lifecycle of Human African Trypanosomiasis.  
(Centre for Disease Control and Prevention) 
 
 
In addition to these human infective strains, cattle are also susceptible to 
strains (T. vivax, T. congolense, and T. brucei brucei ) of Animal African 
Trypanosomiasis (AAT). AAT has a profound economic impact on domestic 
livestock, with adverse effects of the disease rendering animals visibly 
weakened, depreciating their value significantly (Selby, 2011). While many 
farmers may largely be unable to identify the cause of symptoms to be AAT 
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in their livestock, upon noticing the deterioration in the physical condition of 
an infected animal, owners of domesticated animals will infer diagnosis and 
treatment based upon symptom identification, rather than clinical laboratory 
diagnosis (Maudlin et al. 2006). Drugs are then supposed to be administered 
by a locally operating veterinarian or animal health worker, though these are 
not always available (Miller, 2017). 
 
In Uganda the ‘tsetse belt’ runs from the highlands in south-eastern Uganda 
across Lake Kyoga to north-western Uganda and at least 70% of the entire 
country is thought to be infested with tsetse flies (COCTU, 2013). Following 
changes in land use, increases in human density, and a reduction in the 
wildlife population, Ugandan cattle are now considered the primary host of T. 
b. rhodesiense HAT (Holt et al, 2016). The distribution of T. b. rhodesiense in 
Uganda has increased dramatically in the past 10 years, with outbreaks 
being attributed to the restocking of infected cattle into naïve areas following 
military conflict in the late 1990’s (Selby et al. 2013). Since then, acute HAT 
has spread northwards to previously unaffected districts of Uganda (see 




Figure 2: Map of Uganda showing the location of newly T.b. rhodesiense affected districts.  
Purple area encompasses district boundaries for Lira, Kole, and Alebtong districts as of 2010. (from 
von Wissmann et al, 2014). 
 
Human infection with the T. b. rhodesiense strain, which affects the eastern 
regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and predominantly southeastern region of 
Uganda (see figure 4), causes the acute form of sleeping sickness. Where 
the chronic form caused by T.b gambiense HAT takes a long period of time 
before the onset of clinical symptoms, rhodesiense HAT has a very rapid 
progression to severe disease, with 80% of deaths occurring within six 
months (Welburn et al., 2001). Because of this rapid onset of severe 
pathogenesis, the early symptoms of acute rhodesiense HAT are rarely 
detected, particularly as many medical professionals are not trained to look 
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for and recognise these. As a result, the early signs are often confused with 
other endemic diseases in the area, such as Malaria, Tuberculosis, or HIV 
infection (Maudlin et al., 2009).   
 
 
Diagnosis and case management 
 
HAT is initially diagnosed by recognising a patient’s clinical symptoms. 
Owing to the very low parasitaemia of T. b. gambiense in infected human 
hosts, initial serological screening (which detects humoral responses 
suggestive of infection) in Gambian areas has for many years been carried 
out using a card-agglutination test (CATT), with positive individuals being 
later confirmed through parasitological analysis and diagnosis by microscopy 
(Chappuis, et al. 2004). Since the development of rapid diagnostic tests, 
serological screening using these point of care devices is moving to replace 
CATT as the norm. Infection is then confirmed by observing the presence of 
parasites either within the blood, lymph, or in the case of late stages of 
infection, the cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF) via a lumbar puncture. Another 
screening process that ‘suggests’ infection is possible using techniques such 
as PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) analysis. However, this is rare as the 
only diagnostic tools often available to local health workers are basic 
methods such as light microscopy (Picozzi et al., 2002), and still requires 
parasitological confirmation. After the initial clinical diagnosis based on the 
symptomology in the patient, laboratory tests are used not only to detect and 
confirm the presence of parasites in the body, but to establish the parasites 
location within the body which will determine the degree to which the 
infection has advanced in permeating the body’s boundaries. Often, no 
further tests are carried out to determine the sub-species of HAT, with the 
geographical location of the patient often informing the assumption as to 
which the patient is infected with (Selby, 2011. p.10).  
 
This ‘staging’ process ascertains the intensity and location of infection in the 
body. Parasites found at this stage will confirm definitively the presence of 
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infection, only with this evidence can a case be re-classified from ‘suspected’ 
to ‘confirmed’. Patients with no trypanosomes and ≤5 cells/μl are in the first 
(hemato-lymphatic) stage, while patients with trypanosomes and/or an 
increased (>5 cells/μl) white cell count in the CSF are classified in second 
(meningo-encephalitic) stage of infection (Eperon et al., 2014). In the case of 
parasites being present, then a lumbar puncture must be performed to 
establish whether it has crossed the boundary between the blood and the 
cerebral spinal fluid, thus entering the brain. Presence in the CSF will in turn 
require that more invasive drugs be administered which can also cross this 
blood-brain barrier, and thus eliminate the parasite from this part of the body. 
Because of the complexity and various toxicity profiles of anti-trypanosomal 
drugs (as described below), parasitological confirmation and lumbar puncture 
remain routinely performed to confirm the presence of HAT and stage the 
illness. 
 
In rhodesiense HAT cases however, even the process of extracting a CSF 
sample presents an opportunity for parasites which have yet to enter this 
space to break through this boundary and enter the spinal fluid during the 
procedure. Therefore, to avoid this occurrence, a short prophylactic course of 
suramin is administered to the body in order to clear the blood of infection 
before the lumbar puncture is performed (Farrar et al., 2013) 
 
In the case of parasites not being discovered in the CSF, then the treatment 
of suramin will be continued until the infection is totally cleared from the 
body. Where trypanosomes are found present in the CSF and therefore 
indicate a late stage or stage two infection in the body, a more invasive 
treatment is needed (Buyst, 1975). For Rhodesiense HAT patients, this is still 
currently administered in the form of Melarsoprol B, an arsenic derived drug 
which can (in 5-10% of cases) cause encephalopathy (swelling of the brain) 
and be fatal (Kuzoe, 1993; Steverding, 2010). It is therefore of paramount 
importance that the diagnostic, staging, and confirmation process is accurate 
to avoid Melarsoprol B being administered unnecessarily given the violence 
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that it also exerts on the body (Babokhov et al., 2013). 
 
Until now, health workers and patients had two main treatment options for 
gambiense HAT. The first, as with rhodesiense patients, was melarsoprol.  
The second option, suitable only for early stage infections, is the more recent 
Eflornithine monotherapy, requires hourly infusions, to be given every six 
hours for two weeks. Eflornithine monotherapy is better tolerated and more 
effective than Melarsoprol, but owing to the high burden on health workers 
and the high cost of the medical equipment required to correctly administer it, 
patients in some sites still continue to be treated with toxic Melarsoprol 
(DNDi, 2009). 
 
During 2001–2004 a trial of a co-administration of intravenous eflornithine 
and oral nifurtimox (NECT) was conducted in Omugo Hospital, the main 
treatment centre in Uganda at the time, and would go on to be launched in 
2009. NECT has been a game-changer in the treatment of T.b. gambiense 
sleeping sickness, reducing the number of eflornithine infusions required, 
compared to when it is used as a monotherapy, from 56 to 14. Additionally, it 
shortens hospitalisation from 14 days to 10, which makes treatment more 
convenient for patients. Because NECT only requires 2 infusions a day which 
can be administered during the daytime, this is easier for health workers and 
makes treatment far more suitable for remote and resource-poor settings. 
With the WHO’s recommendation of NECT as first-line treatment, all HAT 
endemic countries receive free supplies via drug donations by Sanofi and 
Bayer, and all Gambiense HAT stage 2 patients are now treated with NECT 
(DNDi, 2009). 
 
While NECT has transformed the treatment of Gambiense HAT, the options 
for rhodesiense HAT patients remain limited to suramin (early stage) and 
melarsoprol (late stage). All treatment options for both Gambiense and 
Rhodesiense patients still require painful lumbar puncture and intravenous 
injections during hospital admissions. However, new therapeutic candidates 
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are currently in clinical development which could yet again transform HAT 
treatment, notably because they can be administered orally and treat both 
disease stages (thus eliminating the need for an invasive lumbar puncture) 
(Büscher et al. 2017). Two compounds, fexinidazole and an oxaborole, are 
currently undergoing clinical testing. Fexinidazole, a nitroimidazole can be 
taken orally once a day for 10 days, has concluded phase II/III trials and is 
currently seeking a review from the European Medicines Agency (EMA) 
(DNDi, 2018). These trials are also investigating the potential for home 
treatment, as this is the primary setting (depending on case severity) the 
developers aim to introduce the drug into (Powell, 2017). Combined with 
confirmatory parasitological diagnosis, this would remove the need for 
lumbar puncture. This could also reduce dropout/no-show rates of HAT 
suspects identified with rapid screening tests. The oxaborole candidate 
Acoziborole SCYX-7158 was selected as a promising candidate in late 2009, 
and following successful preclinical trials, the drug entered clinical 
development in 2012.  A Phase II/III trial to assess the safety and efficacy of 
acoziborole when given as a single dose to adult patients with T.b. 
Gambiense was initiated in late 2016 across seven study sites in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (ibid). SCYX-7158 has some advantages over 
fexinidazole, requiring only a single oral dose as opposed to 10 daily oral 
doses. Owing to the high level of active compound retained in the body over 
at least 2 months, Acoziborole also offers protection against re-infection for a 
limited period (Steinmann et al, 2015). Some have argued that the benefits of 
the new RDT and a safe, relatively cheap and easily administered (i.e. oral) 
drug for both stages of both gambiense and rhodesiense HAT “could justify 






Policy on the assessment of treatment outcomes until recently required 
patients be followed-up for up to 24 months with laboratory exams of body 
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fluids, as parasites may remain viable for long periods and cause relapses 
(Ngoyi et al, 2010; Büscher et al, 2017). Given the relatively low prevalence 
of infection in areas endemic for HAT, infections confirmed in previously 
treated patients in an elimination context are typically interpreted as a 
relapse, rather than reinfection (WHO, 2007). In rural Africa such a follow-up 
plan is challenging, and in practice compliance with follow-up is low, with 
patients rarely following programme protocols after their first follow-up visit, 
especially if they remain asymptomatic (Hasker et al. 2012). For rhodesiense 
HAT, patient compliance with scheduled follow-ups decreases with time, 
from 65%–85% at 12 months to 25%–70% at 24 months, whereas 40%–90% 
of relapses occur within 12 months and 70%–90% occur within 18 months 
(Ngoyi et al, 2010), and compliance with follow-up is as low as that for 
gambiense HAT (Küpfer et al, 2012). Due to the acute character of the 
disease, for patients treated for rhodesiense HAT symptoms may reappear 
quickly in relapsing patients. Because symptomatic patients are likely to 
present themselves for follow-up examinations, systematic follow-up after 
treatment for HAT is no longer recommended, and patients are instead 
advised to consult if symptoms reappear (WHO, 2013a; Büscher et al, 
2017:9). These recommendations apply only for routine treatment outcome 
assessment and not for clinical trials of new drugs or new treatment 
regimens (WHO, 2013a:132-133), where 18 months of follow-up are 
recommended (WHO, 2007). 
 
 
Recent and current trends in ‘Tor omele’ control in Uganda 
 
In Uganda, HAT is more commonly referred to as ‘sleeping sickness’, owing 
to the symptoms observed in infected humans. In this sense, it is thought of 
as the sickness that causes excessive sleeping, though local definitions can 
vary. In the rhodesiense affected Lango region, the translation is ‘Tor anino’, 
the ‘disease of sleeping’ was used by many of my interviewees and 
colleagues in the Lango sub-regions of Dokolo, Lira, and Alebtong. 
Elsewhere, others in the Teso sub-regions such as Kaberamaido, the 
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Kumam term frequently used refers to ‘tor omele’ [disease of the fly]. The 
differences in terminology between two closely related languages may seem 
trivial, yet the distinction in terms of their explanatory frameworks for HAT are 
telling. Indigenous names for disease can converge with biomedical 
understandings of disease, and reveals diverse understandings of disease 
aetiology, embodied in indigenous names (Simmons, 2009). Just as this 
name is attributed to the mechanism of transmission, so too ‘tor omele’ 
centralises the significance of the tsetse’s role in HAT. This may trace back 
to historical interventions that have positioned tsetse firmly at the centre of 
the problem and solution, emphasising the importance of bush clearing and 
proximity to tsetse infested areas as key risk factors for local populations.  
Numerous control campaigns to control Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis (T&T) 
were conducted in various regions of Uganda as tsetse invaded new areas of 
the country throughout the 20th century (table 1), but none have proved 
sustainable in the long-term (Okoth, 1999). Before the 1950s, Trypanosome 
and Tsetse (T&T) control relied heavily on methods such as expansive bush 
clearing, ground spraying with dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and 
wildlife culling, which had harmful environmental impacts. From the 1980s, 
more ecologically and politically acceptable methods were developed: 
selective bush clearing, sequential aerial spraying (SAS), insecticide-treated 
traps and targets (ITT), insecticide-treated cattle (ITC) used as live baits, and 
eventually the sterile insect technique (SIT) (Meyer et al. 2016). al. 2012).  
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Table 1: Key documented T&T control operations implemented in Uganda since 1980. (from 
Meyer et al. 2016). 
  
 
Political unrest up to the early 1990s has had a major impact on control 
operations in Uganda. Although early campaigns were initially successful, 
conflicts often disturbed operations, discontinuing them completely in some 
areas (Allsop, 2001). After decades of military conflict in the northern and 
eastern regions (Karamojong cattle rustling, the Teso War, and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army insurgency), cattle restocking programmes doubled the 
parasite’s ecological range, which had previously been limited to the Lake 
Victoria Basin (Selby et al. 2013). In response to large outbreaks in the early 
2000s caused by the northward spread of infected cattle, a public private 
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partnership called Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness (discussed further below) 
was created to disrupt transmission among the animal reservoir. In addition 
to socio-demographic upheaval caused by internal conflicts driving outbreaks 
of HAT, conflicts over Uganda’s boarders, particularly to the north in 
gambiense endemic South Sudan in recent years has driven hundreds of 
thousands of refugees into the country, posing a threat to elimination efforts 
in the north (Picado and Ndung’u, 2017). 
Present methods which depend on trapping or killing tsetse flies with 
insecticides have proven difficult to sustain at the local community level for 
human disease control. Some argue that those tasked with managing 
trypanosomiasis or committed to poverty alleviation in Africa should consider 
continuing large-scale, area-wide tsetse control methods like aerial spraying 
and Sterile Insect Technology (SIT) (Allsop, 2001), which was used for the 
successful eradication of the tsetse fly Glossina austeni from Unguja Island 
of Zanzibar (Vreysen et al. 2014). However, despite this victory leading to the 
establishment of the Pan African Trypanosomiasis and Tsetse Eradication 
Campaign (PATTEC) in 2002, SIT is only effective when the target 
population density is low and is too costly to scale up and sustain outside of 
island and similarly isolated foci of tsetse populations, as they are soon re-
invaded by surrounding tsetse populations (Vreysen, 1995). 
Less technologically sophisticated but highly effective are the wide-scale 
deployment of Stationary Attractive Devices (SADs). These attract female 
tsetse flies to a device e.g. cloth traps or targets that either kill the flies 
through contact with insecticides applied to the surface of the target (Vale, 
1993), or by heat or starvation after being guided to trapped inside a non-
return cage (Brightwell et al., 1991). Tsetse trapping is usually regarded as 
the responsibility of the government, although farmers are often willing to 
contribute labour to their deployment and maintenance (Meyer et al. 2016). 
More recently, efforts to control tsetse in the West Nile region of the country 
using so-called “tiny targets” as an effective tool for HAT control have yielded 
promising results (Tirados et al. 2015). 
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Like the colour attractant targets, the ‘live bait‘ technique exploits finely 
studied behaviours of tsetse, in this case on their blood-sucking feeding 
behaviours. Using insecticide treated livestock, tsetse flies take up a lethal 
dose of insecticide whilst feeding and die (Leak, 1998). Pour-on formulations 
require no particularly sophisticated equipment, and the insecticide 
application is rapid and easy. Unlike with SADs, the technique is also less 
prone to theft and does not suffer from maintenance problems (Vreysen et al. 
2012). In regions affected by rhodesiense HAT, it is generally agreed that the 
curative and prophylactic use of trypanocidal drugs administered by farmers 
remains the most important method of controlling AAT in Africa today (Leak, 
1998). The market logic underpinning this approach is that farmers should be 
willing to pay for treatment of their own cattle with insecticides and 
trypanocides as the benefits of these techniques are perceived as private 
(Meyer et al. 2016).  
The failure of various top-down approaches in Uganda eventually led to the 
feasibility of community-based interventions, such as the FITCA (Farming In 
Tsetse Controlled Areas) and SOS (Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness) 
campaigns, being explored. However, these programmes also faced 
sustainability issues. A lack of engagement of the project recipients was 
attributed to financial issues with community-based programmes, and the 
levels of coverage achieved using Insecticide Treated Traps (ITT) and 
Insecticide Treated Cattle (ITC) were ultimately not enough to interrupt the 
transmission of parasites (ibid). 
 
One Health: an integrated approach to disease control 
 
The London Declaration on NTDs in 2012 was shortly followed by the World 
Health Assembly 66.12 Resolution in May 2013, which encouraged the 
coordination of Veterinary Public Health actors under a ‘One Health’ 
approach, owing to the animal and environmental contributions to 
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transmission and control. This was a crucial step for implementing 
sustainable control programmes for Neglected Zoonotic Diseases like HAT 
(Mableson et al. 2014).  While T.b. gambiense has also been targeted for 
elimination, T.b. rhodesiense is still often spoken of in terms of ‘control’ only, 
reflecting the multitude of factors involved in tackling the zoonotic form. 
 
The ‘One Health’ paradigm is a broad movement that recognises the 
interdependency of human, animal and ecosystem health, and that 
multidisciplinary collaborations are a necessary approach to achieving 
optimum health solutions (figure 3). The model is broadly constituted by a 
collective of actors from a diverse range of disciplines, histories, practices 
and politics. The physical locality of the participating actors within the One 
Health network, whether a philanthropic donor in the US, a Ugandan Vet in 
Tororo district, or a database located on a server in Belgium, is irrelevant in 
this model. Considering Law and Mol’s performative accounts of Actor-
Networks (in Law and Hassard, 1999. p.17), the question of what passes 
between these links and defines this relationality becomes critically 
important. Different contexts shape all of these connections and 
relationships, constraining agents to act in a particular way based on their 
training, the internal politics of their lab or department, and funding climates. 
The required co-operation of more disciplines and sectors, and the merging 
of previously distinct and at time conflicting paradigms in many ways 
epitomises the challenge of the One Health approach in general; an 
assemblage of international institutions, coordinating bodies, organisational 
models and policy initiatives – converging to sustain and promote particular 




Figure 3: Thematic representation of One Health model. 
(from Okello et al. 2014: p.3). 
 
 
Despite the consensus towards a broader One Health system, combining 
veterinary, medical and environmental disciplines and integrated holistic 
solutions – such networks remain inherently compartmentalised, and 
constrained by the inflexibility of its actors. The One Health concept, while 
grounded on the premise of shared knowledge and political will toward 
common goals, is comprised of such a disparate set of actors that the 
practical application of unification across disciplines and sectors is ultimately 
undermined by the rigidity of its purported greatest strength; 
‘interdisciplinarity’.   
 
“Everyone is fighting their corner, trying to get limited funds for their 
technologies, tied up with a particular narrative of vector and disease control 
that suits their technical solution” (Scoones, 2014. p.28). 
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Tackling neglected diseases and the issue of ‘‘neglect’’ in itself requires a 
high-level of advocacy, and the language of advocacy plays an extremely 
important role in constructing what Scoones refers to as ‘justificatory 
narratives’, relying on selling points to invoke action: “It has to kill people. Fly 
bites man, man dies, we should do something […] the key is generating 
success stories” one researcher in Scoones’ study commented (Scoones, 
2014: 5). These narratives are based on a range of factors that vary not only 
between diseases, but also between the two strains of disease in the case of 
HAT. 
 
Catherine Grant’s work on Tsetse control in Zambia has revealed how 
contested methods and views on how best to control Trypanosomiasis has 
depended greatly on the narrative and perspective of stakeholders, while “the 
validity of these debates is often not what drives policy and programming” 
(Grant, 2014: 11). For example, the Government of Northern Rhodesia 
introduced a largely ineffective policy of introducing game fences in the 
1940s in attempts to control the wildlife host reservoir, despite their 
documented failure to impact on tsetse populations. This led to anger among 
wildlife conservationists “at a failure to use evidence available at the time 
showing this”. As one interviewee described; 
 
 “'Tsetse barriers only have a social function […] they are a reference point 
for people, but there is no use or point of them for tsetse flies. Fly gates are 
completely useless and are only there so people can show that they are 
doing something.”      (informant in Grant, 2014: 12). 
 
It is widely understood that not all policy is informed by evidence, and largely 
shaped by narratives advocated by key stakeholders. Grant concludes that 
better monitoring will lead to “increased understanding of the impact of policy 
options and greater motivation for control” and enhancing surveillance will in 
turn allow “narratives to be based on a solid evidence base” (Grace, 2013 in 
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Grant, 2014: 24). However, the conditions under which surveillance data is 
collected and knowledge produced deserves critical attention. A 
comprehensive consideration of all available evidence and knowledge forms, 
including that of indigenous, local knowledge and experience, something that 
Grant herself alludes to as a widely overlooked driver of disease dynamics in 
control programmes (ibid: 13), might help to shape a more rounded and all-
inclusive narrative that empowers all stakeholders. 
 
Political environments continue to inhibit the successful collaboration and 
pooling of expertise and resources to meet shared goals across the different 
sectors and disciplines for Trypanosomiasis control in Africa (Scoones, 
2014). Discord between policy narratives and practice occurs at various 
levels throughout implementation, described by Mosse as an unintended 
‘gap’ between theory and practice. In this climate of ambitious “sector-wide 
approaches, state-level partnerships and policy-based budgetary assistance” 
(2004: 640), these relationships and their influence on the research agenda 
and production of evidence require further investigation. Thus, my research 
attempts to pry open the “black box of unknowing” between policy and its 
effects (ibid) by better understanding the convergence of different agendas 
and interests in Trypanosomiasis control in Uganda.  
 
 
Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness: performing One Health through Public 
Private Partnerships  
 
Partnerships that facilitate the market outreach and funding necessary for 
implementing effective and sustainable intervention strategies are hugely 
important for One Health programmes. However, it may be argued that such 
relationships place large pharmaceutical and commercial partners in 
favourably powerful positions to ‘call the shots’ on what constitutes good 
evidence and appropriate indicators of impact (Hawkes, 2014). This is a 
complex issue that not only highlights power differentials between global 
partners within financial networks, but the way in which evidence is ultimately 
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constructed and fed back into epidemiological and scientific investigation. In 
order to better understand these dynamics and their influential mechanisms, 
it is important to examine the role of such funding models and their impact on 
HAT control. 
 
The control and surveillance of AAT and HAT in Uganda are run in co-
operation with numerous international organisations, research institutions, 
development agencies, NGOs and private firms. These collaborations form 
the basis of the network of relations that co-produce epidemiological 
evidence, upon which policy decisions for disease control are based. 
Founded in response to a major outbreak of T.b. rhodesiense in the 1980s, 
COCTU (the Co-ordinating Office for the Control of Trypanosomiasis in 
Uganda) is one such institutional element of the One Health assemblage in 
action. Seated within the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and 
Fisheries (MAAIF), its mandate is to co-ordinate policy and oversee all 
Human and African Trypanosomiasis control in the country (Smith, Taylor, 
and Kingsley, 2014), and is a “unique example of Uganda’s commitment to 
One Health long before the approach became ‘‘fashionable’’ (Okello et al. 
2014: 2). COCTU’s involvement in the national Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness 
(SOS) campaign is a principal example of this commitment. 
As previously mentioned, the two separate sub-species of HAT are sensitive 
to different chemotherapeutic regimes, and therefore treatment needs to be 
suited to the causative sub-species presented. Therefore, while the two have 
always been spatially distinct, if overlapping of the two strains were to occur 
then accurate field diagnosis would become virtually impossible, and thus 
treatment may be administered incorrectly. In areas recovering from conflict 
and upheaval by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency, SOS was 
initially conceived as an emergency intervention to maintain a ‘buffer zone’ 
between the two HAT strains (Bardosh, 2016). The SOS programme, framed 
within the context and narrative of this emergent threat, i.e. the “thin line 
between two fatal diseases” converging in Uganda (see figure 4)  (Picozzi et 
al., 2005, p.1238), was an initiative that, albeit only focussing on rhodesiense 
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HAT, successfully encapsulated both the Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
and One Health approaches. 
 
Figure 4: Sequential maps of areas of Uganda affected by sleeping sickness. 
T b gambiense (orange) prevalent in northwest Uganda, T b rhodesiense (red) has been spreading 
since the mid-1980s, and its transmission is now occurring within 150 km of the T b gambiense active 
focus. The tsetse belt for Glossina fuscipes fuscipes extends across this region (Picozzi et al. 2005). 
 
The first cases of rhodesiense HAT in Kaberamaido and Dokolo districts 
were reported in 2004, and the continued presentation of new cases to this 
day indicates active transmission in the region (Hamill et al. 2017). In 
response to the initial outbreak, in 2006 a mass chemotherapuetic 
intervention was co-ordinated through a public-private partnership called 
SOS (Stamp Out Sleeping Sickness), comprising of academic partners at the 
University of Edinburgh and Makerere University, business (veterinary 
pharmaceutical company Ceva Sante Animale), philanthropy (IK Aid and 
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Relief Enterprise (IKARE)), and development through the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID). The ambitious intervention targeted cattle 
in the affected region in an attempt to prevent the northwards spread of HAT 
(Welburn and Coleman, 2015), and continued sporadically until 2008, owing 
to the persistence of HAT cases in parishes along the border between 
Dokolo and Kaberamaido (Batchelor et al. 2009).  
 
The word ‘campaign’ derives from the Latin word for ‘field’, just as military 
campaigns were fought in fields (Rogers, 1995). It is a fitting term for a many 
historical HAT control interventions (a number of which were actually co-
ordinated by colonial and post-independence military forces) and is no less 
true of the kind of approach taken by SOS. In an attempt to halt this 
‘catastrophic’ crossover, in 2006 the SOS project undertook an emergency 
intervention comprising of a combined mass trypanocidal treatment 
campaign and insecticidal spraying of cattle in newly infected regions, based 
on the premise that this would remove cattle as a reservoir of the disease, 
thus halting its spread northwards (Smith et al. 2014, p.4).  
 
The mass chemotherapy and spraying was applied in three rounds of mass 
cattle treatments in seven districts between 2006 and 2010, resulting in the 
treatment of 200,000 cattle across Amolatar, Apac, Dokolo, Kaberamaido, 
and Lira districts (8025 km2 and 750,000 people) in Phase One (2006–
2008), and a similar number in Soroti and Serere districts (2873 Km2 with 
369,789 people) during Phase Two (2010) (Bardosh, 2016).  To achieve this, 
the PPP model was considered the most effective means of delivering the 
veterinary medicines and sprays (provided by CEVA Santé Animale) and 
achieving a feasible and sustainable intervention (ibid. p.4). In a 
“collaborative effort involving product, people and know-how” a Public-Private 
Partnership between key academic, pharmaceutical, governmental and 
private sectors was brokered to launch a mass treatment campaign to rid 
cattle of the disease (and thereby protect the human population) (Stamp Out 
Sleeping Sickness, 2014). In a renewed response to this threat, at the time of 
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study, plans to re-implement and scale up the SOS programme on a more 
comprehensive and sustained level were underway, and aimed to test the 
suitability of Development Impact Bonds (DIBs), a novel financial model to 
achieve its targets (figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Development Impact Bond structure chart for the SOS intervention model.  
(Centre for Global Development, 2013: 51), 
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At a time when Public-Private Partnerships are “very much the flavour of the 
age” (Scoones, 2014. p.71), it is increasingly important to scrutinise the 
impact these relations have on which research questions are asked, what 
data is collected to answer them, and how that information is then dealt with 
thereafter. The ways in which data are mobilised and construct evidence to 
frame policy narratives and justify proof of concept for investment is hugely 
important yet largely overlooked. I hope that this thesis will draw attention to 
this process by tracing the kinds of advocacy language deployed by 
interventions and policy back to practice and the evidence used in these 
‘justificatory narratives’ (Scoones, 2014). While the two have been conflated 
in the SOS model, linking business ventures to health outcomes in a post-
conflict, subsistence economy is problematic, something partners pondered 
in Kevin Bardosh’s study of the SOS programme’s legacy, asking to what 
extent “is this business or public health?” (2016: 346).  
SOS was initially successful, significantly reducing HAT incidence from pre-
intervention period, and maintained lower HAT incidence during the 
intervention year, and two years (2007 – 2008) post-intervention (Mukiibi et 
al. 2017). They had established that preventative chemotherapeutic 
treatment, when drugs are applied to enough of the reservoir cattle 
population, could significantly reduce the prevalence of trypanosomes and 
end transmission cycles. Modelling indicated that widespread treatment of 
more than 86% of the cattle population with trypanocidal drugs could 
eliminate T. b. rhodesiense circulating in cattle (Welburn et al., 2006). 
However, monitoring from the first phase of SOS showed that despite 
treating 200,000 cattle across Amolatar, Apac, Dokolo, Kaberamaido, and 
Lira districts (8025 km2 and 750,000 people) and achieving a near 70% 
reduction of the HAT parasite in cattle, reinfection subsequently recurred in 
the reservoir population over the following 18 months (Welburn and Coleman 




The sickness that sleeps: HAT in the landscape of 
elimination 
 
Today, we find ourselves in a familiar situation. While cases have largely 
dwindled over recent years (figure 6), so too has public awareness and 
vigilance of HAT. It seemed for a time that the political will to invest in long 
term solutions for a disease that posed no immediate threat too had waned. 
“We have been here before, but we are too quick to forget”, as one 
prominent Ugandan entomologist remarked solemnly at the end of our 
interview, “complacency is our greatest challenge”.  
 
 
Figure 6:  Number of reported cases of gambiense HAT per year and per country and number of 
reported cases of rhodesiense HAT per year and per country.  
(Franco et al., 2017: 6). 
 
In 2011, owing to the 70% decrease in cases reported to WHO since the 
previous decade (see figure 7), the goal of elimination was deemed feasible 
by the WHO Strategic and Technical Advisory Group for Neglected Tropical 
Diseases. A “roadmap” on neglected tropical diseases set T.b. gambiense as 
a target for elimination as a public health problem by 2020. In January 2012, 
partners from public and private sectors gathered to launch an 
unprecedented effort to tackle NTDs by signing the London Declaration, 
marking a coordinated effort to control or eliminate 10 infections, including 
HAT (WHO, 2013c). This signalled a renewed commitment to ‘putting 
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sleeping sickness to sleep forever’, as one article celebrated. Since then, 
international teams ‘waging a decisive battle against the deadly disease’ to 
‘consign sleeping sickness to the dustbin of history’ (Scholtabers, 2018) have 




Figure 7: Total number of reported cases of HAT (gambiense and rhodesiense) per year.  
The green line plots milestones set out in the WHO Roadmap for HAT elimination (Franco et al., 2017: 
6) 
 
In some respects, gambiense HAT can be considered a more ‘tool ready’ 
disease to control. For rhodesiense HAT however, owing to the added 
complexities of its zoonotic reservoir, total interruption of transmission has for 
a long time not been considered feasible (WHO, 2013b). Just months after 
the gambiense HAT elimination roadmap was launched however, 
participants in the first rhodesiense HAT stakeholders meeting in October 
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2014 declared their interest in joining the international network to advance 
efforts to eliminate the zoonotic disease by “accelerating biomedical 
research, expanding the scientific knowledge base, implementing cost-
effective vector control, improving diagnosis and clinical care, and enhancing 
the efficacy of medical and veterinary public-health measures for the control 
and monitoring of the disease” (WHO, 2014).  
 
In February 2018, Uganda celebrated its one-year anniversary since the last 
domestic case of gambiense HAT was detected in the country (FIND, 2018), 
an achievement attributed to the implementation of novel diagnostics and 
tsetse control interventions through the new ‘Intensified Sleeping Sickness 
Elimination Programme’ (ISSEP). Now re-branded as ‘Trypa-No!’, the 
programme’s challenge now is to capitalise on this success and sustain this 
pressure ‘to the last mile’ (Reynolds, 2018).  
 
 
Figure 8: Trends in HAT in Uganda 1990-2015 (WHO, 2017). 
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Efforts are now being concentrated on priority areas in efforts to not only 
maintain the geographical gap in the ‘cattle corridor’ between the gambiense 
and zoonotic rhodesiense HAT (figure 9), but to sustain them to eliminate 
both strains. 
 
Figure 9: Current Uganda trypanosomiasis control priority map.  
Credit: Coordinating Office for Control of Trypanosomiasis in Uganda (From Muhanguzi et al, 2017). 
 
But how is elimination defined and known? Long, asymptomatic periods of 
gambiense HAT infection in human reservoirs, combined with its frequent 
misdiagnosis for other endemic fevers makes it particularly difficult to find in 
non-endemic settings. In elimination scenarios, as we find ourselves in 
Uganda, the imperfect specificity of diagnostic tools means that, in the low 
prevalences we see today, their positive predictive value (PPV) diminishes 
(Chappuis et al., 2005). Finding HAT beneath the biomedical radar can be 
like finding the proverbial needle in a haystack. In the elimination landscape, 
‘sleeping sickness’ can invoke a new interpretation; not only the sickness of 
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sleeping, but as the sickness that sleeps; latently waiting for social and 
ecological conditions, and transmission cycles to align and configure 
favourably to produce pathogenic possibilities for its resurgence in ‘patches’, 
or ‘hotspots’ (Scoones et al., 2017; Brown and Kelly, 2014). 
 
In her history of disease eradication programmes, Nancy Leys Stepan 
describes characteristic features of the relatively modern eradication model 
in public health, and ‘their useful ambiguities’ (2011: 10). In doing so she 
interrogates funding institutions’ (and consequently the global health 
community’s) historical fixation on techno-centric solutions. Hookworm for 
example, “first and foremost a disease of social misery”, proved to be a 
challenging disease to take on, given the Rockerfeller Foundation’s 
preference for technical solutions over social ones. Similarly, just as their 
techno-centric approach by itself “would not eradicate a disease so 
entangled in multiple determinants of social and economic kind” (ibid: 76), 
the social, economic, and environmental entanglements of HAT with conflict 




Passive case detection and the decentralisation of HAT control and 
referral 
 
Historically, mobile teams have been extensively used to screen at-risk 
populations in epidemics throughout the 20th century (Franco et al. 2017) and 
typically travelled with all laboratory equipment needed to confirm a case 
who would then be treated in hospital. In non-epidemic scenarios such as in 
Uganda today, when mobile teams are regarded as too expensive, 
programmes typically revert to a passive case detection strategy with 
diagnosis restricted to places, usually hospitals, which can similarly perform 
all screening and confirmation tests in sequence. In the rural areas where 
HAT is most endemic, however, such well-equipped hospitals are rare. HAT 
screening campaigns have sometimes been considered “vertical 
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interventions […] deployed in the absence of local healthcare infrastructure” 
(Steinmann et al. 2015) with the risk that the “progressive dismantling” of 
highly specialised mobile teams who possess the most expertise in HAT 
diagnosis could therefore have “grave consequences at the individual and 
community level” (Büscher et al. 2017).  
 
HAT presents a particularly unique challenge to disease surveillance in terms 
of diagnostic capability, treatment, and surveillance. As most cases are 
picked up syndromically during presentation at healthcare centres and 
hospitals, patients who have not been misdiagnosed with malaria (as is often 
the case) and are suspected of having Sleeping Sickness are referred to a 
specialist health centre, which is equipped with the necessary laboratory 
equipment, trained staff, and stocked with drugs to diagnose/confirm and 
treat the disease. As these centres are often long distances away and 
treatment requires a long period of hospitalisation, many patients may fail to 
complete their referrals. The discrepancy between syndromic suspects 
referred from peripheral facilities and those who go on to become 
diagnostically confirmed cases are often unrecorded and un-traceable, 
therefore posing an enormous challenge to the adequate surveillance of HAT 
prevalence. 
 
Reaching the stage whereby a patient will eventually find themselves 
receiving treatment is reliant on connections between a highly decentralised 
healthcare delivery system that rests heavily on the likelihood of health 
workers suspecting HAT and having access to appropriate diagnostic 
equipment. Owing to low awareness – both in the community and among 
health workers – and the multitude of factors that obstruct patients 
successfully being suspected and then diagnosed as a case, the system of 
passive surveillance is widely regarded as an inadequate strategy for 
elimination targets given problems with case detection (Smith et al., 2014: 3).   
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Case detection is beset with concerns surrounding under-reporting; a 
problem particularly true of T.b. rhodesiense, where evidence suggests 
under-reporting to be as high as 40% in some foci (Fevre, 2008). Figures 
indicate a steady decrease of HAT cases over the past decade, however it is 
important to recognize that WHO incidence data are based on reported 
cases (Welburn and Maudlin, 2012:312). In the context of sleeping sickness, 
cases that do not reach a hospital are not reported. For example, in Uganda 
it is estimated that 92% of deaths from T. b. rhodesiense sleeping sickness 
go unreported (Odiit et al., 2005). Studies in several countries endemic for 
rhodesiense HAT (Odiit et al., 2004; Odiit et al. 2005; Matemba, 2010) 
showed patients make up to seven visits to various health care providers 
prior to being successfully diagnosed. Delays in case detection increase the 
chance of late-stage presentation. Given that the fatality rate among patients 
with second-stage rhodesiense HAT is 2.5 times higher than that of patients 
with first-stage disease this is a major cause of public health concern (WHO, 
2013b: 194). 
Underestimation of disease burden is inevitable in sub-Saharan Africa due to 
extrapolation from scant data.  Consequently, this means estimates can only 
be approximate, with a strong tendency towards underestimation of disease 
burden. This problem is amplified where only passive screening exists, in 
areas where health staff may be inadequately trained to detect and identify 
the disease. Even where facilities are sufficiently equipped and staffed to 
diagnose HAT however, case detection thereafter relies on adequate 
reporting of cases.  
This presents particular concern in regions where Rhodesiense HAT is 
spreading further north-westerly where cases are relatively new, and current 
data management and surveillance systems are notably inadequate to deal 
with them (Acup, 2013). It also poses questions regarding how we go about 
detecting HAT in such a landscape; how can spaces of surveillance be 
created whereby an infected patient can be seen by the state? How do 
spaces like the hospital, the private clinic, or the laboratory facilitate their 
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movement through referral in a way that makes them visible, and to what 
extent is it possible to extend such spaces through new technologies in order 
to widen the clinical gaze beyond the confines of a few centres of expertise?  
 
Contemporary innovations and emerging strategies in HAT control 
 
For over a century multiple efforts have been undertaken to control HAT to 
little or no avail. Today, cases in Uganda have dropped significantly, a 
decline frequently attributed to a proliferation of technologies and their wide-
scale implementation. At the Silver Jubilee celebrations for the Ugandan 
Trypanosomiasis Control Council (UTCC) and COCTU in October 2017, 
IKARE director Anne Holm Ranaleet drew this conclusion:  
 
“Slowly but surely our efforts over the last 10 years to control the disease 
are paying off and we can see a steady lowering in the number of Human 
African Trypanosomiasis cases to very few cases per year. Two initiatives 
in particular have contributed to this development. The Tiny Targets and 
rapid diagnosis activities carried out in the West Nile region, and our SOS 
initiative in Northern Uganda”. (IKARE, 2017). 
 
It is these key ‘emerging’ strategies and technologies (Steinmann, 2015) and 
the socio-material assemblages they co-produce that I turn to as the subject 
matter, or units of analysis for my case studies. 
 
 
Innovations in diagnostic capacity: introducing a rapid test for HAT 
 
At the forefront of these ‘important innovations’ has been the development of 
lateral flow rapid diagnostic tests that can be used for the serodiagnosis of 
HAT in place of the Card Agglutination Test for Trypanosomiasis (CATT), 
which requires a constant electrical supply, a cold chain, and trained 
personnel (Jamonneau et al. 2014). In 2013, an RDT-based passive 
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surveillance strategy was implemented in Uganda to spearhead an 
intensified T.b. gambiense HAT elimination programme. The finger-prick test 
(figure 10) developed by FIND with academic, manufacturing and endemic 
country partners, detects antibodies in fresh blood samples against two 
trypanosome antigens. It ostensibly requires minimal training of health 
workers and produces a positive or negative result within 15 minutes. 
 
In 2013, a new RDT-based referral system was implemented by the 
Intensified Sleeping Sickness Elimination Programme (ISSEP) (now called 
‘Trypa-No!”) as part of an enhanced passive surveillance system (Wamboga 
et al. 2017). Tests provided by FIND were delivered through the national 
elimination programme to frontline health facilities as part of a new HAT 
diagnostic algorithm, to be conducted where symptomatic patients tested 
RDT negative for malaria. As the elimination programme area is also 
endemic for malaria, staff at all facilities were already familiar with performing 
malaria RDTs. This familiarity prefigured the implementation of an RDT for 
HAT and it was assumed the test could be absorbed seamlessly into a pre-




The SD BIOLINE rapid antigen test for T.g. gambiense HAT developed with FIND 
 
With diagnostic technologies now spread across three (or more) levels of the 
health system (Wamboga et al 2017), however, this means that for the first 
time in the history of HAT control, the diagnostic algorithm is routinely split up 
over geographic spaces.3 This requires patients and/or samples to travel 
between them and programmes to monitor these movements. People who 
screen positive in these new strategies are implicitly expected to undertake a 
significant role in confirming (or disproving) their own diagnosis. Moreover, 
there is substantial work involved for both programmes and patients to make 
sense of discordant results, since patients who screen positive with RDTs but 
negative in subsequent tests must be followed up at quarterly intervals until 
                                                 
3 In the past, in extremely remote areas inaccessible to vehicles, mobile teams have 
collected blood samples from patients on filter paper to be screened remotely 
(Chappuis et al. 2002, 2005). If a patient tested positive, they were asked to report for 
confirmatory testing at a site where the mobile team could access. However, this 
practice was not widespread. 
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they become seronegative or are confirmed as cases, for up to two years 
(WHO, 1998). Even without the extra layers of referral introduced by passive 
RDT-based systems, most HAT programmes typically achieve low levels of 
serological suspect follow-up (Chappuis et al. 2004; 2005). 
 
 
Fexinidazole: a new oral treatment on the horizon 
 
Current treatment options require identification of the clinical stages of HAT 
(i.e. whether the parasites have entered the central nervous system). The 
painful lumbar puncture procedure and potentially toxic drug regimens this 
entails however may soon become redundant, since new oral drugs effective 
against the both stages of the disease look promising (Kovacic, 2015). 
Fexinidazole (or ‘Fexi’ as it is commonly abbreviated) is a well-tolerated oral 
treatment that can be given for 10 consecutive days (Tarral et al, 2014). It is 
currently in phase III trials in patients with stage 1 and stage 2 HAT and is 
due to come onto the market in 2019, with a high possibility that it might be 
available for both stages of the disease (Sutherland et al. 2016).   
 
Phase II/III study results published in 2017 confirmed that fexinidazole is safe 
and effective and has significant advantages over NECT. Fexi was 
recommended by the European Medicines Agency in November and 
registered in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2018 (DNDi, 
2019). Not only would a safe oral drug, effective for both stages of the 
disease greatly improve access to treatment, it would also remove the need 
for staging through lumbar puncture, a painful and poorly accepted part of 
the referral process (Simarro et al., 2014). Furthermore, its developers, the 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi) are expected to run a phase 
IIIb trial examining the effectiveness of fexinidazole in patients treated as 
both out-patients and in clinical hospital settings to produce information on 
“the drug’s use in settings replicating what the DNDi hope will become 
standard” (Powell, 2017; DNDi, 2017). 
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Meanwhile, a phase IIIb trial to obtain more information about special 
populations not included in previous fexinidazole trials (such as children and 
pregnant women) started in 2016 and is ongoing (DNDi, 2018). 
 
In isolation, this new drug regimen could have significant impact on the 
feasibility of treatment of HAT, but only incremental bearing on HAT control 
as a whole. However, combined with other ‘emerging technologies ’such as 
the HAT RDT and Tiny Targets, Fexi has been celebrated as one of the most 
promising candidates among the arsenal of tools toward elimination. The 
potential effect on patient perceptions is significant, as removing the need for 
lumbar punctures, painful IV administration, and the risk of melarsaprol B 
induced encephalopathy, the diagnostic and treatment practices and 




Tiny Targets: cheap insecticide impregnated nets for tsetse fly control 
 
Devised and developed by the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, the 
Tiny Target device was honed to its present form through repeated field 
experiments in East Africa. Aimed at impacting local populations of riverine 
tsetse that transmit T.b. gambiense HAT, these small insecticide treated 
flags have been deployed and expanded across the West Nile since 2011, 
alongside conventional bi-conical tsetse traps that monitor their impact on the 
population. Donor support from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and 
industry partnerships with Vestergaard-Frandsen has enabled them to scale 
up their prototypes into large-scale manufacturing of targets that can be 
produced cheaply and easily (Lindh, et al., 2012; Tirados et al., 2015; 
Lehane et al, 2016).  
 
A substantial part of the project was not just refining the design of the target 
(Lindh et al., 2012), but preparing the pilot study area for its introduction, 
conducting preliminary social science research and sensitisation prior to 
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implementation. Part of this anthropologically informed approach the 
programme initiated included a women-led tsetse control pilot study, as well 
as continual monitoring and investigation into rumours and concerns 
circulating about the tiny targets as they were deployed. 
 
During the pilot study, local women were recruited to carry out HAT control 
by placing tiny targets along river banks. These activities were compared 
with another village where field technicians and entomological ‘experts’ ran 
the control programme. Overall, women were found to be willing, motivated 
and organised to successfully manage the tiny targets operation 
independently. The ownership and sense of empowerment the initiative gave 
them proved to be cost effective too. Importantly, because communities 
became invested in the benefits of targets and maintained them, more tiny 
targets were functional at 6 months post-deployment in the study site than 
the control site (Kovacic, 2015).  
 
A group of women build and prepare a batch of tiny targets for deployment.  
(Photo: FIND Trypa-NO! Partnership press release, 2017). 
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A recent review on current strategies for engaging women in vector control 
cited this study alongside others in concluding that programmes benefited 
from increasing women’s participation in vector control, as they create 
economic opportunities for women, and provide access to communities that 
may otherwise be hard to reach. Crucially, a programme’s success was often 
“contingent on working within existing networks or finding women in the 
community who were considered trustworthy” (Gunn et al, 2018: 8). This 
approach to implementing Tiny Targets proved to be a turning point, with 
several members of the programme remarking in personal communication 
that the input from an anthropological perspective was instrumental in 
improving the acceptability of the programme beyond merely changing the 
physical design of the targets. 
 
3V vet networks: targeting cattle using community mobile spray teams 
 
After failing to sustain the impact of their first two mass cattle treatment 
campaigns, the SOS programme found itself at an impasse, as the 
prevalence reductions achieved initially could not be maintained without the 
regular application of insecticides to cattle after treatment brigades withdrew. 
This underscores the need to complement mass-treatment activities with 
better sustainability programs to prevent the need for recurring emergency 
interventions (Mukiibi et al. 2017). This prompted a revision of the SOS 
strategy, flipping the top-down vertical intervention model on its head to a 
more ‘bottom-up strategy’ (Bardosh, 2016). Over the course of 6 months in 
2008, five graduates from Uganda’s only veterinary school at Makerere 
University were employed to gather information, educate livestock keepers, 
and sell the Vectocid (insecticidal spray) and the trypanocides VerebinB12 
and Veridium (Morton 2010), which were previously donated by Ceva 




A 3V Veterinary drug store in Kaberamaido district. 
 
As anthropologist Kevin Bardosh wrote in his study of what became the ‘3V 
Vet’ franchise, the emphasis on “farmers-doing-it-for-themselves” (Boiardi 
and Hehenberger 2014) and building “local innovation systems” (Morton 
2010) was hailed by the global health community as a triumph of One Health 
in action. Over the following 6 years, IKARE would invest more than 
$450,000 in this ‘3V network’, reflecting an emerging trend in social 
entrepreneurship, where pathways for development and public health are 
forged through business, poverty alleviation, and empowerment (Prahalad 
2006). The spray services offered by the 3V network transformed the 
concept of ‘farmer incentives’ for tsetse control, by blurring the line between 
the perceived private goods of livestock health/animal trypanosomiasis 
control, and the public good of HAT prevention (Leonard 2000). Shifting the 
‘public good’ of trypanosomiasis control into the hands of market forces was 
seen as a cost-effective solution, with proponents avowing that “SOS 
addressed one of the perennial challenges to global health: sustainability” 
(Bardosh, 2016: 339). 
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Kevin Bardosh’s study captures the tail end of Phase Two of SOS in 2010 
which expanded the intervention to Soroti and Serere districts, and 
eloquently describes the establishment of the 3V vet network and how it 
evolved as a ‘social experiment’ (2016). The publication came at a pivotal 
moment in the project’s history, as programme partners by this time were 
bidding to rollout another ambitious control campaign spanning 32 districts 
based on the SOS model. Phase Three of SOS depended on partners 
fundraising for one of the first Development Impact Bonds (DIBs)—a novel 
funding model which uses private investors, with the potential for returns on 
their investment based on the achievement of  various ‘trigger points’ in 
program outcomes (Centre for Global Development and Social Finance, 
2013). This time, to procure the vast amount of funding needed to sustain the 
intervention’s impact, SOS had to marshal the evidentiary charisma (Kelly, 
2018) and justificatory narratives (Scoones, 2014) to build a case for the DIB 
model that could achieve its targets to the ‘last mile’. “Time will now tell 
where the ‘experiment’ goes from here”, Bardosh signed off with cautious 
optimism. It was not long after this time that I entered the field and joined the 















Disentangling HAT: a socio-ecological approach  
 
This theoretical framework foregrounds the series of multiple, multi-sited, 
sequential case studies by drawing on socio-ecological approaches, and 
employing ethnographic methods to produce “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 
1973) of contemporary HAT control. I have chosen to depart slightly from the 
foundational conceptual frameworks of actor-networks and assemblages, 
toward the more recently developed and relevant concepts of 
‘entanglements’ (Nading, 2014), ‘hotspots’ (Brown and Kelly, 2014); and 
‘ecosystems’ (Yellepa et al. 2017), that account for the complex dynamics of 
socio-ecological systems in which HAT exists. ‘Ecosystems’ and ‘ecologies’ 
capture the complex, entangled, dynamic, and adaptive nature of the social, 
technical, environmental, and biological assemblages that configure disease 
events and shape the conditions whereby individual agents and political 
structures react to and intervene on them.   
 
 
Theorising science and technology for global health and development 
 
Popular discourses on technological determinism, whereby technologies are 
made the subject of an active force for change, convey a vivid sense of 
technology as a driving force of history, whereby technical innovations 
appear and cause important changes to happen. In each case, for example, 
“the contraceptive pill produced a sexual revolution”, “the microscope 
transformed biomedical understandings of disease” and so on, a complex 
event is made to seem the inextricable result of a technological innovation. 
Technology has typically been understood as a linear pattern of 
development; a straightforward application of science, whereby scientific 
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knowledge is crafted into technological artefacts to deal with easily 
identifiable problems or opportunities (Sismondo, 2004 in Smith, 2013).  
Unlike other, more abstract forces for change such as socio-economic, 
political, cultural, and ideological factors, the tangibility of material 
technologies creates a perceivable sense of causal efficacy (Smith and Marx, 
1994). While it is true that technology is inextricably linked to development, 
the linear progressive and causal nature of this association can be 
misleading.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, “soft” determinists remind us that the 
history of technology is a history of human agency, and upon reflection “it is 
evident that artefacts only have significance in the hands of people” (Whyte, 
van der Geest, and Hardon, 2002:104). An innovation, once introduced into 
society, is depicted as taking on a social life of its own; it’s adoption and 
proliferation diffusing throughout society until it becomes entangled with 
intricately interrelated socio-technical ecosystems, until “its continued 
functioning is a precondition for the reproduction of the entire social order” 
(Smith and Marx, 1994). Indeed, technology and society are mutually 
constitutive, comprising of people and objects in social relations expressed in 
purposeful practices (Pickstone, 1994:14). They are embedded in the other 
to the extent that it “subsumes our identities, shapes how we interact with the 
world, and circumscribes our future” in positive and negative ways. “Each 
propels the other along, and the successes and failures of both are bound 
together” (Smith, 2009: 1).  
 
Likewise, the history of medicine, and the history of biomedical technologies 
might not be an example of a long struggle toward a shared understood set 
of concrete biological mechanisms. Instead, “it is better represented by the 
interplay of different coexisting systems of explanation, each filling a role 
where the other fails” (Keil et al., 1999). Current Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) go beyond emphasising the social complexities and 
ramifications of technologies, to return to the aetiology of techné as a 
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‘practical art’, a concept that suggests intention, purpose, and goals. Through 
participant observation, STS hones in on the purposeful relationships 
between people and things, how they take on meanings through 
routinisation, and together co-produce effects (Whyte et al. 2002:104). STS 
recasts science as a social and political activity, scrutinizing the way science 
frames questions, it’s methodologies, and means of reaching consensus 
(Leach et al, 2005).  
 
The emergence of STS in the 1970s initially turned to this task through 
ethnographic studies of laboratories, scientific communities, and the 
implementation of technologies (see Collins, 1974; Latour and Woolgar 1986; 
MacKenzie, 1990; Kohler, 1994; Pinch and Klein, 1996). Through the STS 
lens, scientists, engineers and technologists are trained as members of 
‘epistemic communities’, all with their own norms, and institutions. They 
adhere to ascribed rules and standards, conforming to devices created by 
their communities. STS rejects the essentialist conception that scientific 
method and technology holds the key to producing ‘pure’ knowledge, or 
immutable ‘truths’, or that scientists and technologists undertake their work 
“inoculated from the politics of their own communities of practice” (Smith, 
2013:8). By treating all modes of knowledge equally, or ‘symmetrically’, and 
adopting a supposedly impartial approach to explaining people’s beliefs, STS 
attempts to place science in a social and cultural context (Bloor, 1991). 
 
Actor-network theory (ANT), developed by prominent French STS scholars 
Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, and the British sociologist John Law, is less 
of a theory as a 'material-semiotic' method, in that it attempts to map 
relations that are simultaneously material (i.e. between things) and 'semiotic' 
(between concepts). For example, the HAT control network is one comprised 
of many things (both human and non-human); vets, doctors, tsetse fly traps, 
maps, diagnostic tests, hospitals, patients, and organisations. But it is also 
constituted by shared concepts; of one health, of development, of 
humanitarianism, and the public good. ANT posits that networks are 
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precarious by nature and must be continuously performed through repeated 
enactments in order to maintain their stability. For the HAT control network to 
stabilise and function, its component actors must enact relationships that 
hold the network together. Patients must present with symptoms at local 
health facilities and attend follow-up referral appointments. Health workers 
must recognise symptoms and follow diagnostic algorithms. Cases must be 
reported and travel up through a hierarchy of institutions; to the Ministry of 
Health, to COCTU, to the WHO, setting in motion a series of pre-planned 
events and protocols. Entomologists and veterinary staff co-ordinate with 
district and national offices to deploy tsetse fly traps or conduct cattle 
spraying campaigns. Research institutions collaborate with donors and 
engage in public-private partnerships to develop new ways to implement and 
monitor novel technological interventions.  
 
 ‘Assemblage’ thinking shares some striking similarities with ANT. Both 
propose a relational view of the world, where action results from the 
‘becoming together’ of initially disparate elements. Both share the idea of 
emergence, whereby the whole system is more than the sum of its parts, and 
both promote distance not as a geographical construct, but as a function of 
the intensity of a relation, i.e. a topological concept of space. Furthermore, 
they both emphasise the importance of the socio-material, that is, “that the 
world is made up of associations of human and non-human elements” (Müller 
and Schurr, 2016). ‘Global assemblages’ (Ong and Collier, 2005) describe 
the systems through which global forms of techno-science, economic 
rationalism and expert networks gain significance and influence. The global 
assemblage is a tool for the production of ‘global knowledge’, that is 
“knowledge about global forms and knowledge that strives to replace 
socially, politically and spatially context-bound forms of knowledge” (Smith, 
Taylor and Kingsley, 2015: 2).  
 
Rather than contending to deconstruct the multiple agencies of actors within 
the disease “network”, between the ‘local’ and ‘global’ scales of 
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epidemiological surveillance and the narratives that frame their daily 
practices, I conceptualise these entanglements as socio-technical 
“ecosystems” (Yellepa et al., 2017; Michael and Madon, 2017). In these 
systems, epidemiologists are also political actors, as are veterinarians, 
community health workers and laboratory staff, whose lives are all 
‘entangled’ (Nading, 2014) with those of parasites and tsetse flies. Indeed, 
acknowledging the shortcomings of ANT (Law and Hassard, 1999; Latour, 
1999), Bruno Latour’s revised emphasis away from the agency of actors 
toward the ‘circulatory forces’ that shape their position within the network 
follows Donna Haraway’s assertion that, rather than focussing on misleading 
notions of stable objects or entities, it is better instead to think of  
“relationships” as “the smallest patterns for analysis” (Haraway, 2010. p.26). 
The concept of entanglement therefore adheres to modern iterations of ANT 
that reject definitions of entities and essences in favour of terms such as 
‘fluid’,  ‘trails’ and  ‘ontological choreography’ (Cussins,1998). Rather than 
analysing opposing notions of micro and macro, individual and structure, I 
argue that the complex and entangled epidemiology and ecology of Sleeping 
Sickness renders the scalar distinction between local and global 
infrastructures, bodies, and forms of knowledge increasingly difficult to 
maintain; “They are themselves entanglements of relationships […] a set of 
attachments” (Nading, 2014. p.10).  
 
In more recent years, STS has expanded beyond the traditional spaces and 
topics of laboratories and controversies, relocating and engaging outwith the 
natural and physical sciences in the Global North. It is perhaps a natural 
progression then that scholars of Critical Global Health are increasingly 
embracing a ‘messy hybrid’ of their own field and STS, as they turn to the 
“mundane infrastructures of Global Health [as] the local elements of a well-
oiled machinery” to “trouble the grand narratives of assumptions 
underpinning many Global Health projects” (Montgomery et al. 2017:6). 
Throughout this thesis I present a response to this call, making the argument 
for a ‘critical epidemiology’ (Edelman, 2017) of HAT that encompasses a 
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biosocial perspective (Parker, Polman, and Allen, 2017). The precarity of the 
HAT network and paucity of reliable surveillance data on its prevalence and 
distribution in multiple bodies (human and non-human) calls for an approach 
that is mindful of how epidemiological knowledge of HAT is constructed out 
of social interactions (Smith, 2009:10) with the technologies that produce 
epidemiological data. This argument draws on an increasing body of 




Critical Global Health and STS 
 
Departing from the colonial era and post-war framings of ‘tropical medicine’ 
and ‘international health’, the contemporary field of ‘global health’ brings 
together an immensely diverse range of actors. Today, an industry of private 
and public actors have proliferated from the field, as pharmaceutical 
companies have rebranded themselves as ‘global health companies’ (Biehl 
and Petryna 2013), while public–private partnerships (PPPs) and product 
development partnerships (PDPs) between industry and non-profit partners 
are booming. These ‘partnerships’ are a key mobilising metaphor generated 
by development policy discourse “whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of 
conceptual precision” conceal ideological differences to facilitate compromise 
between parties, “so that agency can be distributed within project systems” 
(Mosse, 2004: 230). Often, as is the case with HAT, donors preferentially 
fund specific and technologically oriented vertical programs. However, 
philanthropic efforts to improve health outcomes may inadvertently end up 
reinforcing the inequalities they seek to overcome, as the interests of public 
health agencies give way to an ‘asymmetry of power’ between private-sector 
actors and public interests (Birn 2014). Those scrutinising the power and 
governance of public–private formations argue that on the one hand these 
can be viewed as “successful social technology innovations”, while on the 




A prominent voice against the ‘structural violence’ wrought by neoliberalism, 
anthropologist-physician Paul Farmer takes a community-based approach to 
tackling poverty and disease by placing a focus on making health systems 
work over technological interventions (Keshavjee 2014). Critiques of ‘top 
down’ approaches in global health traditionally attended to the problem of 
ignoring local specificity (Foster 1976). Proponents of a ‘slow research’ 
method cite the need to make the ‘local’ as the starting point, tailoring 
policies to local conditions, and creating research platforms that centre local 
features over those that are labelled as ‘global’ (Adams et al. 2014). 
 
Hopes for a ‘magic bullet’ and the power of ‘data’ continues to be fetishized, 
while the visions of technocrats tend to outweigh other forms of practical and 
meaningful evidence. While new technologies will always hold an important 
place and be in demand, there has been increasing concern and calls to 
move away from an overemphasis on ‘surrogate endpoints’ and the search 
for ‘silver bullet’ solutions in global health; as although searching for solutions 
are worthwhile endeavours, these cannot expect to be ‘silver bullets’ when 
introduced into suboptimal systems (Pai et al. 2018). This is why I have 
focussed on the socio-technical ecosystems into which new HAT 
technologies are being introduced, as opposed to their cutting-edge 
attributes, which are described and widely lauded in the literature elsewhere. 
 
Multiple and fragmentary global health interventions also consolidate what 
anthropologist Susan Reynolds Whyte and colleagues (2014) working in 
Uganda call ‘projectified’ landscapes of care.  Within these landscapes, the 
supposed beneficiaries of interventions are rarely visible, appearing either as 
having nothing of import to contribute, or as uncritically and passively 
receptive to interventions. A strong biomedical emphasis remains pervasive, 
casting the concept of community engagement as politically necessary but 
‘scientifically’ irrelevant (Biehl 2007). But as global health has emerged as a 
 84 
dominant assemblage of actors and institutions, its consolidation as a field 
has prompted new calls for scrutiny (Janes and Corbett 2009). 
 
Numerous critiques have emerged that destabilise the assumed 
architectures and imperatives governing global health, challenging 
discourses and what defines the ‘global’. A large body of critical literature 
frames global health as a neocolonial or postcolonial imperial project. For 
example, historian of medicine Warwick Anderson (2014) argues that 
biomedicine is ‘constitutively colonial’. Introducing a special issue in ‘Social 
Studies of Science’ (2002) on postcolonial technoscience, Anderson 
emphasises a postcolonial perspective to focus on global flows of knowledge 
and practice as key, to “show us how scientific and technological endeavours 
become sites for fabricating and linking local and global identities, as well as 
sites for disrupting and challenging the distinctions between global and local” 
(Anderson, 2002). Studies have since engaged with STS concepts in 
attempts to deconstruct how Eurocentric ideas are embedded in how science 
is enacted in the Global South (Chakrabarty, 2012).  
 
Beyond postcolonial work, Global Health and STS projects have coalesced 
on common ground. First, by examining global flows of knowledge and 
fluidity, i.e. how science and technology ‘travel’. Second, by bringing to light 
the testimonies of those actors and regions, predominantly in the Global 
South, which have been traditionally absent or hidden from STS, while 
actively seeking new theoretical concepts from these places (Engel et al. 
2017). Another critique of global health takes a more Foucauldian approach, 
focusing on the new regimes of governmentality and biosecurity 






The illusion of impartiality: situating myself within the epistemic 
community 
 
The pinnacle of Bloor’s Strong Programme in STS, the concept of ‘symmetry 
in practice’ as the impartial and equal treatment of different modes of 
knowledge, has since been criticised as little more than “a misconceived 
methodological cloak” (Pels, 1996:278), representing an unrealistic and 
illusory endeavour. Some have pointed out that scholars of STS are no less 
engaged in knowledge politics than the scientists and technologists they 
study (Engel et al. 2017), as they involve themselves in scientific 
controversies by necessity, subverting the dominant view and thereby 
elevating that of the ‘underdog’ (Wynne, 2006). In presenting my case 
studies I too have had to be mindful of how this work may be interpreted as 
one of championing ‘frugal innovations’ (Prabhu and Radjou, 2015) over the 
dominant model of technologically sophisticated programmes that have come 
to define trypanosomiasis and tsetse control. While there is valid critical 
value in questioning dogmatic global health structures, I have had to check 
my own overenthusiasm for simplicity as an inherently desirable attribute in 
itself. If anything, this thesis builds a case against the global health 
community’s fixation on simplification where complexity should be embraced. 
 
Coming from an multidisciplinary background, I have inevitably brought some 
of my own disciplinary baggage to this work. Anthropologist Ashanté Reece 
has recounted similar reflections on the value of brinigng these diverse 
disciplinary backgrounds (our ‘elsewheres’) into our ethnographic work from 
the margins and rejecting anxieties that such work will be deemed ‘not 
anthropological’ by those working from ‘the centre’ of the discipline (Reece, 
2019). Having studied biological and medical anthropology before moving 
into the growing field of evolutionary medicine and public health, I came to 
this project with certain preconceptions about the biomedical and 
epidemiological profile of HAT. I appreciated the eloquent scientific 
discoveries and developments made in trypanosomiasis and tsetse research 
but struggled in critically evaluating these against a backdrop of rich social 
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science research on the political economy and social history of HAT (Ford, 
1971; Barrang-Ford, 2006; Scoones, 2014; Grant, 2014; Lachenal, 2017). 
While grappling with where these new technologies and approaches to HAT 
control aligned amidst the vast expanse of theoretical literature, I regularly 
found myself falling back on metaphors from ecology and evolutionary 
biology to make sense of new theoretical concepts, from Actor-Networks to 
Assemblages. This was partly a retreat to an epistemological comfort zone of 
sorts, but also in response to many of the overlapping themes and 
terminology used between disciplines. 
 
In my readings of assemblage theory (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980; DeLanda, 
2012) and Global Assemblages (Ong and Collier, 2005) for example, 
concepts of social complexity, constellations, and fluidity resonated with the 
intricacy and dynamicity described in the field of Ecology. In its earliest 
definitions, Ernst Haeckel in 1866 defined ecology as “the whole science of 
the relationship of the organism to the environment including, in the broad 
sense of the term, all the ‘conditions of existence’ “ (Stauffer, 1957:140). 
McMichael (2001) provides a more comprehensive and contemporary 







Social ecology perspectives explore the relations between people and their 
social and physical environments, over time and across several levels of 
analysis: personal, familial, cultural and institutional (Stokols et al.,1996; 
Butterfield & Lewis, 2002; Golden and Earp, 2012). In this thesis I adopt a 
social ecology approach, and the stance set out by Panter-Brick et al. (2006) 
in their case study on malaria prevention, that for global health interventions 
to be culturally appropriate and compelling (and result in demonstrable public 
“Ecology refers to the interconnected relationships between populations of plants and 
animals and between them and their natural environment. There is an emphasis on 
integration, interdependency, and feedback processes, all within a systems context 
(p.17). Ecology is a way of observing and thinking about the complex natural world; it 
is integrative, not disaggregative” (p.20). 
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health impact), the design of interventions must be situated “within the social 
and ecological landscape of local communities” (Panter-Brick et al., 2006: 
2812). Drawing from the same thread as Veena and Ranendra K. Das’s 
“local ecologies of care” I aim to understand how 
everyday experiences of HAT are crafted in specific configurations protocols 
and practitioner behaviours (Das and Das 2006). This approach takes up an 
‘ecological’ framework that conceptualizes interventions in terms of their 
potentially simultaneous impact across a broad range of social, biological, 
and political economic relationships (Adams et al., 2014) Medical 
anthropologists have captured this conceptualisation of ‘diseases of 
development’ in tracing the inadvertently iatrogenic effects of interventions 
such as mosquito eradication and deforestation on health outcomes (Hughes 
1969). Here, as one piece of the ecological reality is altered, with the 
introduction of a new diagnostic device for example, its implications and 
effects are systemic and affect the socio-technical ecosystem as a whole.  
 
Elsewhere, the rhetoric of ‘therapeutic landscapes’ deployed in human 
geography and medical anthropology (Gesler, 1992; 1993; 2017; Winchester 
and McGrath, 2017) evoke comparisons with the ‘adaptive landscapes’ 
metaphor once used as a heuristic tool for qualitative reasoning in 
evolutionary biology (Svensson, 2016). In a dynamic socio-ecological 
landscape such as HAT, populations adapt in response to changing 
landscapes as they evolve, such as the shift from active screening to a 
passive surveillance strategy, the introduction of new diagnostic tests, 
algorithms, or new therapeutic drug regimens into the treatment landscape. 
This appreciation of the dynamic, adaptive processes involved in producing 
and stabilising landscapes makes an ecosocial approach (Krieger, 2011) to 
exploring the socio-technical ecology (Michael and Madon, 2017) of HAT a 
compelling conceptual framework for this thesis. 
 
Introduced in the early 1990s in the field of health geography, the concept of 
therapeutic landscapes was an attempt to bring together ideas about place 
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and human health (Gesler, 1992; Andrews, 2004). The defining elements of 
the therapeutic landscape centred around physical (natural and man-made) 
environments, social environments, and symbolic environments. The idea 
that an individual’s health is influenced by physical environments is taken on 
face value, with variables like noise, light, dirt, or ventilation for example, 
having easily measurable effects on health. However, though harder to 
quantify perhaps, social and symbolic elements of a therapeutic landscape 
can have as significant effect on healing as physical elements (Gesler, 
2017). Researchers who took up the therapeutic landscape metaphor 
however, have pointed out that certain aspects of a healing space that is 
therapeutic to one person might not be to another (ibid). This draws attention 
to the phenomenological nature of the landscapes that individuals traverse 
amidst subjective and relative experiences of health and well-being. The 
concept has since been expanded beyond human-environment interactions 
to encompass the analysis of structural and symbolic constructions of place.  
Originally utilised as a conceptual tool to examine patterns of health-care 
seeking, medical anthropologists have since applied the therapeutic 
landscape “in the study of holistic health care, treatment seeking, risk 
negotiation, clinical spaces and design, social networks of therapy, regional 
political economies of health, landscapes of resistance and exclusion, and 
other health processes” (Winchester, 2015).  
 
I have taken up the landscape metaphor in my own analysis where it relates 
to the environments in which suspected HAT infected individuals are 
detected and subsequently confirmed and managed by local HAT control 
systems. The term and concept is encountered regularly throughout the 
thesis when describing the journeys people make in seeking treatment, 
reaching a diagnosis, negotiating complicated referral algorithms, and 
receiving treatment. It is also employed when discussing the diagnostic 
landscape within and outside of clinical spaces, such as the cultural evolution 




The landscapes I describe throughout this thesis are not physical per se, 
although they often comprise certain physical elements;  the condition of 
roads and transport networks; the geographical distances between primary 
health centres to referral hospitals; the availability of electricity in a laboratory 
that determines which diagnostic devices it can house; or the geospatial 
distribution of tsetse habitats. But these landscapes are also socially 
constructed, by the social proximity of people to private drug clinics or 
traditional healers (Chandler, 2011), by household level cost-benefit analyses 
of spraying cattle, fears and anxieties of medical procedures or drug side 
effects, collective memories of past interventions (Kovacic et al., 2015), or 
relationships of trust between people and services (Lee and Palmer, 2018). 
The landscapes that determine a person (or population’s) risk of exposure to 
HAT, or their likelihood of being detected as a case, emerge as an imagined 
environment, or ‘response surface’ (Svensson, 2016) against which people 
make calculated decisions about their own (or their animals’) health.  
 
To situate HAT as both a feature and event in this metaphor I have drawn on 
Brown and Kelly’s ‘hotspot’ metaphor to conceptualise “the mundane 
interactions that create the conditions for pathogenic possibility” (2014: 3). 
Initially developed to analyse the complex relationalities driving Viral 
Haemorrhagic Fever (VHF) transmission, the hotspot is a useful analytical 
heuristic to identify sites where various human– animal–nonhuman 
entanglements facilitate pathogen movements and transmission. More than a 
single state of aligning criteria, the hotspot describes the transient moments, 
or “context in actions” (Lezaun and Woolgar 2013), where the temporary 
convergence of political designs, economic strategies, agricultural 
techniques, armed conflict, built environments, and practices of care come 
together to create the conditions for disease communicability (ibid: 2). This 
speaks to an ‘ecological imaginary’ that goes beyond singular moments of 
exposure or contact into ‘the assemblages of diseases’ (Audy 1954:962 in 
Brown and Kelly, 2014). 
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Here I have also found the concept of ‘patches’ as described by Scoones 
(1991; 2017) a helpful metaphor to conceptualise the spatial plane of 
intersecting social and environmental elements come together in moments of 
transmission. Patches are defined in ecological terms as biophysical features 
associated with particular vegetation and animal populations for example 
(Pickett and Cadenasso 1995 in Scones et al., 2017). But patches also form 
part of social landscapes (Scoones 1991), shaped by “an intersection of 
social relations, institutional dynamics, and political contestation” (Scoones et 
al., 2017). When landscapes change, bringing transmission cycles into 
contact, disease dynamics in turn may also fundamentally transform with 
profound implications (Adams et al., 2017). The mass displacement of 
populations during civil conflict allowing tsetse habitats to proliferate, followed 
by the re-introduction of large numbers of infected cattle for example created 
patches, or hotspots, in which conditions for pathogenic possibility coincided 
to produce notable outbreaks of rhodesiense HAT in the 1980s and early 
2000s. 
 
Troubling the techno-centric narratives that define contemporary global 
health interventions (Mongtomery et al., 2017), I question the extent to which 
programme strategies which emphasise rigid, blueprint-driven interventions, 
are able to effectively deal with the “open socio-ecological dynamics, 
complexity, uncertainty, and non-linearity that underlie parasitic transmission 
in human communities” (2017: 2). Given the complex socio-ecological 
dynamics of HAT, I join them and others that argue for an interdisciplinary 
approach to HAT control, not only between natural and social science 
investigation, but involving meaningful local participation (Bardosh, 2016; 





Critically evaluating Community Participation in interventions 
 
Public-Private Partnerships and donors have historically centred cost-
effectiveness to programme sustainability, but much less so the broader 
socio-ecological dynamics of disease control (Michael and Madon, 2017; 
Scoones et al., 2017). Much of the recent literature on the sustainability of 
global health interventions concerns strategic ‘community participation’ for 
improving sustainability, but this has largely focused on technology 
acceptance and co-operation. There has been a long tradition in critical 
development studies of questioning whether rhetorical appeals to 
‘community’ and ‘participation’ actually correspond to anything substantial 
(Oakley, 1989; Rifkin and Kangere in Hartley, 2002; Howard and Wheeler, 
2015). To date, few studies have explored who exactly comprise the 
‘communities’ concerned, and to what extent or end their participation is 
encouraged (Montgomery and Pool, 2015; Kelly et al., 2016; Madon et al., 
2018). Rifkin’s (2014) review of community participation interventions on 
communicable and non-communicable diseases concludes that while many 
participatory interventions seem to have an impact on improved health 
outcomes, the role of community participation and its relationship with these 
outcomes remain poorly understood or defined, with no standard definition 
for the terms ‘community’ and ‘participation’ even. Community participation 
has come to be loosely conceived as an intervention evaluated only through 
health related outcomes, rather than through all of the dynamic changes that 
occur throughout the participation process.  
 
While my research does not employ participatory methods per se, it does 
concern itself with participation and collaboration as a variable in the 
sustainability of interventions. A growing body of literature in global health 
and development views ‘community participation’ as an essential driving 
force for health program sustainability, based on the assumption that 
engaging with communities makes interventions more relevant to local 
priorities (Rifkin, 1986, 2014; WHO, 2002; Draper et al., 2010). However, the 
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mechanisms by which community participation leads to sustainable health 
outcomes exactly, and to what end, remain unclear (Hossain et al., 2004). 
Intervention studies are dominant in health research, largely designed by 
health professionals seeking to test hypotheses by introducing interventions 
and evaluating their outcomes. However these outcomes are determined by 
context, and context varies (Rifkin, 2014). Given that large, population-wide 
vertical programmes have traditionally dominated HAT control, I am 
interested in how these emerging strategies are evolving with shifting 
development discourses on the relationship between intervention 
sustainability and community participation, since calls for community 
participation in the Alma Ata declaration (WHO 1978). 
 
Participation in this context is concerned with ‘handing over control’, and the 
ownership of activities, outputs and outcomes to beneficiaries, viewing 
beneficiaries of interventions or research as drivers of the process, rather 
than interventions being imposed on them (Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995). 
Community participation encompasses a range of different approaches, from 
health delivery and promotion, community development, to social, economic 
and political justice (WHO, 2004). My research specifically focuses on the 
health intervention delivery framework, and engagement between HAT 
control programmes and their perceived local beneficiaries. I also expand the 
category of ‘local people’ to include the local staff implementing these 
projects, as they too form part of the micro-level socio-ecological systems 
into which programmes seek to integrate.  
 
My research takes the definition of community participation as a “process 
that supports interventions” (Kovacic, 2015: 34), which centres the 
transformative and dynamic process of participation as being equally 
important in driving health-related outcomes. While my study does not 
employ participatory methods, it is interested in understanding how 
engagement and participation with target ‘communities’ are used as methods 
for making HAT technologies acceptable and sustainable. To this end my 
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research is interested in how interventions measured domains such as 
empowerment, ownership, capacity building, resources mobilisation, 
management, cost-effectiveness, and sustainability (Rifkin, 2014). In 
choosing to conduct case studies on technological interventions delivered 
through donor funded public private partnerships, by a range of government 
and non-governmental actors, I also aim to explore issues of participation in 
the context of authoritative power and control, where divisions of power are 
exercised among participants themselves, between facilitators and 
participants, or between donors and beneficiaries (Cook and Kothari, 2001). 
 
Debate has revolved around whether community participation ought to strive 
toward improving service delivery, increasing the uptake of interventions, or 
addressing broader structural inequities in healthcare (Rifkin, 2003; George 
et al., 2015a). The Tiny Targets standard operating procedures for example 
stipulate that “the main goal of sensitization is to achieve community 
acceptance of a tsetse control operation […] to promote behaviours that will 
optimize trap and target performance in the field” (Torr, 2016: 13). 
Measurable indicators for evaluating behavioural change and impact 
however is complex and difficult to define. How one defines ‘community 
acceptance’ for example could be interpreted in a number of ways and 
subject to some debate as to on whose terms a technology is accepted or 
not accepted. 
 
Furthermore, Mosse (1994) argues that the term ‘participation’ can be used 
by ‘experts’ to manipulate local communities and extract ‘local knowledge’ to 
serve their own interests. Knowledge is created by the dominant views, while 
less dominant opinions, (particularly if they do not align with the project 
objectives), are often excluded. Robert Chambers has written extensively on 
Community Participation and points out that contrary to common 
misconception, local participation, particularly in East African development 
projects, has “often been inequitable because of compulsory labour, 
contributions in kind exacted by force, regressive levels of contributions, and 
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the capture of benefits by local leaders and elites” (2005: 86). Medical 
anthropologist Paul Farmer (2013) also interrogates ‘whose knowledge 
counts’ and the institutionalisation of the of external ‘expert’ authority in 
public health, arguing that inequalities in global health are fuelled by such 
disparities.  
 
Indeed, there is growing recognition that by its very nature community 
participation must address issues of power and control (Madon et al., 2018). 
For example, one study of community-led treatment interventions for 
onchocerciasis (river blindness) control across four African countries 
revealed the need for programme implementers to improve communication 
and outreach activities,  allowing communities more control over planning the 
timing of treatment administration and ownership of the intervention 
(Amaziqo et al., 2002). Another recent study in Uganda has also showed 
how unrealistic community expectations, limited drugs and supplies, poor 
supervision and lack of compensation resulted in feelings of 
disempowerment amongst health workers, with adverse effects on their 
motivation to deliver health services for febrile children (Banek et al., 2015). 
As this thesis goes on to show, interventions may also be compromised due 
to lack of understanding or trust between the community and frontline health 
workers, as well as the capacity and morale of community health workers 
delivering interventions in resource constrained contexts. Drawing on existing 
evidence from other studies an theory I would expect that HAT interventions 
which are less collaborative or participatory are less sustainable, as they fail 
to make interventions culturally appropriate, appealing or culturally effective 




As the previous chapters have made clear, there is a need to better 
understand the relationship between science and global health and 
development, and more specifically the ways in which appropriate 
technologies can be made available to those living in extreme poverty 
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(Conway and Waage, 2010). While global investments in scientific research 
since World War II have undoubtedly helped achieve progress in many 
domains of ‘development’, progress has also been uneven. Many of today’s 
so-called neglected tropical or zoonotic diseases (NTDs or NZDs) of poverty, 
for example, have been overlooked for decades by the assemblage of 
governments, actors and systems responsible for determining priorities in 
global health. With focused advocacy efforts over the last two decades, 
however, these diseases have received increasing attention and resources, 
which have in turn attracted new actors and the development of innovations. 
This also matters theoretically, as while normative discourses on the subject 
describe science as leading to development in a linear way, an important 
body of critical social science literature describes this relationship as 
symbiotic (Smith, 2009; 2010). Development may be driven by the 
implementation of new technologies, but science is also pushed forward by 
our desire for progress. The risk in this relationship is that science can 
effectively absolve us of developmental responsibility, leaving us in a position 
whereby action today is easily retracted in favour of future techno-solutions. 
 
Uganda is a priority country in which to observe the interaction of science 
and development in HAT for at least two reasons. First, in the post-colonial 
period, it is one of the only countries in Africa which experienced both large-
scale, debilitating outbreaks and large-scale, impressive control 
programmes. Second, the multiple forms of Trypanosomiasis (human Tb 
gambiense and Tb rhodesiense as well as the several strains which cause 
disease in animals) that occur here make coordinating the scientific and 
developmental, human and animal, social and economic systems influencing 
their control particularly complex. This project aims to identify the political 
and social processes by which epidemiological evidence on what constitutes 
a ‘case’ of disease is constructed (Krieger, 2011; Broadbent, 2013; Edelman, 
2018), and how scientific technologies and practices re-inscribe the social 
processes shaping evidence construction on the ground. This study 
comprises ethnographic observational analyses of the daily practices of 
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different groups involved in the surveillance, management, monitoring and 
analysis of both forms of HAT, across a number of settings through a series 
of case studies. The reasons behind my choice to focus on HAT to examine 
these key issues are threefold; 
 
Firstly, Trypanosomiasis is an ideal candidate for the ‘One Health’ approach, 
particularly given the range of complex interactions between human, animal, 
vector and environmental ecosystems at play in T.b. rhodesiense HAT 
(Coker et al. 2011 in Scoones, 2014. p.1). This makes it an ideal case study 
to disentangle questions relating to the dynamic drivers of neglected disease 
in this region and its impact on development. The symbiotic, co-evolved 
relationship between the disease, its hosts, vectors, and the environment 
(both physical and social) typifies both the One Health and eco-political 
entanglements, whereby each element interacts with and influences the 
agency of others within this complex system.  
 
Furthermore, Sleeping Sickness is what is described by the WHO as a ‘tool 
deficient’ Neglected disease. Rather than being amenable to large-scale, 
cost-effective, Mass Drug Administration programmes, as are some ‘tool 
ready’ NTDs (WHO, 2008), the complex (zoonotic in the case of 
rhodesiense) epidemiology of HAT requires more cross-cutting and 
interdisciplinary approaches to control. Firstly, the vector is difficult to control, 
and what drugs are available are often toxic and thus dependent on a 
positive diagnosis, which in itself presents major technical problems (Brun et 
al., 2010). Patients co-infected with other diseases such as malaria not only 
risk delay in treatment due to misdiagnosis in the first instance, but also 
require initial treatment to clear the malaria parasite before treatment for HAT 
can commence.  Many patients for T.b. gambiense HAT have been shown to 
present at health clinics only after reaching the second stage of infection 
(Kovacic, 2009:.28), and while the severe onset of symptoms in T.b. 
rhodesiense patients may lead to earlier clinical presentation, the urgency for 
accurate diagnosis and swift treatment cannot be understated. 
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Finally, HAT poses a particularly unique challenge to data collection and 
evidence formulation, owing to problems with poor surveillance and case 
detection, under reporting and misdiagnosis. These ultimately amplify 
difficulties in delivering effective healthcare and resources diagnostic tests, 
training, equipment and drugs where they are needed most (Acup, 2013). 
This is particularly the case in decentralised and resource constrained health 
systems such as Uganda’s, and one of the reasons for the country being my 
chosen field setting. The levels of under-detection in newly affected northern 
districts of Uganda such as Kaberamaido, Dokolo and Lira will likely be even 
higher than in other parts of the country (Wissmann et al., 2014. p. 7), where 
for every person that is reported to die of sleeping sickness, it is suspected a 
further 12 die of the disease undetected (Odiit, et al., 2005). 
 
Many ANT studies typically focus on ‘network builders’ such as scientists, 
while larger actors often include representatives of industry and government, 
as those who “initiate scientific and technical innovation and exert influence 
over its direction and trajectory” (Latour, 2005). My study moves beyond 
these narrow definitions of scientific communities, recognising and 
encompassing the agency of all actors initiating and generating data in this 
system, from farmers and healthcare professionals, to laboratory staff and 
patients. Following these individuals and their daily practice allows me to 
trace the ‘trails of entanglements’ (Nading, 2014) that Sleeping Sickness 
leaves behind. Drawing on existing ethnographic work (Latour and 
Woolgar,1986; Mol, 2003; Nading, 2014), I carried out a series of micro-level 
case studies in the field, laboratories, and clinics, tracing the production of 
epidemiological evidence through the HAT control system. Bringing 
ethnographic insights from the community and the hospital together reveals 
and highlights practices that transcend the confines of the hospital, in the 
care provided by family members during hospital admission, or the practices 
of local health workers who occupy both domains (Brown and Kelly, 2014). 
 
 98 
The findings of this research contributes to growing debate around how data 
is produced, and knowledge constructed in decentralised health systems in 
spaces where technological capacity and support for adequate disease 
surveillance is reportedly lacking. The observations outlined in this thesis will 
furthermore feed into a critical analysis of the framing and advocacy for HAT 
control and elimination in global health policy literature, and offer a front line 
perspective on the practical operationalisation and implementation of policy 
recommendations at the ground level. By describing the daily practices, 
negotiations, and trade-offs that occur throughout various stages of the HAT 
case detection process, the construction of evidence and its authoritative 
claims on power and expertise within the science and development 
































Research Design  
 
 
Study Objectives  
 
In order to contribute to the literature on how scientific knowledge is 
produced, valued and acted upon, my research design aimed to move 
beyond describing scientific consensus on the spatial distribution and 
epidemiology of the disease, toward critically analysing how technologies for 
sleeping sickness control are implemented in the field and come to produce 
this knowledge. This explores how HAT is positioned topologically and 
conceptually across disciplines and groups of actors by investigating the 
structure and integration of HAT control and elimination strategies through 
connections between key stakeholders operating across human and animal 
health networks.  
 
Broadly, the study aims to develop a critical ethnographic account of HAT 
control in Uganda. Specifically, it seeks to: 
 
1. Describe how HAT and perceptions of risk are constructed socially through 
technology, biomedical practice and global health discourse  
 
2. Examine how technologies of surveillance are integrated into the passive 
screening system for HAT and to what extent they address challenges to 
access and uptake of HAT services and overall case detection 
 
3. Identify gaps between HAT elimination strategies and policy, and the 
practical enactment of these on the ground. 
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Some anthropological theorists have argued the case for an “ethnographic 
empirical lantern in the critical studies of global health” (Petryna and Beihl , 
2013). I hope to contribute to this with body of literature empirical 
ethnographic examples toward a critical study of HAT control.  
 
The original research design for this project was structured around the core 
elements of social research design outlined in key methods texts by Blaikie 
(2000) and de Vaus (2006). Based on my research of existing literature and 
my experiences from preliminary fieldwork in 2014, I chose to conduct a 
series of ethnographic, embedded case studies (Yin, 1994) across multiple 
settings across Northern Uganda, which took technology-based interventions 
as the unit of analysis. Case studies are often seen as prime examples of 
qualitative research which adopts an interpretive approach to data by 
studying ‘things’ within their context (de Vaus, 2006: 10). They have 
generally been discussed and viewed – from a methodological point of view- 
as ‘soft’ options, but they have been fundamental to the substantive and 
methodological development of the social sciences (Yin 1989;1993). Good 
description is fundamental to this endeavour and has added immeasurably to 
our knowledge of the shape and nature of science and development. I aimed 
to design a research study that uses in-depth descriptions to provoke 
questions toward theory building, the process by which research begins with 
observations and uses inductive reasoning to derive a theory which attempts 
to make sense of these observations -  or post factum theory (Merton, 1968). 
When adopting a more inductive, theory building approach, a sequential 
design, whereby case studies followed one another, is more appropriate than 
a parallel approach (de Vaus, 2006: 227). An advantage of the sequential 
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approach is that the selection of each case and some of the issues examined 
can be informed by other questions identified in earlier cases. 
 
Qualitative data was collected over an extensive period spanning 12 months 
to allow sufficient time to access and fully describe these case studies. 
Within this methodological framework, the in depth, semi-structured interview 
played a key role, as well as extensive and descriptive observational field 
notes.  
 
The cases, or ‘objects’ of study, are the units that we seek to understand as 
a whole. It is helpful to distinguish between cases as a whole and cases that 
consist of various levels or components. Yin (1989) uses the terms ‘holistic’ 
and ‘embedded’ designs to refer to this distinction. Some cases consist of 
multiple levels or components. For example, the national HAT control 
programme as a case study includes government staff, health workers, 
patients, entomologists, and policy makers, and so on. The control 
programme can be conceived of at the ‘holistic’ level where we focus on 
characteristics of the programme the level of the global One Health 
assemblage. But there are also many sublevels of elements to the 
programme. A full picture in all its complexity can only be obtained if I collect 
information from a wide range of the constituent elements (embedded units) 
of the larger unit (de Vaus, 2006: 220). I sought to build up a picture of each 
case by taking into account information gained from many levels in the hope 
that the cumulative body of work would tell us more than, and something 
qualitatively different from, that which any constituent element of the case 
could tell us. The insights gained from health workers, patients, community 
animal sprayers, programme managers etc. would probably differ and, when 
taken together, provide a much fuller, more complex understanding of the 
whole than would the perspective provided by any particular element of the 
case; “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (ibid: 221). Since many 
cases will consist of different elements, different methods of data collection 
may be required. A survey of health centres might be appropriate, 
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observation of point of care testing or treatment, while interviews are a good 
way of gaining information from programme managers and frontline health 
workers. Taking a mixed-methods approach, my research also employs 
some use of surveys (of health centres) and some limited quantitative 
analyses of responses from patient interviews.  
  
Data was collected over a period of twelve months from July 2015-2016, with 
the assistance of translators/research assistants identified with the 
assistance of COCTU and local collaborators. Research assistant(s) were 
recruited and briefed on the study objectives and trained in the qualitative 
methods prior to data collection commencing. In order to develop a complex 
understanding of the services, organisations, social networks and systems of 
thought influencing access to care, I used a range of qualitative, 
ethnographic methods. To describe narratives driving HAT service provision, 
key informant interviews were conducted with heath care workers delivering 
HAT services as well as government and NGO officials who organise HAT 
and health services for local communities. Focus group discussions (FGDs) 
with local communities, as well as community health workers and animal 
health workers were used to elicit narratives about HAT and general risks to 
health in the population. These were further supported by interviews with 
people seeking HAT tests at facilities. Non-participant observation of these 
services was used alongside these activities throughout the fieldwork period 
to describe the context of HAT testing and delivery of health services at 
facilities serving local populations.  
 
My fieldwork was split into four sub-studies, examining technologies of 
surveillance and case detection, community perceptions of HAT, and 
practices of surveillance and control from the point of care up to programme 
level. Therefore all of the research objectives outlined above are covered in 
each study while focussing on different technologies, perceptions, and 
practices operating across the country and across control systems for both 




The fieldwork setting for my research took place in the borderlands 
separating the two strains of HAT on the continent. While cases of T.b. 
gambiense to the North West of Uganda are arguably declining, T.b 
rhodesiense has become increasingly established in the Teso and Lando 
sub-regions of northern central Uganda, namely Kaberamaido, Dokolo and 
Lira (figure 12). By working on the fringes of these HAT border regions I 
aimed to gain a unique insight into the different surveillance networks 
(human, animal, and vector) operating and responding to the outbreak 
narrative (Leach & Dry, 2010) being enacted on the “thin line between two 
fatal diseases” (Wissman et al. 2014) within a geographical space of 
epidemiological contention.  
 
One half of my research would be based in the West Nile region, where new 
RDTs for HAT have been rolled out in order to enable faster, cheaper 
diagnosis of chronic T.b. gambiense HAT. Local communities in West Nile 
use pluralistic health services (Leslie, 1973). ‘Medical pluralism’ refers to the 
multiple treatment systems that spatially co-exist alongside biomedicine. It is 
extremely common in the health seeking process in this region for people to 
use different treatment options, ranging from the formal health system to 
traditional methods, such as herbal treatment and traditional healers. Self-
treatment with medications purchased at informal local drug shops, often run 
by lay people, is also extremely common (Kovacic, 2009). I chose to conduct 
half of my research here as the West Nile is where two new innovations in 
HAT surveillance and control (the new RDT and the Tiny Targets) were being 
rolled out and scaled up at the time of study. I conducted my investigations 
into these alongside each other while based at the Liverpool School of 
Tropical Medicine’s field station in Arua town where I was able to utilise the 




The other focus of my fieldwork took place across four districts (Lira, 
Alebtong, Kaberamaido, and Dokolo) in the Teso and Lango regions of 
northern central Uganda which have been affected by Rhodesiense HAT 
since 2004 (Hamill et al. 2017). The on-going threat of a potential public 
health crisis given the increasing spread of T.b. rhodesiense northward 
highlights the importance of heightened surveillance in this region, and has 
partly informed my intention to focus my research here. By following the 
activities of community animal health workers along these edges, insight may 
be given into how such vertical, disciplined approaches to data management 
shaped by PPPs and DIBs models potentially affect the quality of evidence 
collected on the ground. Here I also conducted a study of treatment 
experiences among recovered rhodesiense patients discharged from the two 




Figure 10: Study regions for case studies 2, 3 and 4 in Lira, Kaberamaido, and Dokolo districts  
(Red), and studies 1 and 4 in the West Nile (green) (Selby, 2011: 173). 
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Home to the mostly Christian Lango, Iteso, and Kumam peoples, the 
predominant economic activities in these areas are agriculture and fishing, 
with most of the population engaged in or dependent on subsistence mixed 
crop- livestock farming (Bardosh, 2016). This is a region where, owing to the 
relatively recent establishment of T.b rhodesiense, capability for detecting the 
disease is low, while the need for heightened surveillance is great.  
 
I chose to work in these specific districts owing to the relatively recent 
establishment of T.b. rhodesiense in this region, necessitating the 
assessment of local healthcare facilities’ ability to adequately detect and 
respond to new cases. Based on the most recent available figures of HAT 
cases and T. brucei sero-prevalence among cattle (indicated by recent 
prevalence sampling conducted by the then recently completed SOS 
feasibility study), I was able to narrow my study location down to specific 
areas. Within this region I also visited a selection of Health Centres of 
various levels from the facilities represented in the national census and in 
previous studies (figure 13), and carried out a survey of the levels of 
diagnostic, laboratory equipment, personnel and data recording systems 
present. This way my observations relating to the infrastructural capacity of 





Figure 11: Map of Health Centres across Northern Uganda. 




During this phase of research I was based at the HAT treatment centre at 
Dokolo HC IV in Dokolo town centre, where I was also hosted by Dr 
Frederick Odongo, a co-founding member of the 3V vets franchise and 
community mobile spraying network. Being based at Dokolo HC gave me 
access to up to date data and records on HAT patients treated and 
discharged from the treatment centre, as well as plenty of opportunities to 
work alongside and speak with staff who manage HAT cases on a daily 
basis, as well as any HAT patients that were admitted during my study. 
Dokolo HC was an ideal location to base myself from conducting the survey 
of health centres across Kaberamaido and Dokolo districts being located at a 





Data management, storage and analysis 
 
Where translation was required, research assistants were trained prior to 
fieldwork to record, transcribe, translate and store qualitative data. Where 
translation was not required I recorded interviews and transcribed these 
accordingly, storing data on both a local and secure cloud network 
(University of Edinburgh DataSync server). Each interview or Focus Group 
Discussion transcript, associated field notes, contact summary notes and 
audio recordings were labelled with an ID number substituting for the name 
of the participant and saved as a single document. These qualitative 
documents were then imported to NVivo software (version 11) for thematic 
coding and analysis according to the objectives and design outlined above.  
 
Ethical Considerations  
 
A research protocol for this research was reviewed and approved by the 
University of Edinburgh School of Social and Political Sciences’ Ethics 
Review Board, Busitema University IRB, and the Ugandan National Council 
for Science and Technology (see appendix 1, 2, and 3), and approved by the 
President’s Office of Uganda (appendix 4). 
 
Following the ethical guidelines outlined by the ASA (Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth) I ensured that all participants 
were fully informed regarding the purpose of my study and give their oral 
consent and understand the following:  
i) That participation in my study is entirely voluntary 
ii) They may choose not to answer any question that might cause 
concern or discomfort 
iii)  They may leave the study at any time without having to give a 
reason for leaving.  
 
Consent was obtained by asking respondents’ permission to record 
interviews on tape (Fontana & Frey, 2000: 645) Where consent was given to 
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do so, professional titles have been used in publication, but no names given. 
Elsewhere, names of individuals (e.g. healthcare workers and community 
sprayers in ethnographic vignettes) have been changed to preserve the 
identity of participants (Homan, 1991; Wiles et al., 2005). Interview and focus 
group participants were given the option to have their responses and data 
anonymised, whereby respondents are referenced only by a unique 
numerical identifier code in interviews and descriptive categories instead of 
names (e.g. health centre nurse, farmer, lab technician etc.).   
 
No participants were exposed to any physical or psychological risks or harm 
for this study. No interviews were conducted without informed consent 
(consent forms in appendix 5), and particular care was taken to explain that 
participation in the study is voluntary. When approaching patients waiting for 
tests, interviewers stressed that neither I nor they are clinicians and so 
cannot offer any medical advice. Oral consent scripts were translated into 
local languages (and back-translated into English to verify accuracy) with the 
assistance of research assistants fluent in local dialects. Written consent was 
obtained from health workers and staff representing organisations. Where 
low levels of literacy among local populations presented barriers to providing 
written consent, witnessed oral consent was obtained with the option of 
participants providing a thumb print to consent forms. Participants were also 
offered the option of not being audio recorded but still contributing to 
conversations. No remuneration was given to people who participated in the 
study, and all participants were anonymised in reports of the study findings. 
 
Participation in the research may have been voluntary, but several scholars 
have also acknowledged that there are few compelling reasons to engage, 
and participants are rarely presented with economic incentives (Maanen, 
1991; Clark, 2008, 2010; Way, 2013). When conducting my research, I was 
careful to make clear that no remuneration for participation could be made, 
and that the impact of my research was unlikely to be directly beneficial to 
specific individuals or communities. While I did not have the time or 
resources to return and relay my findings to communities, I communicated at 
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the time that important aspects of my findings, informed by participants’ 
anonymised responses would be communicated via various channels of 
research distribution to hopefully improve certain aspects of the national HAT 





To capture the most rounded perspective I used a range of ethnographic 
methods including in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and 
observation, with the large body of my data coming from interviews and 
recorded observations of practice and conversations with key informants.  
 
Key Informant Interviews  
 
Key informant interviews offer a combination of structure and flexibility, with 
face-to-face interactions offer a relaxing, intimate and informal context to 
allow a constructive conversations to develop between myself and the 
respondent (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Key informants in my study include 
practitioners taking part in the diagnostic, treatment and data collection 
process – as the generators of data (whereas ‘experts’ can be considered 
producers of evidence), as well as patients. I held these with a wide range of 
individuals, varying from policy makers and representatives from key 
stakeholders in PPPs, and knowledge brokers (i.e. those delivering evidence 
to policy makers such as academic researchers), to healthcare professionals 
(both animal and human), lab technicians, to members of the local 
community and recovered patients. 
 
While I intended to negotiate access to some of these individuals from my 
base in the UK, the initial period of time in Uganda during preliminary 
fieldwork in 2014 was used to establish contacts and familiarise myself with 
informants, and address any other outstanding logistical issues regarding 
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access and schedules. I anticipated, correctly, that some complications may 
arise, such as informants changing appointments or reluctance to participate 
in interviews. This pattern reflects Hertz and Imber’s account of accessing 
and interviewing elites and other key informants (1993, p. 3). These 
experiences had implications for cost and time management, and to some 
extent were unavoidable. However the few occasions where access was 
hesitant were largely mediated by approaching interview subjects formally, 




Focus Group Discussions and Participant Observation 
 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) data draws on participants’ spontaneous 
interactions with each other in a safe space to share ideas and opinions 
among people of similar social, economic, cultural and gender backgrounds 
(Lincoln and Denzin, 2000). FGDs provide opportunities to explore different 
perspectives, although compared to interviews, they are generally more 
prone to generate opinions accepted as norms in a given social context 
(Richie and Lewis, 2003). For my study, focus groups were held with farmers 
to explore local animal health priorities and approaches to treating cattle for 
animal and human trypanosomiasis. Robert Chambers’ material on 
Participatory Rural Appraisal (1994; 1997) and workshops (2002) provided 
some useful insight into various approaches to consider when designing my 
own workshops and group discussions. I was also extremely fortunate in 
being able to accompany Dr Jennifer Palmer at the beginning of my fieldwork 
in July 2015 in conducting focus groups in the West Nile for her own 
concurrent research. This gave me some first-hand observation and 
experience of setting up, mobilising, and running focus groups with research 
staff. 
 
The basis for the content of topics and themes covered in FDGs was 
informed by a review of the literature and previous studies, and feedback and 
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interviews with local 3V vets regarding local attitudes and farmer’s reception 
of the SOS intervention and local community sprayers. My research 
assistants and I aimed to gather natural groups of 8-to-10 people that could 
feel comfortable in each other’s company to share their thoughts freely. 
Occasionally, particularly during election season in 2016, this was 
complicated by the frequent touring of political candidates in motorcades 
which would gather people and hand out sums of cash or items of party 
affiliated campaign merchandise. This sometimes led to initial confusion or 
disappointment with our arrival and purpose of mobilising groups, which was 
delicately handled by my research staff. 
 
On other occasions, focus groups were interrupted by inebriated individuals 
which disrupted proceedings. However in most cases this was no more than 
innocuous interruptions or interjections, and only once escalated into an 
altercation between group members which resulted in the focus group being 
suspended. This was later re-scheduled to the following day at a time in the 
morning when we were informed we would be more likely to find people in a 
state of sobriety, and we decided to conduct FDGs early on in the mornings 
thereafter. 
 
It was important for me to make my position as an independent researcher 
with no affiliation with local healthcare services or the Ministry of Health very 
clear to participants. During one of my first focus groups, some respondents 
aired their concerns about the consequences of sharing negative 
experiences with local health services: 
 
“For instance, coming here and getting information like this, all these 
problems, these people will now punish us for telling you”. 
 
“Politicians up there they will come and shout at them [health workers] 
for telling you these things”. 
- Focus group participants, Lira district 
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Although it had been made clear whilst explaining the study and obtaining 
consent that all respondents would be anonymised, the topics covered in the 
discussion – on health and local healthcare services, elicited concern that we 
were conducting a report for the Ministry of Health, and that any complaints 
might lead to serious repercussions for local health workers or the population 
being served by local government health centres. Although we managed to 
allay these concerns, and greater lengths were taken to make ourselves and 
the project distinct from any formal association with the health sector, I was 
mindful that responses during discussions may be influenced by the nature of 
the topics discussed, or simply by my fitting the image of a white European 
working with health and development projects in an historically research 
fatigued region. This would be true for one-to-one interviews as much as 




Health Centre Survey 
 
During my survey of level II and III Health Centres across Kaberamaido, 
Dokolo, Alebtong, and Lira Districts, I visited 13 facilities, (2 HC IV, 12 HC 
level III, and 10 HC level II) and interviewed 29 members of staff. These 
would generally be the most senior available members of staff on duty on the 
day of visitation, such as the clinical in charge or medical superintendent. 
Each health centre visit would always include a viewing of the laboratory 
facilities (if any) and an interview with lab staff. This allowed me to get a 
rounder view not only of the health centre’s general capacity and position 
within the local area in terms of community outreach, but also an insight into 
the material, technical capacity of the testing capabilities on site. Most of the 
facilities visited had a working lab with at least one member of laboratory 
staff, a laboratory technician, or lab assistant, and in some cases both 
(generally level III facilities only).   
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Marsh (1982) argues that quantitative surveys can provide information and 
explanations that are ‘adequate at the level of meaning’, but recognises that 
survey research is not always good at capturing the subjective dimension of 
behaviour. This is why I have incorporated semi-structured interviews with 
staff, and in-depth observational data through ethnographic methods. By 
recording the diagnostic capacity in technological terms, I could evaluate the 
extent to which the presence or absence of these material objects are in the 
diagnostic assemblage, compared to say the syndromic suspicion of staff, or 
their confidence in performing certain tests or knowing how to report or 
manage HAT cases if they arose. Responses to these kinds of questions are 
less amenable to survey methods and overly reductive, and so a mixed-
methods, largely qualitative approach to this case study allowed for a 




Study limitations and responding to problems in the field 
 
 
While some adverse circumstances during my fieldwork were averted or 
mitigated through meticulous planning, not all eventualities can be accounted 
for in risk assessments or fieldwork plans, and at times I found myself having 
to adapt to rapidly evolving situations as they arose. This ranged from 
frequently occurring and relatively benign events, such as delays in gaining 
permissions and approvals from authorities, loss of hardware or data, 
transport breakdowns, and becoming stranded by adverse weather and 
environmental challenges, to less common but disruptive and potentially 
serious events. In my own experience these included becoming seriously ill 
in a remote place, bereavement (for which I took leave from fieldwork and 
returned to finish data collection later than scheduled), team members 
needing to leave at short notice for personal emergencies, losing access to 
finances, defusing conflict situations with agitated or inebriated individuals, 
and navigating signs of potential political unrest (e.g. during election season).  
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I have also had to adapt and respond to changing relationships between 
collaborating research groups, or fieldwork plans and partnerships falling 
through. Having a flexible, iterative research design meant that I had 
alternative options available to me, and after revising my research design 
more than once due to changing circumstances, I was able to build a 
stronger and more resilient project. The motivation to conduct a large and 
ambitious project such as mine also enabled me to adapt to multiple changes 
to circumstances and plans throughout my fieldwork, and having this flexible 
research design allowed me to navigate and respond to changing 
circumstances to minimise negative impacts on the schedule or 
implementation of my research.  
 
For example, the unfortunate timing amidst the uncertain and critical stage of 
the feasibility study phase of the SOS mass cattle treatment campaign I was 
planning to work alongside, eventually rendered my collaboration with the 
programme untenable. Possibly owing to uncertainty of securing investment 
at the time, my involvement may have become a subject of discomfort and 
contention with some partners. To avoid potential conflict or disruption to the 
programme (and minimise potential risk to my own research), I responded 
quickly to an opportunity that had arisen with the Tiny Targets tsetse fly 
control programme that was being piloted and scaled up in the West Nile 
region of Uganda. This was in a more advanced stage of implementation, 
and would allow me much greater access to participating communities for my 
own research. Being able to be flexible in this way meant that I was able to 
respond to a changing situation on the ground and strengthen my research 
the better for it. 
 
 
Reflections on positionality and responsibility  
 
I have sought to align this thesis with a body of ethnographic research that 
concerns itself with how interventions work in the context of global health and 
development. However, this is not in itself an ethnographic piece of work per 
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se, although it does employ a suite of qualitative methods from the 
ethnographic toolbox, namely in-depth interviews, naturalistic observation, 
and discourse analysis. Moving from one technology or intervention, and 
thus study site, as often as I did for this research, meant that the length of 
time, extent to which I could immerse myself as part of one particular 
scientific community or role was too limited to describe the insights produced 
as truly ethnographic. Other distinctions must also be drawn between 
ethnographic studies and my own, given the socio-economic and 
epistemological characteristics that preclude me as an ‘outsider’ from 
securing the degree of engagement with various communities required for a 
full ethnography. As a white, middle-class British-Irish woman, my physical 
appearance and identity as a ‘mzungu’ in Uganda would always be my most 
prominent and defining presentation in most social interactions. 
 
During one particular encounter at COCTU headquarters, after delivering a 
progress report from my research to a member of staff, I was asked whether 
I planned to return to Uganda to ‘become a consultant’ after I finished my 
PhD. “People from your countries make nice careers in consulting. They fly in 
at great expense and interview everybody,  then make a nice report to tell us 
what we already know!” We laughed, but I found myself hesitant, 
embarrassed that I had been ‘caught out’ with my privilege on show. 
 
Of course, the observation was entirely on point; my position as a white, 
western woman conducting research under a well-funded project with a 
renowned British university could never be anything but conspicuous. One of 
the key lessons I took away from my fieldwork was just how these 
intersecting layers of privilege are only inconspicuous to those who benefit 
from it. Daily realisations through such interactions provoked moments of 
overwhelming reflexivity, and brought home a profound sense of 
responsibility. Not only in terms of how I position myself as a researcher, but 
how I raise the ‘voices of the field’ (Okwaro et al., 2015) my research was 
drawing on. My expertise often paled significantly against the collective 
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wealth of my informants’ knowledge, which had been packaged in the potted 
summaries of my own ‘analyses’, and the concern that my relationships with 
local practitioners was extractive or exploitative in some way became an 
uncomfortable point of existential contention for me during my fieldwork. I 
also learned that acknowledging and confronting this discomfort is a good 
thing, and that situating my anxiety in context can serve productively as good 
praxis toward being critically reflexive of my work. That I had the funding and 
institutional backing to be in Uganda conducting this research seemed 
revealing of a long and problematic relationship between global ‘northern’ 
institutions, often forged through ties to colonial pasts, with countries in the 
global south.  
 
The privilege afforded to me by my association with Edinburgh University, an 
institution with a long-standing relationship with the COCTU and wider HAT 
community in Uganda, was revealed to me frequently in daily interactions 
and performances of institutional and reputational power. For example, my 
ties with Edinburgh were often conflated with an association with the Welburn 
group and the SOS programme. In my early days of fieldwork this was at 
times a great facilitator to gaining access to certain individuals in COCTU or 
the Ministry of Agriculture for example, but also a barrier in other situations 
where this relationship had not necessarily been positive. In the early stages 
of my project, from my co-supervision with Professor Sue Welburn and 
during preliminary fieldwork in 2014 accompanying the SOS programme, this 
association was more tangible and a source of reputable association I could 
draw on when arranging meetings or interviews with key stakeholders. 
However, as this supervisory and collaborative relationship changed over 
time up to when I began my main phase of data collection, my association 
with SOS diminished, and to some degree my status with it. I now had to 
present myself more as being from the University of Edinburgh, but 
independent from the Welburn group and SOS, a frequent source of 
confusion given the interchangeable conflation of ‘Edinburgh’ with ‘SOS’ that 
had developed over the past decade. However, emerging as an 
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‘independent’ researcher from an institution with well-established ties to the 
HAT network in Uganda, but unaffiliated with any particular intervention 
project was also liberating and made my interactions with other research 
groups or programmes much easier, being perhaps viewed as unthreatening, 
or relatively impartial.  
 
Additionally, coming from a multidisciplinary background, it is logical that I 
would draw on a number of disciplines when designing and conducting my 
research. The original project I attained my studentship for was funded by an 
Advanced Quantitative Methods ESRC studentship, which encouraged 
students with a quantitative background to pursue multidisciplinary PhDs. 
However, despite my initial enthusiasm for surveys, models, and Social 
Network Analyses in earlier research proposals, it became evident very early 
on that the kinds of questions this project was asking could not be answered 
using quantitative methods. Therefore, this thesis drew on a mixed methods - 
and largely - qualitative approach. Taking a mixed methods approach was 
advantageous in that it allowed a flexible approach to my research design, 
and the freedom to adapt my topics of study in response to the reality, 
including the changing nature of collaborations, that I encountered on the 
ground.  
 
By tracing Trypanosomiasis from the point of detection through to the 
preventative control, I found not a singular version, but multiple 
‘Trypanosomiases’, enacted by different actors across different settings (Mol, 
2003) in different ways. By following the trajectory of the disease through the 
landscape of elimination, I aimed to characterise some of the structural, 
biological, and socio-technical  elements of the HAT ecosystem. I began by 























Where the sickness sleeps  






“Artefacts only have significance in the hands of people” 
 
- Whyte, van der Geest, and Hardon, 2002 
 
 
Diagnosing Human African Trypanosomiasis (HAT) is complicated, requiring 
the alignment of clinical suspicion with serological, parasitological, and 
molecular confirmation to determine appropriate treatment. Classically HAT 
is diagnosed via a three-step approach: the identification of clinical and 
serological suspects, parasitological confirmation, and disease staging. This 
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chapter concerns the first two steps which can be broadly classed as ‘case 
detection’. It begins by describing a mobile screening, a now rare event that 
once characterised the state’s public performance of HAT intervention in the 
historically T.b. gambiense endemic West Nile. Participants problematise the 
new strategy, foregrounding the chapter’s exploration of how HAT is detected 
syndromically by patients and health workers amidst a changing referral 
landscape.  
 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on the treatment seeking trajectories of 
syndromic patients in pluralistic landscapes of state, self, and private care. 
Where these intersect with state health infrastructures of surveillance, HAT is 
then ‘read’ (Umlauf and Beisel, 2016) and ‘translated’ (Callon, 1980) by 
serological diagnosis (via the presence of trypanosome-specific antibodies in 
the blood).The chapter then focusses on the trajectory of patients who are 
serological suspects as they navigate the new decentralised referral system 
to receive their confirmatory diagnosis. Interviews with 20 RDT-positive HAT 
suspects who had failed to complete their follow-up referral reveal that the 
diagnostic landscape and treatment-seeking pathways navigated by patients 
are not as linear as the Intensified Sleeping Sickness Elimination Programme 
(ISSEP) assumes. Communication at the point of testing is identified as a 
factor in determining referral non-completion, as suspects were largely 
unaware of the need or importance of having their RDT result confirmed by 
microscopy, or in some cases unaware that they had even been tested 
positive for HAT by a rapid test. 
 
Introducing an RDT-based passive surveillance system is innovative in being 
a cost-effective approach to placing diagnostic technology within the ‘material 
proximities’ (Fontein, 2011; Brown and Kelly, 2014) of patients at the primary 
healthcare level. However, this case study suggests the diagnostic 
assemblage is held together by important relationships of trust and 
communication that are sensitive to change, and highlights the importance of 
social proximity (Chandler et al., 2011). 
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Previously, HAT diagnosis has been carried out by mobile lab teams which 
confirmed cases in village screenings and transported patients for treatment. 
Since cases have declined however, expensive active screening campaigns 
have become less effective. As a result, these have been phased out and 
replaced with passive, symptom-based algorithms. Without early treatment 
HAT is fatal, yet timely diagnosis in regional referral hospitals is difficult to 
access for many of the remote, rural communities predominantly affected. 
Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs) are designed to be affordable, portable and 
easy-to-use; desirable attributes in resource-poor settings, and favourable in 
disease elimination conditions where case numbers are low and highly 
localised. 
 
Testimonies from RDT-positive referral patients depict the historical and 
social phenomena that shape the ‘therapeutic’ landscape in which individuals 
seek care (Gesler 1992, 1993; Gesler and Kearns 2002; Street and Coleman 
2012; Winchester and McGrath 2017; Cross and MacGregor, 2009). They 
describe the local “ecologies of testing” (Umlauf, 2017), and the management 
of expectations and anxieties, illustrating how patients navigate and 
frequently deviate from the diagnostic landscapes imagined and constructed 

















James claps his hands in jubilation at our arrival, “It is here! Stop the car,” he 
announces as we pull up into a clearing. After three hours of navigating pot-
holes and impenetrable fields of elephant grass and cassava, we finally 
come upon Ewanyati. The village is too far from either Yumbe or Omugo, the 
two closest health centres with level IV laboratory facilities, for us to transport 
patients back for their microscopy tests, so today we must bring the lab with 
us. 
 
While active screening is no longer the norm here in the West Nile, specific 
projects and reactive screenings are still conducted sporadically, though not 
as part of a concerted large-scale surveillance programme. In recent months, 
the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine has been conducting active 
screening across the region where it has just introduced a widespread 
network of insecticidal treated nets called Tiny Targets, in a bid to 
significantly reduce the tsetse fly population and interrupt transmission of 
human infective T.b. gambiense HAT. By actively searching for cases in 
these areas the programme sought to establish a baseline of prevalence 
data from which to measure the impact of the targets on human cases in the 
region. When I join the team in November, the screening programme is 
moving into its second phase. People who had tested positive using the 
CATT (Card Agglutination Test for Trypanosomiasis) and the new RDT 
during mobile screening must now be “rounded up”, as the regional 
programme officer Oliver puts it, and brought to the closest lab facility where 
they can undergo further tests to determine if their initial serological 
diagnosis can be confirmed via parasitological demonstration by microscopy. 
In circumstances where this is not feasible, such as today, the capacity to 
perform these tests must be brought from the clinic to remote communities.  
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After this first round of active screening follow-ups no more mobile teams 
would be deployed, and patients would be expected to present themselves 
for any further follow-ups at their nearest microscopy centre (as per the 
passive surveillance system). Ewanyati is approximately 40km from the 
nearest microscopy centre, compared to the average distance between 
peripheral RDT sites and referral facilities, closer to 12 km (Wamboga et al., 
2017), and so any confirmed suspects assembled before us here today faced 




The Omugo Hospital mobile screening team test their first patient in Ewanyati, Yumbe 
District 
 
Those who have arrived already queue patiently to be seated and have their 
CATT and RDTs repeated, and venous blood samples taken to be 
centrifuged, prepared, and inspected. Technician David takes the samples 
and drips them carefully onto individually numbered CATT cards and RDTs, 
assembling them neatly on the table in a line. Meanwhile, Jacob is 
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performing the mAECT (mini Anion Exchange Centrifugation Technique).4 
Jacob crouches over a chair, whirring capillary tubes in a handheld centrifuge 
device not dissimilar to a mechanical whisk, and prepares blood smears onto 
glass slides. Chief lab technician Albert has positioned himself and his 
microscope at the end of the production line, where he relays his results to 
Oliver, who is recording them on his clipboard.  
 
Given this kind of mobile screening is no longer the norm and has been 
replaced by the new RDT-based referral system, I’m curious to learn how 
much participants know about the new rapid test for HAT, and I approach a 
congregation of people while they wait for their results. 
 
 “Now that we know they [the RDTs] are there, I could ask for a test, yes” one 
young man responded thoughtfully, “but I don’t know how the health worker 
would react to my question […] I don’t know whether the health workers in 
our unit here will respond to our call saying we want to be tested for this 
though” (Active screening positive suspect 2). The significance of this 
uncertainty would become pertinent later on, though given how referral-non 
completion had been framed in earlier conversations with programme staff, I 
anticipated my questions regarding the new referral system to elicit generic 
complaints about long journeys and transport, as I had been told to expect. 
Instead these open a new discussion altogether. 
 
“We would find all possible ways to go, because it is a bad disease which 
needs to be treated seriously.” 
- Mobile screening positive suspect 2 
 
 
“Our worry is if we are told to come again and be tested again after 3 
months. I wonder if we will need to go to Omugo, or Yumbe, or if the team 
will come here again like they have today.” 
                                                 
4 This consists of separating the trypanosomes from venous blood and concentrating them in 
the bottom of a transparent tube by low speed centrifugation. After centrifugation, the tip of the 
transparent tube is examined under the microscope for the presence of mobile trypanosomes. 
The large blood volume (350 µl) allows detection of less than 100 trypanosomes/ml resulting in 
high sensitivity (Büscher et al. 2009). 
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- Mobile screening positive suspect 1 
 
 
“If we have to come every 3 months, how long will this take? How many 
months before someone tells us that we are positive or negative?”  
- Mobile screening positive suspect 2 
 
 
“My worry is treatment. The areas they go to for it; Omugo and Yumbe are 
very far. Now we have information about RDTs in the units that is okay, 
but also bring the drugs to the unit too!”  




Others join and jeer in agreement. James our mobiliser, a former ‘Sleeping 
Sickness Attendant’ (SSA) with over 20 years of experience with the MSF 
screening teams, interjects to explain the referral process at more length, 
responding to questions and elaborating on the specificities of follow up 
procedures. The group eventually settle, seemingly satisfied, and 
conversation resumes. 
 
“There are two main things, major problems. First, to go to hospital we 
need money, which we need to find money ourselves before we go. Also, 
we have the problem of leaving family who we need to support. We also 
need to also find a member of family to support us at the hospital when 
we go, so who will then be left behind to manage?”  
- Mobile screening positive suspect 3 
 
“That is a very big challenge, as I would be leaving the family to suffer, but 
if I don’t go then I am sick, then I must get the treatment. This is a very big 
challenge to us”. 
  
- Mobile screening positive suspect 1 
 
“I am worried, the first test we were told to be followed up after three 
months, and if today again it is positive they say to go again after 3 
months. This gives us worry, why does that happen?”  
- Mobile screening positive suspect 2 
 
James attempts again to assuage their concerns, but the disjointed nature of 
referral and follow-up continues to raise apprehension and confusion among 
the group. The perplexity this system poses to those seeking diagnosis 
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passively may be more problematic than anticipated, particularly where there 
will not be an experienced team of staff on hand to guide them through the 
complexities of this novel and unique process at length. 
 
My sub-study on RDT referral non-completion had been conceived in 
response to the problem of referral drop out, or ‘defaulting’, whereby 
serological suspects failed to present for follow-up microscopy tests to have 
their diagnosis confirmed by parasitological demonstration. Reasons for drop 
out were generally assumed by the elimination programme to be logistical, 
and staff had been quite adamant that the only real challenges facing 
suspects reaching follow-up and completing referral were poor attitudes and 
the distances involved in travelling to health facilities for microscopy.  
 
 
 “People give distance to the microscopy centre as the reason for not 
coming. Sometimes it can be up to 45 km to travel to get to the 
microscopy centre, and Koboko Hospital is the only one in the county”  
- District programme supervisor 3 
 
“People are not willing to get tested, there are some negative attitudes 
[…] Because some [suspects] have a negative attitude to going, I have to 
counsel them and assure they will not have to pay”  




Meanwhile, one District Supervisor seemed confident that - providing the 
technology and capacity are present - there is no problem of case detection 
to speak of.  
 
“Case detection is not a problem – there are no challenges. So long as 
RDTs and health workers are there then they will detect cases”  
- District programme Supervisor 4 
 
 
Nevertheless, the experiences described above and subsequently by RDT-
positive suspects in this study deviated from the control programme’s vision 
of the landscape it imagines its target population to be navigating. Namely, 
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that people would get sick and go to their local health centre and be 
comfortable asking staff to test them for HAT, and that this request would be 
met and they would be tested with an RDT. It assumed that the health worker 
there would give their results with clear instructions, and that those who 
tested positive understood those instructions and would comply with them 
unhesitatingly should they be practically able. What it failed to envisage is the 
collective memory communities have of past HAT epidemics and the mobile 
screening teams that came with them. Nor does it acknowledge the 
relationships of trust in local healthcare services, or the multiple confounding 
social and personal factors that make accessing care not merely a matter of 
physical presence of locally available tests, but complex relationships and 
socially embedded diagnostic cultures.   
 
 
Environments of uncertainty: making the national elimination strategy 
work in local practice 
 
The troubling dilemma of losing patients to follow up is one shared by many 
of the ISSEPs District Supervisors. A case, having left the confines of the 
health facility transforms from a visible, monitored, knowable body, into an 
unknown, potentially infectious agent. This patient outside of the follow up 
cycle is reimagined, from once being a victim of HAT (or potential victim in 
the case of serological suspects), to a potential vector and infectious 
reservoir in the community (Battin et al. 2009). One ISSEP supervisor 
expressed his concerns about losing patients in West Nile to follow-up and 
the ‘environment of uncertainty’ this creates; 
 
“It is important to reach every RDT+ suspect and make sure they reach 
microscopy, We want to avoid an environment of uncertainty. Each 
person must come to be declared by microscopy. We don’t want to 
create room for people to be living with Trypanosomes […] We don’t 
know if they are positive or negative, so we pray that they haven’t gone 
on to infect others in South Sudan for example where the health system 
is weak”. 
- District Supervisor, Koboko 
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Here, ‘at risk’ and ‘vulnerable’ patients are re-configured as non-compliant 
bodies by referring to the threat they pose to others, as they continue to go 
about their daily activities while potentially infected, thus posing a risk to the 
wider community around them. In framing the issue of referral-non 
completion in this way, it is possible for programme managers and policy 
makers to detract from other socio-economic and cultural drivers of HAT 
under-reporting, and instead problematise individual, deviant, ‘defaulting’ 
bodies that threaten targets being met.  
 
Their ‘status’, as many patients and health workers referred to, is ambiguous 
outside of the physical constructs of the surveillance infrastructure; the 
penetrability of the control programme being limited to the material confines 
of the lab. However, in the same way the state can be brought into the clinic 
(Hutchinson et al, 2016), the clinic too can move through space and extend 
the ISSEP assemblage to reach remote communities and deviant bodies. 
These environments of ‘epidemiological uncertainty’ propels new forms of 
evidence making and surveillance (Biehl, 2016). For example, the ISSEP 
District Supervisors (DS) had each come up with their own tailored solutions 
to some of the logistical challenges to patients completing referral. In Koboko 
district, this consisted of following up patients through local Village Health 
Teams (VHTs) with whom the DS has contact with. As the home village of 
the suspect is often (but not always) recorded in the patient register, by 
referring to the record books of the receiving facility that performed the RDT, 
he could find their Case Report Form (CRF) and subsequently the VHT that 
cover their village and their contact details. Where they had access to 
motorcycles, sometimes VHTs would pick patients up from home and bring 
them to their microscopy appointment, though “generally the intervention is 
counselling to convince them to come under their own volition” (District 
Supervisor, Koboko). Liaising through local networks in this way often 
resulted in much higher adherence, as it was mediated through trusted local 
VHTs and allowed them to relay important information which may have not 
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been communicated effectively at the point of testing. However, even VHTs 
require support to carry out follow-up.  
 
These strategies, while largely effective in keeping the programme functional 
on a day-to-day basis, come at the expense of the unremunerated personal 
time of District Supervisors (and other support staff) which is already 
stretched across a multitude of other responsibilities. Koboko’s DS 
suggested that if he didn’t keep on top of doing follow-ups himself, those 
patients would have never come to their appointments, saying “it has 
become a necessary part of the programme”. Elsewhere, one DS who had 
17 outstanding HAT suspect ‘defaulters’ at the time of study told us how he 
could not follow them up himself because of other commitments, and that 
before he got his motorcycle (provided from the government’s NTD 
programme) it was very difficult to trace suspects to follow them up at all. 
 
“It would be easier if the Ministry of Health had budgeted for the 
movement and commitment involved in following up defaulters. I have to 
work around my budget given to me with many other projects and 
commitments, but they are making more cuts all the time”.  
- ISSEP District Supervisor, Yumbe District 
-  
 
Another DS devised an even more extensive strategy, bringing laboratory 
capacity to suspected patients to their home;  
 
“We take the lab person to take blood samples when they visit as they 
know how to best handle them in transit. They take these to the 
microscopy centre and repeat the RDT, then prepare microscopy 
samples and filter paper samples for LAMP”. 
- ISSEP District Supervisor, Maracha District 
 
At the time of writing, a pilot study not too dissimilar to this approach had 
been formalized and carried out in Bandundu Province in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo using ‘mobile equipe’ (or ‘mobile mini’) teams on 
motorcycles (Reed, 2017). These teams, comprising three ‘scouts’ and one 
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person to confirm diagnosis, travel by motorcycle to make house-to-house 
visitations, extending the reach of HAT clinical services and improving 
coverage of Gambiense HAT detection and follow up in difficult to reach 
populations.  
 
The screening capability of a mini-team is similar to that of a conventional 
mobile team, but is more flexible, reaches more people in remote villages, 
and takes into account the activities of communities. This ‘fast and light’ 
approach to active screening and follow up has so far proved successful 
owing to its flexibility. However, despite its relative simplicity it remains no 
less expensive than the traditional truck-based mobile teams as the cost of 
human resources and tests etc. still must be accounted for (Boelaert. HAT 
modelling meeting, 2017). The primary weakness of the mini-team approach 
is that the diagnosis of RDT positive cases is only confirmed a few days after 
the screening, thus the risk of not being able to find those with a positive 
diagnosis again, i.e. positive patients dropping off referral, remains a key 
challenge (HAT platform newsletter, 2018:15). 
 
Herein lies the crux for Uganda’s programme. Sleek, innovative solutions can 
be devised and co-ordinated in the face of adverse circumstances, and the 
efforts made by ISSEP supervisors to simply ‘make things work’ is important 
labour that makes the RDT align with components of the decentralised 
healthcare system. A benefit of not prescribing a rigid method of 
implementation has been that practical solutions can emerge to fill locally 
specific problems. However, supervisors all share other leadership 
responsibilities within this system, come with associated costs that have to 
come from somewhere. Their efforts, while resourceful and commendable, 
ought not to be taken for granted as long-term sustainable solutions. For this 
reason I am reluctant to glamourise the ‘tinkering’ involved in trying to make 
new diagnostics ‘fit’ into local assemblages of care, as it panders to the 
unhelpful trope of the ‘innovative spirit’ of African practitioners “turning 
obstacles into opportunities” (Van Houten, 2018) in global health media. This 
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serves only to detract responsibility from the power structures that allow 
conditions, whereby implementation staff at the sharp end of interventions 
must undertake such ‘noble struggles’ to make programmes work amid a 
constellation of local priorities. Approaches such as mobile motorcycle labs 
and VHT follow up teams do make confirmation testing both more physically 
and socially proximate. However, the current referral system at both entry 
and exit points is disjointed and difficult to navigate for patients. Re-
configuring this landscape to a more ‘user-friendly’ one requires facilitation 
from HAT referral support structures. However, the responsibility of devising 
and funding these changes need to come from the spaces of policy and 
programme design, and not placed on overstretched and under-resourced 
staff at the implementation end of interventions.  
 
In the following sub-study, the testimonies of serological suspects in this 
system complicate a prevailing narrative of global health; that diagnostics 
equate or lead to diagnosis, and that cheaper more accessible diagnostics 
create greater and more equitable access to care. It centres human 
interactions and the importance of communication at the point of testing over 
the presence of devices, where discordant results reveal discordant priorities 
between programmes seeking cases and patients seeking care. This lays 
bare the gap between the objectives of the elimination programme with those 
of the health system with which it has ostensibly integrated. Finally, it 
suggests the material proximities of diagnostic technologies to target 
populations is less significant than their social proximity; through structures of 
support, trust, and communication.  
 
 
Referral non-completion among RDT-positive suspects  
 
Between August 2013 and February 2014, Uganda’s Intensified Sleeping 
Sickness Elimination Programme (ISSEP) introduced three diagnostic 
technologies across different levels of the public health system. All of the 212 
health facilities in areas of West Nile believed to be at risk of T.b. gambiense 
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HAT transmission were supplied with HAT RDTs (Wamboga et al. 2017). 
Nine well-maintained and staffed facilities in the project area were also given 
training and equipment to perform parasite confirmation techniques. Three of 
these facilities were also upgraded to perform the sophisticated molecular 
LAMP (Loop-mediated Isothermal Amplification) testing. For this kind of 
referral-based intervention to succeed, patients need to be able to navigate 
the referral step easily and trust programme supervision structures which 
guide patients between them (see figure 14). 
 
At each of these levels, relationships of trust and power between patients 
and health providers is a key dynamic to understand programme compliance 
(Horter, Kerschberger et al. 2016), with trust built partially on what people 
see and hear about technology (including diagnostics (Beisel, Umlauf et al. 
2016)) and institutions (Ostegaard 2015).  Thus, referral completion involves 
not only technical and organisational considerations, but also expectations 
and emotions (Bossyns and Van Lerberghe 2004). Many studies of the 
referral process therefore conclude that low referral compliance reflects more 
about the health system than the patient, since “every non-respected referral 
is an unsatisfied patient with an expressed need but with an inadequate 
response of the health service” (Peterson, Nsungwa-Sabiiti et al. 2004, 
Bossyns, Abache et al. 2006, 56). For a referral-based intervention to 
succeed, patients thus potentially need trust in both referring and receiving 
facilities as well as programme supervision structures which support patients 




Figure 12: The T.b. gambiense human African trypanosomiasis diagnostic referral algorithm 
implemented by the ISSEP in Uganda.  
Adapted from Wamboga et al. 2017: 7. 
  
 
In this sub-study I examined patient experiences and perceptions of HAT, 
HAT tests and the referral system in relation to HAT testing, to identify 
systemic challenges to referral completion by HAT screening suspects. I 
interviewed a total of 20 serological suspects (RDT+) who had not completed 
referral. Of these, 4 had returned for one follow-up microscopy examination, 
but not returned for repeat follow-up, indicated in the text as ‘RDT+MS-’ for 
‘microscopy negative’. Of the 20 RDT+ suspects I interviewed, the majority 
(15/20 or 75%) were female, (see Table), the median age was 40 years 
(range 8-76), and the median time between first screening RDT+ and 
interview was 13.6 months (range 3.0-26.3, 13.5 for the 16 RDT+ suspects 
and 16.6 for the four RDT+MS- suspects). Participants had been screened at 
13 frontline facilities across four of the seven districts covered by the ISSEP 
(see figure 15). The median distance from respondents’ RDT screening sites 
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to the facility they were referred to was 15.0 kilometres (range 5-48 km), 
slightly further compared to the whole sample (13.0 km, range 1-50). All the 
suspects completed their outstanding microscopy examinations after 








RDT+ suspects outstanding 




Total 94 20 
District 
  Arua 30 (31.2) 9 (45.0) 
  Koboko 22 (23.4) 2 (10.0) 
  Maracha 20 (21.3) 3 (15.0) 
  Yumbe 22 (23.4) 6 (30.0) 
Gender 
  Male 34 (36.2) 5 (25.0) 
  Female 60 (63.8) 15 (75.0) 
Age (years) 
  Median (range) 30 (3-79) 40 (8-76) 
Time referral outstanding (months) 
  Median (range) 12.9 (1.2-26.2) 13.6 (3.0-26.3) 
Distance to referral facility (km) 
 Median (range) 13.0 (1-50)* 15.0 (5-48) 






Figure 13: Map of West Nile region in Uganda showing locations of HAT-endemic districts included in 






Awareness and perceptions of risk 
 
While patients may not have suspected HAT themselves before being tested 
for it, most patients I interviewed appeared to take the disease seriously. This 
included an awareness of their own risk from HAT, particularly after receiving 
a positive RDT result. Almost everyone interviewed had some personal 
knowledge of HAT, having known relatives or people in their village who had 
suffered or died from it during outbreaks in previous years. Other key 
sources of knowledge included community sensitisation campaigns 
associated with medical active screening programmes or LSTM’s tsetse fly 
control intervention using insecticide treated targets. At the time of interview, 
nearly all respondents claimed to feel there was a risk of HAT in their area. 
Peoples’ perceptions of risk were discussed in terms of their proximity to 
tsetse flies near rivers, ‘the bush’, and dark, densely vegetated forest areas. 
Risk was also interpreted in relation to the presence of HAT interventions, 
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with comments such as, “We have that fear because the screening teams 
came to our village” (RDT+MS- suspect 1, Arua) and “I have fear in my hut, I 
have seen tsetse fly nets being hung up [nearby]” (RDT+ suspect 19, 
Maracha).  
 
Despite a moderate local knowledge of HAT, awareness of the RDT for T.b. 
gambiense on the other hand was extremely poor, and so knowledge about 
the test and its position in the referral system was similarly limited. Given 
peoples’ lack of awareness of HAT RDTs, their presence in frontline facilities 
did not seem to have had a similar influence on suspects’ perception of HAT 
risk prior to testing. Like mobile screening teams raising risk awareness, 
comments about not personally feeling to be at risk until testing RDT+ such 
as the following, however, suggest that the process of screening RDT+ may 
have heightened some suspects’ perception of personal susceptibility to 
HAT: “from the result of my blood I have that thought that I have sleeping 
sickness” (RDT+ Suspect 21, Maracha). 
 
By the end of this sub-study I concluded that very few participants had been 
aware that HAT control in the region had been handed over to government 
services, and were still under the impression that this was still co-ordinated 
by MSF through mobile screenings. Prior local knowledge about HAT among 
RDT positive suspects in the West Nile were largely based on collective 
memories from past epidemics which were managed by MSF.  
 
Knowledge of the referral process or treatment of HAT was also very low 
across both active and passively screened patients, and only those with 
experience of either having been treated before or having known a close 
relative who had also suffered from the disease had been aware of what the 
staging process or treatment involved. Some knowledge was based on 
rumours or stories from past epidemics when MSF was operating in the area. 
Some expressed fear about the infection staging process, such as the 
lumbar puncture, or the perceived excessive blood withdrawal during follow 
 137 
up. Others were concerned about the side effects of treatment and the 
impact on their productivity and livelihoods.  
 
 
“In previous years the first people who came to treat, they told us that 
when you are vaccinated with that vaccine you cannot work”. (RDT+ 
suspect, Arua District) 
 
 
In all cases, the decision to use HAT RDTs was initiated by health workers, 
rather than on the request of patients. “The technician health worker started 
just removing blood and testing, and told me they have found sleeping 
sickness in my blood. It wasn’t my previous idea that I am coming to test for 
sleeping sickness” (RDT+ suspect 17, Koboko). Low awareness of the HAT 
RDT among respondents before testing may partly explain why self-referral 
was not as common as reported in other studies (Palmer, 2014; Palmer, 
Surur, Checchi et al. 2014b). Only two people (both from Maracha District) 
had previous knowledge that the RDT was available at their local health 
centre through sensitisation activities. One respondent in Koboko District 
knew they were available in the main referral hospital.  
 
This was the ISSEP’s first faulty assumption; that syndromic patients, on 
suspicion of their own symptoms or after ruling out malaria, would know they 
could request to have a rapid test for HAT at their local primary healthcare 
facility. In this regard, the introduction of the RDT to bring diagnosis closer to 
communities had been, at the time of study and among my respondents, a 
practically invisible intervention. Indeed, many respondents were still under 
the impression that in order be tested for HAT they must either wait for a 
mobile screening team to visit their village or travel to Omugo Hospital. This 
would explain some concern among respondents that active screening for 
HAT had not taken place in their area for some time, and sentiments that 
MSF or the state had somewhat abandoned them. In a place where sleeping 
sickness interventions have historically been “the most visible expression of 
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the state” (Lachenal, 2017), active screening is taken as a signal that the 
government is proactively taking HAT seriously. 
 
I found that people in remote areas generally fell into one of two groups; 
those that felt reassured that the withdrawal of screening teams meant the 
area was no longer at risk, and those who felt concern that ‘they’, [MSF or 
local government], had lost political will to control the disease, leaving 
communities ‘behind’ and vulnerable to further epidemics. Very few 
respondents were aware of a national sleeping sickness control programme, 
the availability of local free tests, nor of on-going efforts to eliminate the 
disease. Thus, despite attempts to sensitise communities during the initial 
phases of the ISSEP (Wamboga et al. 2017), the introduction of RDTs into 
health centres appeared to have transformed the state’s HAT diagnostic 
algorithm without altering the populations’ perceived treatment seeking 
landscape at all. This mismatch renders the main feature of the enhanced 
passive surveillance strategy - accessibility (a key trait of the rapid test 
design) - futile, as the device remains out of sight and out of reach to the 
remote populations who need it. Elsewhere outside of my study districts, 
despite fears that refugees were at particular risk of disease and posed a 
credible threat to elimination (Picado and Ndung’u, 2017), based on low RDT 
performance figures ISSEP coordinators switched to a sentinel surveillance 
strategy in areas hosting the highest concentrations of refugees from South 
Sudan. This meant that RDTs were removed from most refugee-serving 
facilities, ultimately exacerbating the existing inequities in access to HAT 
surveillance (Palmer, Robert, and Kansiime, 2017). As the following section 
explains in more detail, placing RDTs in government health facilities already 






Patient pathways to testing  
 
At the time of interview, most suspects reported having experienced 
symptoms consistent with HAT, particularly headaches, fever, or excessive 
sleeping during the day. HAT-like symptoms were commonly described as 
part of a long-term, difficult to diagnose or treat illness that some patients 
reported suffering from for years. While peoples’ symptoms matched the 
HAT syndromic screening profile, however, only one person, who had a 
family member previously treated for HAT, had ever considered they might 
have had the disease before being tested. Everyone else assumed that they 
were suffering from malaria or typhoid, or were unsure of what could be 
causing their symptoms, so sought diagnosis and treatment from local health 
facilities and drug shops. Some additionally considered whether they might 
be affected by witchcraft or a common flu, and so took herbal treatment.  
 
“It started like malaria. From there I took a step and went to the clinic. I 
bought a drug, tablets. I took the drugs for two to three days, on the third 
day this thing threw me down, I was bed ridden […] from there they told 
me this is not malaria, what is detected it looks like sleeping sickness”. 
(RDT+ suspect 19, Maracha) 
 
 
Of those who suspected malaria or typhoid, the majority reported to have 
sought treatment from local drug shops in the first instance. Here they would 
not be tested, but after describing their symptoms would be advised by staff 
how much of a certain drug they should purchase. Many respondents 
reported buying drugs for typhoid or malaria, and taking these for one to 
three months on average, or up to one year in some cases, before being 
prompted to seek help at a health centre after symptoms had failed to 
improve. 
 
“I started buying drugs from a clinic called Adrayo. I would also go to 
clinic at Ochodri. I would only explain what I am feeling, and the 
attendant would only give what drug they thought I needed. I would also 
give money and they would give me the drug up to the amount of 






‘Hope Medical Clinic’ in Rhino Camp refugee settlement, Arua district. Many shops of 
this kind serve as an informal treatment provider in rural communities, including 
where government health facilities are equidistant. 
 
 
While many acknowledged their significant role in a pluralistic health system, 
drug shops were widely cited by health workers as a key challenge to 
detecting HAT patients at the point of care. 
 
“The problem is though, some people do not even go to the facility; they 
will go to a clinic where they don’t have the RDTs […] these are just 
places where people go to get drugs. They are drug stores […] some 
people prefer going to clinics instead of health centres. They want 
treatment, so […] they will just go straight to buy the drugs from a clinic. 
Also the clinic might not be so far to travel”.  




Some respondents also sought healing through religious faith, relying on 
continuous prayer and visiting their church and church leaders. Only after no 
improvement in their condition would they then seek help from a health 
facility. In other cases, individuals would treat themselves with herbal 
remedies, either prepared at home by themselves using family recipes, or 
using herbs prepared and purchased from people locally who sell them. 
These would be used to treat flu-like symptoms, or in some cases where the 
patient felt they had been suffering from some ‘traditional curse’, which 
required herbal treatment. The distinction between biomedical and ‘local’ 
illnesses is drawn frequently, as supernatural causes of disease, as opposed 
to biomedical origins, would likely render conventional drugs ineffective. 
 
“I also heard that this treatment would take long in your body and you 
would fail to recover, especially this treatment will fail to treat you 
because curses are attached to your life”. 
- RDT+ suspect, Yumbe District 
 
“I was becoming insane and so I could not clearly figure out which 
disease was disturbing me. I possibly thought this was typhoid. I also 
thought there was also traditional curse following me, whereby the 
treatment is you have to wash your body with some herbs”. 
- RDT+ suspect, Koboko 
 
Where patients felt these alternative treatments improved their condition 
slightly and allowed them to continue their work, this would further postpone 
their presentation at health centres. 
 
“I was taking herbs, I would drink them. They [relatives] instructed me 
how to make, so I would make my own […] I thought it was flu that is 
causing all that. I continued taking the herbs for flu, but the pain persists 
so this influenced me to go for the test”. (RDT+ suspect, Yumbe) 
 
 
These responses suggest that seeking treatment is not necessarily 
dependent on or directed by biomedical diagnostic technologies, as patients 
circumvent formal health facilities and testing procedures to access drugs. 
Furthermore, they suggest treatment success is not determined by diagnostic 
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tests that ‘clear’ them of their infected status either, but by the alleviation or 
absence of the symptoms that initiated their treatment-seeking journey. Amid 
the discordant priorities between biomedical systems that seek to confirm or 
clear people of diagnoses and patients seeking to alleviate their symptoms, 
those who were tested and found positive by HAT RDTs then had to face 
pulling together resources and support to undertake follow-up referral to have 
their serological suspicion confirmed. 
 
 
Socio-economic challenges to completing follow-up referral 
 
Given that many other RDTs like malaria and HIV are generally free of 
charge, and that in many cases the HAT RDT was performed alongside 
these other free tests, most respondents correctly assumed that the RDT for 
HAT is also free of charge. Those who expressed concern at having to pay 
for a sleeping sickness test appear to have been reassured by health 
workers at the time that this service is free. In a few cases communication 
appeared to have broken down, where some patients believed health 
workers were charging them for HAT testing. This had discouraged them 
from coming for further follow-up tests, such as this young man who was 
deterred from attending a follow-up microscopy appointment, believing he 
could not afford it; 
 
“When I was taken to Arua, I was to be tested of sleeping sickness but 
these people charged me 20,000 shillings. Because I did not pay the 
20,000 they did not test sleeping sickness, I had to come back home. I 
had already got the [RDT] result that I have sleeping sickness in Sirpi 
[health centre] but I was referred for further tests in Arua. They charged 
20,000 because they said they could not do the second test from there”. 
(RDT + MS- suspect, Rhino Camp, Arua)  
 
 
On top of the added costs of transport to reach hospital to have these tests, 
expense is a big barrier to patients coming for referral appointments. 
Furthermore, in the experience of some respondents where free RDTs for 
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other diseases such as malaria have been performed and positive results 
given, health workers would then instruct them to go and purchase the 
treatment elsewhere. Knowledge about the treatment involved for HAT is 
very low, and so none of the participants knew whether the treatment would 
cost money, or how much this would be. There is also added associated 
costs to coming for follow up referral appointments every three months, 
which in this sense (despite tests being available for free) in fact make the 
referral process relatively expensive. The vast majority of patients I 
interviewed were very willing to come for follow up tests once the importance 
of confirmation was made clear to them, but for various economic and 
logistical reasons many still could not attend the appointment given to them. 
Barriers to reaching referral appointments unassisted remained consistent, 
though not necessarily those anticipated by the ISSEP. As expected, matters 
of distance or lack of access to transport and funds to that end were cited 
frequently. 
 
“Because of transport we would not come […] if we are to be followed 
again then we will need to be picked from our places like today”. 
(RDT+ suspect, Arua district) 
 
“I had prepared to come and test for sleeping sickness here in Omugo, 
but this shortcut there is water, that always floods there so I was waiting 
for dry season to come”. 
(RDT+ suspect, Yumbe district) 
 
 
For others, though, including many who had already cited transport, other 
challenges to referral completion were also given, including the length of time 
spent away from home which entails further complications such as needing 
to arrange support for family left behind, childcare, and food. These are 
issues that make leaving home for one day for follow up testing problematic, 
and the prospect of having to spend up to two weeks in hospital for treatment 
posed the same problems but on a larger scale.  
 
“This year the crops did not yield well so there is a bit of famine. So we 
have the problem of leaving family who we need to support. […] Also we 
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need to find a member of family to support us at the hospital when we 
go, so who will then be left behind to manage? I would be leaving the 
family to suffer.” 
(RDT + suspect, Yumbe District). 
 
 
“I need to make sure there is money for transport and money for feeding. 
When you are found positive and you need to be admitted and you also 
need food and someone to stay around you. Since I’m just like this by 
myself and I have small children, they are not strong enough to look for 
things to help me so I could not come”. 
(RDT positive suspect, Arua district) 
 
 
Others complained of negative experiences of the lumbar puncture (LP) 
procedure, though this was generally tolerated as a necessary part of 
diagnosis. One suspect additionally reflected on the impact on livelihood and 
indirect costs of LP and treatment even after discharge from hospital, saying:  
 
“When you are vaccinated with that vaccine [referring to the lumbar 
puncture procedure] you cannot work […] I also heard that this treatment 
would take long in your body and you would fail to recover, especially 
this treatment will fail to treat you because curses are attached to your 
life” (RDT+MS- suspect 3, Arua).  
 
 
Aside from the challenge of arranging support for family left behind at home, 
there is also the issue of finding a carer to accompany patients in hospital for 
the duration of their admittance for support. Many mentioned the need for 
support, either from someone to bring them to hospital, or more specifically 
to look after and attend to them while at hospital in case they are admitted. 
This individual would provide help with food, washing clothing and bathing 
the patient, as this is not something provided by health staff at hospitals. 
Without such an individual (usually a close member of family) to attend to 
them in hospital, many people would not come for treatment. There is also 
the need for support at home in their absence, usually for children which 
need to be fed and cared for. If such family or personal support cannot be 
arranged, then many felt that they are tied to stay at home despite their 
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willingness to come to the hospital. Therefore, it is also an issue of time and 
the length of time spent away from homesteads and from daily work that 
shape the landscape in which symptomatic patients seek care. Without such 
support, it is understandable that HAT patients might fear a lengthy hospital 
admission and the effect it might have on their family, livelihoods, and 
finances. These concerns are a powerful agent in determining an individual’s 
health seeking behaviour and choices early in the referral process. 
 
“For me I had lost interest in going for further treatment because no one 
helps me in my condition, in this sickness unless you have a father or a 
mother, but no one helps me” (RDT+ suspect, Koboko district) 
 
 
“The problem would be finding care for the family members we would 
leave behind. We would need to look for somebody to give support to our 
family, maybe a neighbour. If we are to be admitted then we would come 




Contrary to claims by some staff that cite access to transport (though this 
was a key issue) and “poor attitudes” as the primary causes of patients 
defaulting referral, those who reported they felt well informed about the 
testing process and understood the importance of confirmation claimed they 
were more likely to adhere to future referral appointment despite the various 
logistical and financial barriers to reaching hospital. This highlights the 
importance of communication at the point of testing to align programme 
incentives with patient priorities and improve referral completion. Negative 
experiences at the point of testing appear to significantly reduce the 
likelihood of suspects returning and completing referral. Close observation of 
the interactions between patients and health workers in the lab during testing 
confirmed the accounts given by my respondents, with health workers having 
little to no time to discuss the rationale behind testing nor the implications of 
results during brief interactions with patients. While I cannot say that 
encounters appeared to be overtly negative (which could have been on 
account of my presence), I could see how the brevity of point of care 
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interactions limited the space in which effective communication on a 
relatively complex post-testing referral process could sufficiently take place. 
 
Experiences at referring facilities 
 
 
At referring facilities, patients in my study appeared to have received little 
information about the HAT testing process. In all cases the health worker 
they visited had tested them for HAT alongside tests for malaria or typhoid 
and most patients told us they only became aware that they had been tested 
for HAT after they received a positive RDT result. Five people (quarter of my 
sample) even left the facility not understanding they had screened positive 
for HAT. Three of these reported that the first time they heard they could be 
infected with HAT was when a district supervisor, lab supervisor or village 
health team member followed-up their outstanding referral, as described by 
the patients quoted below. 
 
“That time he [the health worker] did not tell me he has found sleeping 
sickness in my blood, but he told me he has found malaria […] When 
these technicians from Yumbe hospital [a microscopy site] went to Kochi 
[an RDT site] they gave information to me at home that they have 
discovered sleeping sickness in my blood. I said, ‘why so abrupt like 
this?’ When I went for the test they didn’t tell me I had sleeping sickness. 
Even my husband had to pick my small patient book and went to hospital 
to check, and found that in my small book it was not indicated that I had 
sleeping sickness, but the big book had my name in the list with the 
names of people who have sleeping sickness, that is how I got to know 
about it”. (RDT+ suspect 14, Yumbe) 
 
“I was not told I have sleeping sickness, no one in the health facility told 
me that until they wrote information and sent it through some guy who is 
doing business in this trading centre […]. He said, ‘did they tell you about 
it when you went for the test?’ I told him ‘no they did not tell me’. Now 
they have told me that I have sleeping sickness”. (RDT+ suspect 5, Arua) 
 
 
Two suspects even reported that sensitisation for our interview was the first 
notification they had received. Such patients therefore reported not to have 
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known about any follow-up appointments, nor that they were considered to 
have an outstanding referral by the national programme. Even when results 
had been given at the time of consultation, however, several people 
expressed confusion and even suspicion about why they were being 
referred. Only a minority of patients attributed the reason for referral to 
limitations of the test, such as the following individual: 
 
 “They told me this could possibly be sleeping sickness. Since their 
machine’s detective strength is not adequate I should come to Omugo [a 
microscopy site]”. (RDT+MS- suspect 3, Arua). 
 
 
More often however, rather than questioning the reliability of the RDT itself, 
peoples’ confusion about referral rationale was expressed as distrust in the 
expertise of referring health workers who appeared to not be interpreting the 
results correctly: 
 
“I did not trust them because they told me that I should come for further 
testing in Omugo, which means they failed to interpret the result from the 
first test”. (RDT+MS- suspect 4, Arua) 
 
“It was explained, but he did not explain in a direct way. He did it in an 
indirect way, saying that the drug for sleeping sickness is at Omugo or 
Arua [another microscopy site], so you must go there to get the 
treatment”. (RDT+ suspect 4, Arua) 
 
 
“People who are learned, they automatically use politics in their 
speaking. He [health worker] did not tell me exactly the way you have 
said, but he showed me the way so that I can come and discover from 
this side” (RDT+ suspect 17, Koboko). 
 
 
“When these people told me that I could be having sleeping sickness I 
felt they are not being open to me, I was trying to force them to be open. 
I thought that if they know that it is there, they should tell me I have 
sleeping sickness, so I was trying to force them. I knew I had sleeping 
sickness [because] I would be among other people and I would fall 
asleep during the day. That is the symptom I knew meant I had it”. 




As evident from the last quote, patients’ own interpretations of their 
symptoms influenced their trust of test results and health worker 
interpretations of them.  
 
While some were sceptical that they could have HAT because their illness 
experience was inconsistent with what they had heard about the disease, 
others trusted RDT results because they were “feeling it inside [their] blood” 
(RDT+ suspect 10, Yumbe) or in some other way, saying, for example: “My 
swollen legs did not change, and the signs and symptoms I experienced 
continued, so I believed I had sleeping sickness” (RDT+ suspect 2, Arua). 
This corroborates earlier suggestions that diagnosis is more strongly 
attributed to lived illness experience beyond the diagnostic test result.  
 
Before receiving their results at microscopy centres, patients reported that 
they would likely trust the second round of tests more than the first, 
associating more reliable tests with being conducted in larger hospitals: 
 
“Because I think this is the biggest hospital that can bring out the truer 
result than the previous one” (RDT+ suspect 12, Yumbe) 
 
“It can differentiate between truth or lies. So if the first test may say it is 
true I have sleeping sickness, while today it might say it is false, or the 
first test might say I don’t have, while here it will say that I have; I will 
prove from here”. (RDT+ suspect 17, Koboko). 
 
Only one patient expressed distrust of the motivations behind the referral 
rationale and having to attend larger hospitals, telling us she had declined to 
come for further blood tests because of family members’ suspicions about 
blood theft: 
 
“I got false information from people that they had come to steal my blood, 
so I was not in a position to come. I spoke to my people at home, but my 
husband was not pleased so I would not have come by myself” 
(RDT+MS- suspect 2, Arua). 
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Other characteristics associated with receiving facilities, besides trust in the 
tests they offered, thus appeared to influence most peoples’ decisions not to 
present, particularly financial concerns related to referral. While a frequent 
concern in many interventions that require blood drawing (Deconinck and 
Palmer, 2017; Fairhead et al, 2006; Geissler and Pool, 2006) reports of 
rumours pertaining to blood theft and blood draw refusal were few in this 
study (only 2) except for the RDT+ MS- suspect quoted above, and the father 
of one CATT+ mobile screening suspect in Ewanyati, Yumbe district, who 
refused microscopy on the grounds that “he listened to these stories about 
how much blood they take, and is fearing that someone will take it back to 
your country, that they will steal it” (James, active screening mobiliser). As 
the following vignette illustrates, the taking of venous blood samples for 
confirmatory testing is not only a biomedical procedure, but a socio-technical 
practice attached to expectations established by the performative 



























Maracha is a very large and impressive level IV facility on first impression, a 
plethora of signs picketing the entrance inform visitors this is a private 
hospital funded by a European NGO. The laboratory is a large and airy room, 
the open space accentuated by how sparsely equipped it appears to be. I 
count two microscopes on entering, and a small centrifuge under some 
plastic sheeting tucked away in the corner of the work bench. Dull ivory 
coloured tiles line the walls adorned with posters, referral flow charts, 
standard operating protocols, stock lists, and various useful phone numbers 
of local VHTs. I note a diagnostic algorithm for HAT RDTs, and a sleeping 
sickness awareness poster, sun-bleached and curling at the edges. Maracha 
hospital has one of a small handful of laboratories across the West Nile with 
the capacity to test for and confirm cases of HAT, and so this is where 
patients from across the entire district (and border regions of neighbouring 
districts) who have been identified as suspected cases travel to have their 
diagnosis confirmed. 
 




A charismatic young man in a white lab coat then introduces himself as Tom, 
one of three technicians. He is taking bloods today he informs me eagerly; “I 
am the best man for the job” he chimes, his colleagues laughing in retort, “He 
is not the best! He is the fastest. That one is not always the best”, his fellow 
technician David teases. 
Dr Oliver had been keen since I came to Arua that I come to the lab and be 
present for what he ceremoniously declares “the bleeding”, when RDT-
positive suspects have their samples taken for follow-up microscopy, and 
today was the first of many I would spend in Maracha and Omugo labs 
observing the daily enactments of diagnosis.  
 
Patients file in one by one and sit down at Tom’s instruction in silence. Some 
wince as he jabs and pins down the needle with his thumb, most fixate 
resolutely on the ceiling while he fumbles with his remaining free hand to 
locate a fresh capillary tube in his pocket. He pushes it in with a sharp tug, 
and waits for the blood to trickle into the glass receptacle. A few seconds 
later the procedure is done. He slides the needle out quickly replacing it with 
a small wad of cotton wool, then bends the patient’s arm up and instructs 
them to hold it in place before waving them off back outside to the waiting 
area. No words are exchanged, only gestures. Instructions given and 
observed in total silence. The formality and expediency of the procedure is 
impressively brusque. 
 
His last patient of the day, an elderly man, peers in and shuffles through the 
door sheepishly. Yellow rosary beads dangle from his open collar, which he 
rolls between his fingers anxiously as Tom begins tugging up his sleeve to 
locate a vein. By this point he has gotten into of a rhythm of sorts, and is 
taking up the procedure like an assembly line worker in the full flow of 
production. Pulling the man’s arm down in a swift, automated motion, he 
wraps a latex glove around the bicep in one seamless manoeuvre. I’m 
beginning to understand his colleague’s jest; he is certainly efficient to the 
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point of abrupt. His patient’s free hand clutches at a tremoring knee, his feet 
shuffle agitatedly. Tom pushes the needle in and waits a few seconds for the 
blood to come, the man’s eyes bulging as the tube fills with his substance. 
Tom smiles and shakes his head, persevering until the tube is full before 
finally withdrawing his needle. The man immediately clenches his hand 
around the puncture.  Visibly irritated by this interruption in his routine, Tom 
grabs and pulls away the patient’s hand to replace with his cotton wad. 
“There is always a difficult one!” he chuckles. The man turns to me, rasping 
in protest, “Too much! You took too much blood. Why did you take so 
much?”  
 
When I later interviewed the individual that Tom had taken “too much blood” 
from, I referred to this exchange and asked him to elaborate on his 
experience. 
 
 “Yes! I complained to you. There is too much blood taken for this test. 
It is not like the other test where they just take a small amount from 
your finger. Today they fill a whole glass. Look at me! I am so old and 
have no blood to give. They should not take so much. They should at 
least replace it […] with soda.”  
 
Several studies have documented blood draw refusal from participants 
stating that too much blood was being taken by trial or programme staff. 
Explanation for this concern largely relate to the concept of blood as a 
valuable, indispensable necessity of life which cannot be easily replenished 
(Deconinck and Palmer, 2017; O’Neill et al, 2016). As for the suggestion his 
blood ought to be replenished or compensated with ‘soda’, there was general 
agreement among other patients I spoke to after testing that this exchange 
was an unfulfilled expectation of theirs also. James later explained to me that 
during past MSF screening campaigns, it would not be uncommon for 
patients undergoing blood draw for microscopy to be given a bottle of soda, 
not for any biomedical reason as such (as some participants had come to 
associate it), but as some token of compensation for their time. Watkins and 
Swidler describe a similar routinisation of practice, in their description of “an 
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untheorized consensus of what an HIV/AIDS programme should look like”, in 
which they describe the ‘choreography’ of training sessions, constituted by a 
ritualized set of practices. As with the choreography of HAT diagnosis, they 
describe how certain objects and exchanges become entangled in the 
enactment of trainings, where flip charts, ample lunches, and mid-morning 
and mid-afternoon Fantas become a “ubiquitous social practice […] 
performed jointly by  donors, brokers, and villagers” (Watkins and Swidler, 
2013). This was one of a host of expectations that previous interventions and 
referral models had impressed on the collective memory of ‘reflexive 
communities’ (Mackian, 2004). The memory of these typical exchanges 
between healthcare providers and those undergoing testing had become part 
of the diagnostic narrative in the West Nile, and gone on to form part of 
patients’ collective expectations of the procedure and its outcomes. Patients 
bring diagnostic expectations from mobile labs into the clinic, where they 
continue to be negotiated and managed between patients and health workers 
during the diagnostic process.  




Discordant results at follow-up 
 
For treatment to be given, multiple diagnoses must be ‘aligned’ (Mol, 2006; 
Street, 2014). Such misalignment, where RDT positive and microscopy 
negative results (which can be caused by cross-infection, sensitivity, or low 
parasitaemia) prolongs this period of uncertainty before a person can access 
treatment.  Receiving discordant (RDT+MS-) results at labs in receiving 
facilities caused some patients to revise their understanding of which tests 
could now be trusted to give the ‘true result’. As one patient described:  
 
“I thought that Omugo [Hospital, a microscopy centre] has to be the one 
to give the true result […] but they told me it takes a long process to 
come up with a result, so I have to come back and they will send the 
result here and the technician will tell me if I am truly sick” (RDT+MS- 
suspect 1, Arua, referring to the process of further testing via LAMP) 
 
For others, confusion was expressed as distrust in the health staff that 
performed their microscopy. This was especially true for RDT+MS- suspects 
who again received negative results but were asked to return for another 
quarterly follow-up appointment. One patient said: “since they did not cure 
me, I am not sure of their profession, I’m not sure of their work […] the health 
worker, the one who tested me did not discuss the result with me, instead 
they discussed it with another health worker” (RDT+MS- suspect 4, Yumbe).  
 
Realising the financial implications of more travel associated with conflicting 
results not only gave patients the impression that confirmatory testing would 
become a very expensive process. Many patients also highlighted the 
unfairness of their compliance with HAT programme referral rules but not, in 
return, being taken of care of by the same system. One person, for example, 
demanded to know, “Now that you have brought us, after testing, will they 
give us treatment straight away or not?” (RDT+MS- suspect 2 Arua). Another 
suspect explained: “First I came there and was found positive, and from here 
I was told the disease is not there so was told to come after three months, so 
I was taken to the other unit and was on some medication. I took all those 
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drugs, but still there is no change” (RDT+MS- suspect 1, Arua). Such 
suspects, who believed that they did indeed have HAT, were dissatisfied that 
HAT treatment could not be given at the moment of testing, as for other 
diseases such as malaria. During this sub-study I observed only four 
instances of serological suspects receiving further clinical investigation for 
symptoms after microscopy or repeat RDT testing. While clinical staff 
appeared dedicated to the ethics consent counselling process, their time was 
limited and a full syndromic examination and exploration of alternative 
diagnoses did not seem to be part of their usual routine. Moreover, long 
outpatient queues of up to two hours required to see clinicians after testing 
negative meant that many patients preferred to return home and (for RDT+ 
patients) wait for LAMP results by phone. 
 
This highlights where programme objectives diverge from and override those 
of patients. Given the priority of patients is to seek treatment and alleviate 
their symptoms, failure to receive alternative diagnoses after receiving 
discordant results negatively effects relationships of trust in the referral 
system, and potentially wider aspects of the system such as local health 
staff. Where the explanations behind frequent outcome of discordant results 





Local socio-technical ecologies of HAT testing  
 
 
The socio-technical interactions described by many patients in my referral 
study may help to explain why many initially seek treatment outside of the 
government healthcare system. As my daily observations in the lab and 
account of blood drawing in Maracha Hospital lab demonstrated, 
communication (regarding which tests are being conducted, rationale for 
testing, discussion of results, and the importance of follow-up henceforth),  is 
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largely absent from the health worker-patient consultation. Meanwhile, within 
a diagnostic ecosystem that prescribes the passive acceptance of 
professional or ‘expert’ clinical opinion, patients with limited information at 
hand (i.e. no awareness of HAT RDTs or understanding of how confirmatory 
diagnosis works) rarely asserted themselves in these exchanges. 
 
This partly elucidates why alternative spaces and services are often sought 
outside government health frameworks, where individuals feel they can 
articulate their symptoms and desires more freely on a more ‘customer-
provider’ oriented exchange (Chandler, et al. 2011: 939). In stark contrast to 
the “palpable power imbalance between health workers and patients”, 
community members are aware of the power they hold over drug shop 
workers in providing their income. This contributes to a sense of agency in 
the process of seeking treatment, including asking for advice and purchasing 
or rejecting treatment, thus clients are empowered by the relative ‘social 
proximity’ of the relationship with informal providers such as drug shop 
workers compared with health workers in public health facilities (ibid.) This is 
more suited to the ‘trial-and-error’ diagnostic culture which drives the private 
drug shop market in Uganda (Mboye et al., 2010: 2), yet is at odds with the 
test-result driven method of clinical decision making that the HAT referral 
system must ensure. Having said this, shortly before the time of this study in 
September 2015, 16 private drug clinics in Koboko and Yumbe towns were 
enrolled in the project under a pilot scheme, while 3 facilities serving 
refugees in Adjumani that had been dropped were re-engaged (see Palmer, 
Robert, and Kansiime, 2018). Of 13 HAT cases reported in the project area 
from the ISSEP’s implementation up to December 2015, 1 was identified 
from one of these enrolled private clinics (Wamboga et al., 2017). The 
implications for placing RDTs in socially proximate settings such as private 
clinics on HAT case detection therefore warrants consideration, and 
highlights the need for a more critical discussion of relationships of power 
between patients and health workers, structural barriers to care, and the 
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Assimilating HAT RDTs into ecosystems of surveillance 
 
Community perceptions of HAT control programmes are not only influenced 
by historical memories of past interventions, but shaped by how new 
methods are introduced. To expect that community perceptions will 
unreservedly accommodate new interventions without thorough information 
dissemination which includes two-way communication between communities 
and programmes is unrealistic (Kovacic et al. 2016). Innovations are made 
compatible not only through deeply embedded cultural values and practices, 
but also with previously adopted ideas (Rogers, 1995: 225). Existing 
ecologies of testing are the mental apparatus by which individuals assess 
new technologies, to compare against what is already familiar and known 
(Rogers, 1995). As the elimination programme area for the RDT intervention 
is also endemic for malaria, staff at all facilities were already familiar with 
performing malaria RDTs (Wamboga et al. 2017). This familiarity prefigured 
the implementation of an RDT for HAT and it was assumed the test could be 
absorbed seamlessly into a pre-established diagnostic routine. Malaria and 
HAT RDTs have shared aesthetic features, but how similar are their social 
lives? Post testing, the diagnostic processes they initiate significantly 
diverge. 
Owing to the potentially toxic nature of HAT drugs, treatment cannot be 
administered based on clinical suspicion or RDT results alone, and patients 
must travel to hospital for follow-up tests (microscopy, lumbar puncture, 
PCR). This can be disappointing for patients, and confusing when negative 
follow-up tests contradict initial positive RDT results, the most common 
outcome in elimination settings. Unattractive aspects of the culture of care at 
receiving facilities such as long waiting times, dismissive or harsh treatment 
by health workers, language barriers and recurrent drug stock-outs can 
dissuade patients from completing referral (Bossyns and Van Lerberghe 
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2004, Peterson, Nsungwa-Sabiiti et al. 2004). Even if patients manage to 
reach facilities they have been referred to, there can be problems with patient 
processing and lab service unavailability (Palmer, Surur et al. 2014), 
compounded by poor communication about referral linkages and poorly 
integrated recording and monitoring systems (Heunis, Wouters et al. 2011) 
that prevent referral consultations or tests from being carried out. For 
patients contemplating the costs and benefits of completing HAT referrals in 
a place where cases are low and therefore unlikely, the implications are 
profound. Falling short of expectations set by the malaria model it sought to 
assimilate, the HAT RDT not only fails to eliminate the need for a laboratory, 
but introduces additional layers of diagnosis, bureaucracy, and travel for 
patients and health workers. In contrast to the mobile team-led system which 
preceded the RDT, the diagnostic algorithm for HAT is divided across 
different levels of the health system and geographic spaces, requiring 
patients to travel between institutions by their own means. This raises the 
question, that given the teleology of testing differs between programme 
definitions and patient priorities, where in this system does diagnosis occur 
exactly? Is it where a trace antigenic signature of HAT is ‘read’ in the window 
of an RDT, or where parasites can be seen by the human eye and ‘counted’ 
by microscopy? (Umlauf and Beisel, 2016). By the biomedical gold standard 
definition happens at a point in the referral algorithm that takes time and 
unseen work for patients to reach.   
 
The HAT elimination surveillance programme is primarily (and 
understandably) interested in optimising sensitivity, since any missed case 
can be a potential source of infection from which epidemics can start to build 
(i.e. District Supervisors’ concerns about leaving room for environments of 
uncertainty). On the other hand, this chapter has drawn attention to the 
human cost of imperfect test specificities in a context of low disease 
prevalence. Moreover, that so few patients in my sample left microscopy 
facilities with an alternative diagnosis or treatment for their ongoing 
symptoms raises an important discrepancy between meeting the objectives 
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of an elimination programme and meeting individual patients’ needs. Despite 
the vision of those who designed the HAT elimination programme that the 
HAT RDT would integrate seamlessly into the existing malaria diagnostic 
ecosystem, this was premised on a presumed similarity between the two 
RDTs that in fact did not extend beyond the physical features of the device 
itself. However, diagnosis cannot be reduced to the binary result displayed in 
the RDT window. It is a spatially and temporally distributed process that 
comprises a dynamic assemblage of infrastructures, comprising health 
information systems, supply chains, and clinical expertise. Diagnostic 
ecosystems are as fragile as they are dynamic and complex, and new 
technologies can have unpredictable and destabilising effects on 





Parasitological demonstration by microscopy remains the epidemiological 
gold standard for HAT diagnosis, yet the passive surveillance system relies 
heavily on suspected cases being detected at the point of care, and 
subsequently completing referral to determine their ‘true’ infection status. 
Thus, the processes and environments by which patients reach the point of 
detection and trajectories thereafter are critical to understanding why some 
suspects do not complete referral or go undetected altogether.  However, 
HAT is located and defined in the practices of the patient, and “comes into 
being differently according to what people feel and self-diagnose, where they 
go for support and how they (get) treat(ed) themselves” (Umlauf and Beisel, 
2016: 9). 
 
In the West Nile region of Uganda which has recently decentralised its 
passive surveillance system, I examined patient experiences and perceptions 
of HAT, HAT diagnostic tests, and the referral system to identify systemic 
challenges to referral completion by RDT-positive suspects. This chapter has 
described the diagnostic landscape that patients must navigate forging 
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pathways to treatment. By investigating experiences among a minority of 
suspects who failed to complete referral under the new algorithm, differences 
between the landscape imagined by the state and that experienced by 
patients have been revealed, thus allowing the social proximity of RDTs and 
their agency in local testing ecologies to be explored (Chandler et al, 2010; 
Umlauf and Beisel, 2016). This chapter demonstrates how current case 
detection strategies fail to reflect local treatment seeking strategies and 
diagnostic cultures, and that far from simplifying diagnosis, introducing RDTs 
can introduce complications of their own with potentially iatrogenic effects on 
the health system by eroding important aspects of trust in both diagnostic 
technologies and referral structures. Medical historians have shown that 
elimination success depends on strong health systems (Stepan, 2011; Birn, 
2009) but this relationship can also work the other way around, whereby 
inappropriate elimination strategies can potentially harm health systems 
(Stepan, 2011). The breakdown in communication between health workers 
and patents at the point of RDT testing, and disappointment at receiving 
discordant results at follow up with no alternative explanation or treatment 
undermines important aspects of trust in referral support structures. 
 
RDTs are ultimately social objects, entangled and embedded in social 
practices, and the agency of diagnostic technologies is determined not only 
by their physical accessibility in terms of mobility and cost, but also by their 
social proximity to target populations and the diagnostic cultures that govern 
their positionality within local testing ecologies. Despite achieving relatively 
high referral completion (85%) under this strategy, the RDT-based enhanced 
passive surveillance system could do more to make itself more culturally 
acceptable and effective to the local context to which it has been 
implemented (Panter-Brick et al., 2006). Effectively addressing health 
provider communication about the meaning of HAT test results could avoid 
future mistrust of HAT referrals as programmes in Uganda, and elsewhere, 
mature. I further argue that the RDTs have been somewhat paradoxical, in 
that they fail to solve the problem that they purport to; namely eliminating the 
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need for a laboratory, even requiring corroboration and legitimisation from 
more sophisticated tools and laboratory infrastructures. Thus, the clinical 
gaze supposedly extended by RDTs is actually limited to those spaces where 
patient diagnostic landscapes and state structures intersect. More than this, 
the programme forces patients out of their preferred treatment-seeking 
landscapes and into state structures which place the responsibility and costs 
for their own diagnosis onto economically vulnerable populations. 
 
These testimonies give us insight into how the transposing of biotechnologies 
can present unexpected complications, exposing steep global health power 
imbalances (Sariola et al., 2017) between national programme objectives 
and the delivery of acceptable local care. Many of these challenges are 
intensified in the laboratory space where diagnostic encounters occur, and as 
such the following chapter seeks to describe these and the accounts of staff 
working in these spaces. It is here that I shift my analysis, from where I have 
thus far described the conditions and processes by which patients navigate 
the pathways that leads to this space, to the infrastructures of surveillance 





































Infrastructures of surveillance 
Socio-ecologies of testing in the public health centre 
laboratory    
           
 
“Infrastructures cannot be built into boxes” 
- Street, A. 2014 
 
From seeking out cases in the community using point of care devices, this 
chapter shifts from a patient perspective, to where HAT is brought into the 
clinic and under biomedical scrutiny through confirmatory diagnostic 
procedures by health workers. It is important to note the location of study has 
also shifted, highlighting key policy and programme differences between the 
different strains of HAT. Here, although there are more HAT cases in central 
northern Uganda, there is less programmatic priority for human case 
detection because there is no such PPP for eliminating rhodesiense HAT as 
there is the ISSEP for gambiense. The previous chapter showed that for the 
socio-technical ecosystem of HAT surveillance to detect cases, components 
must not only be positioned physically, but aligned socially in practice. This 
conclusion turns out to be as true for healthcare workers as it is for patients, 
as I describe a precarious distribution of health workers struggling to align 
protocol with practice, and juggle multiple programme objectives where HAT 
is a low priority. Data collected from a survey of 15 health centres in central 
Uganda is drawn upon to explore the structural apparatus of surveillance and 
interrogate the concept of infrastructure beyond “staff, space, stuff, and 
systems” (Farmer, 2014). The testimonies of health workers provide an 
additional perspective of the diagnostic ecosystem, one that encounters the 
restraints of a decentralised healthcare system, the demands of target driven 
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vertical programmes, and struggles of delivering care with little resources or 
structural support. This phase of study moves from an elimination setting of 
T.b. gambiense, to a region where zoonotic T.b. rhodesiense is reportedly 
increasing.  
 
As in the previous chapter, attention is drawn to the flaws of passive 
surveillance where awareness is low. Here however, focus shifts to the 
implications of this in a setting where HAT may be spreading into new 
territories. By describing the material components of the health system on 
the frontline, infrastructures are reimagined, stretching beyond technological 
capacity to encompass the relational aspects of diagnosis and care. Whether 
the introduction of a discrete new diagnostic tool, the digitisation of 
information, or the wide-scale structural decentralisation of health services, 
changes are not implemented onto a passive system. They interrupt, 
destabilise, reconfigure, and adapt to an existing diagnostic ecosystem, and 







My first few days in Dokolo town are hosted by Dr Frederick Odongo, a local 
veterinarian and founding member of the 3V Vets network. He has brought 
me to Dokolo Health Centre IV to meet who he calls the region’s ‘focal 
sleeping sickness person’, Serena Akello. Prior to arriving in Dokolo, I had 
spent quite some time at the COCTU office in Kampala consulting with the 
national HAT control programme to compile a list of key individuals involved 
in HAT in the area; the District Health Officer, District Veterinary Officer, 
Vector Control Officers, entomologists, and so on. Like Frederick, Serena 
had never been mentioned while mapping out the regional HAT network, yet 
here were two individuals who were apparently central to the local 
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assemblage of HAT management and control. Frederick beckons her to join 
us in the Clinical Officer’s office which is currently unoccupied, he is 
seemingly familiar and quite at home here. Serena sojourns across the 
courtyard and enters the room with an infectious warmth to greet us both – 
her and Frederick appear well acquainted as she asks after his children and 
how business is going. Taking the rare opportunity to rest her feet from her 
ward rounds she pulls off her plimsoll shoes, and at Frederick’s invitation 
delves into stories about patients whose treatment she has overseen 
throughout her time here.  
 
Serena wears many professional hats in her work but appears most heavily 
invested in her role managing sleeping sickness cases, and despite being 
the hospital’s most qualified clinical nurse she also oversees HAT cases 
management in Dokolo District. She emphasises the struggle of juggling 
multiple responsibilities and not having enough time to carry out all of the 
tasks required of her. Later during my time at Dokolo HC, one of the nurses 
recalled in admiration how, whilst in theatre performing an emergency C-
section, Serena was called to attend to a HAT patient who had become 
unresponsive. “She then had to leave theatre mid-operation to go and save 
their life, then return to finish the operation, and save another!” This is 
apparently typical whenever they have a HAT admission as she becomes 
overstretched in her duties, though not through necessity but by virtue of her 
experience and knowledge of HAT. 
 
 “Even though there have been several other members of staff trained, 
when I am absent they call on me for advice or to return to the hospital.”  
 
During my time in Dokolo, it became very clear that – despite not being 
recognised as such in any formal manner – Serena was in fact the lynch pin 
to the entire local HAT network. Were it not for her being on call to manage 
cases and deliver treatment at a moment’s notice, there was a very real 
chance case management would falter and patients would need to be 
transferred to Lwala, or even Lira hospital much further away. Aside from 
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highlighting the very severe fragility of this network and infrastructure, it also 
begged the question – what would happen were Serena to leave and be 
removed from this unstable ecosystem? How would such a significant actor 
in this network, with such a high centrality of agency, come to be accounted 
for or replaced? 
 
“Now I just put myself in situation where, when I leave, are they going to 
close the treatment centre? When I’m on leave they call me back for tryps 
patients. You know I want to go back to school outside Dokolo, what will 
happen? Now when they brought this new HAT patient yesterday they 
started calling me when I was at funeral rights in the village! There were 
people here trained, and yet they call me while I’m on leave. People want 
this [rubbing her fingers together] – money – because some NGOs 
assist, they come and people are used to them paying them. I don’t know 




In terms of plugging this capacity gap, there had been very little health 
worker training or community sensitisation in the region until 2014 when they 
received upward of 20 cases. In response, the National Control Programme’s 
director launched active screening and a sensitisation campaign broadcast 
over local radio. However it is difficult to know what, if any, lasting affects this 
has had on the community’s awareness, or indeed the suspicion index of 
health workers who Serena claims will not turn up to training while there is no 
financial incentive (unlike other disease control and elimination programmes, 
sleeping sickness training does not offer payment for attendance).  
 
 “People are so money minded and don’t think about the patients. Even just 
last year there was training by the Ministry of Health, but now here there is 
nobody. Those who are in their work for money will not go. For me, my call 
was not for money but for my work” […] People are used to this kind of work 
that either you are paid or at the end of some month. For sleeping sickness 
there is nothing. That is why people have not picked interest. Even those 
who were trained previously before me, people have not picked up. They 
come and get their allowances and go back”. 
 
Others at the various levels of programme co-ordination and delivery often 
expressed similar concerns, referring to a lack of support or financial 
incentives contributing to difficulties in building capacity.  
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“Transport is a  challenge. There are three different organisations that 
support our work – stop malaria, pathways, family planning, all gave me a 
bicycle, but none of them work now, they need repairing. The other 
[challenge] is that we are not trained regularly. Also when you have these 
meetings people have to sign their name and then after that they are 
expecting payment for attending. They won’t come to the sessions with no 
money on offer. ” 
 
- VHT worker, Kobulubulu Subcounty, Kaberamaido 
 
My relationship with Dr Serena proved to be one of the most insightful from 
the health-worker perspective, and offered an open and candid account of 
the difficulties faced by those working at the nexus of HAT control on the 
ground. It became starkly apparent throughout my fieldwork in the region that 
Serena was arguably one of the most important agents in the region’s HAT 
ecosystem, and alongside a handful of other key individuals like Frederick, 
her tireless work is pivotal in holding this fragile assemblage together. 
Throughout our time together, she frequently reflected on the struggle of 
juggling multiple responsibilities with little time to carry out all of the tasks 
required of her; “If I am not here then nothing happens for sleeping sickness 
patients”. 
 
Serena’s concerns about capacity centred on a lack of financial incentives 
deterring other health workers from taking up the responsibility of HAT case 
management. However, this potentially masks some of the underlying 
structural problems that discourage her colleagues from taking up her place. 
For instance, Serena’s reputation as the ‘focal sleeping sickness person’ 
places her in the unenviable position of being the authority on managing HAT 
cases. Although there may be other sufficiently trained health workers to 
undertake the responsibility of overseeing HAT treatments, while Serena is in 
Dokolo the default course of action will frequently be to defer to her 
expertise. Indeed, health workers at facilities I surveyed who had any 
knowledge of how to act on a suspected case told me they knew only to send 
them to Dokolo where Dr Akello was based. Being the acute form of HAT, 
rhodesiense is associated with particularly alarming connotations and 
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notoriety for being difficult to treat, given the “toxicity and complex 
administration” of currently available drugs (WHO, 2018). It could also be the 
case that some health workers simply did not wish to have the responsibility 
of administering drugs like Melarsoprol with a history of adverse side effects 
and fatalities and, seeing how dependent the local HAT assemblage is on 
Serena, are reluctant to take her place once she has gone. 
 
The strong imagery associated with past outbreaks of HAT filling treatment 
centre beds is an image HAT programmes have tried to transform in endemic 
settings, by reintegrating HAT patients into regular medical wards, renaming 
‘treatment centres’ and ‘HAT wards’, and re-shuffling staff responsibilities to 
integrate HAT management with routine inpatient management. Dokolo 
Health Centre IV, despite still being widely referred to as ‘the Dokolo HAT 
Treatment Centre’, houses HAT patients in the same wards as other 
admitted patients. WHO guidelines do not require patients to be treated by 
particularly trained personnel or in a specialist unit, however the collective 
memory of HAT management lingers. One retired medical officer from 
COCTU recalled the 2014 outbreak, saying the wards at Dokolo “looked just 
like the old days”, with rooms full to capacity by row upon row of HAT 
patients. The effect of recent outbreaks on the perceptions and confidence of 
local health staff to take on the responsibility of HAT management may be 
considerable, and easily dismissed as idleness or financial interest.  
 
 
Mapping capacity across Uganda’s health system 
 
It is worth noting that elimination monitoring, underpinned by the HAT Atlas 
(Simarro et al., 2010), defines passive surveillance coverage in terms of an 
‘at risk’ populations’ distance from “facilities with capacities for HAT diagnosis 
and treatment” using time-distance analysis (Franco et al., 2017: 4), whereby 
the cumulative travel time is calculated from any location to the nearest 
health facility (ibid: 5). Diagnostic capacities for HAT are categorised as 
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‘clinical’ (DxC), ‘serological’ (DxS), ‘parasitological’ (DxP), and ‘stage 
determination’ (DxPh) for gambiense HAT (Simarro et al., 2014). As a 
serological screening test is not available for rhodesiense HAT, the 
categorisation is only for DxC, DxP, and DxPh capacities (Franco et al., 
2017). Importantly, only travel time is calculated. The economic costs of 
travel (something that respondents in both my gambiense and rhodesiense 
patient studies described as a key factor in referral completion) are not 
considered in these analyses. How ‘capacity’ is defined beyond devices, and 
at what level facilities actually conduct HAT testing however is not monitored. 
This illustrates the elimination programme’s diagnostic landscape in 
geographic terms, but tells us very little about how HAT diagnosis actually 




Health Centre Survey and laboratory staff interviews 
 
To dig a little deeper into this material notion of ‘capacity’ I visited health 
centres to gain some greater understanding of how the presence or absence 
of key elements of diagnostic ‘infrastructures’ facilitate diagnostic practice 
(table 3). Of 13 government health facilities surveyed across Kaberamaido 
(6), Dokolo (5), and Lira (1) districts, only 7 employed a laboratory technician, 
while 8 relied on a lab assistant to conduct laboratory tests. 2 facilities had no 






















Ocero III Kab 15 0 1 3 3 1 
Kwera  III Dokolo 17 1 1 2 2 1 
Kobulubulu III Kab 21 1 1 2 4 1 
Kangai III Dokolo 16 1 0 2 3 1 
Kalaki  III Kab 20 1 1 2 6 1 
Kaberamaido  IV Kab 59 1 2 3  18 1 
Boroboro III Lira 22 1 0 2 3 1 
Bata III Dokolo 17 0 1 2 2 1 
Awiri  II Dokolo 7 0 0 0 1 0 
Amwama II Dokolo 3 0 0 0 2 0 
Alwa III Kab 17 0 1 2 3 1 
Lwala IV Kab 22 2 2 3 13 1 
 
 
Of these, 11 facilities were equipped with a working microscope and a 
member of staff trained to operate them, while nearly all (12) were equipped 
with malaria RDTs (see figure). The types of tests available generally reflect 
the most frequent health complaints affecting local patients, which ranged (in 
order of most common) from malaria, HIV, diarrhoea, Sexually Transmitted 
Infections, cough, respiratory tract infections, TB, and pneumonia. Skin 
diseases, brucellosis, and intestinal worms were also given as less common 
but notable health complaints among the local population.  
 
Knowledge and awareness of HAT symptoms was variable, but generally 
high. Most health workers interviewed could identify key symptoms, but 
admitted that without a history of being bitten, few would suspect HAT if 
patients presented with them even in the case of testing negative for malaria. 
Some (5) said that they would refer cases thought could be possible HAT 
suspects to high level IV facilities. No respondents considered HAT to be a 
local health priority, and the vast majority (with the exception of those 
working at level IV facilities) considered HAT not to be an issue locally given 
the low profile of cases. Seven members of staff, all based in the higher 
HCIV facilities, were identified as having received formal HAT training, four 
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receiving training in 2012, three in 2014. However, even among those who 
received training, this was considered to be ‘limited’ and confidence to act on 
the knowledge gained from this was low. 
 
Informal health providers 
 
During my interviews health workers regularly expressed distain for drug 
shops and their use by patients. While recognising their centrality in local 
community treatment seeking networks, many generally regarded private 
clinics to be unregulated and illegitimate, and problematic to their everyday 
practice in multiple ways. 
 
“Sometimes you find they [patients] have been taking medication – you 
might find a neonate being given very strong antibiotics, or a pregnant 
woman being given a drug that could affect the pregnancy, and some 
people come claiming they’ve been getting treatment, but when you ask 
which kind the documentation it is not there. So for us health workers it 
becomes very difficult to determine what kind of drugs this person has 
been on, whether it was correct or not, so it effects the treatment plan – 
you can’t intervene and know what kind of treatment to give this patient. 
Some they come with serious conditions and have been given the wrong 
treatments”. 
- Clinical Officer, HCIII, Dokolo 
 
“The biggest challenge is these people who are handling these drug 
shops, they are not properly trained, someone goes and asks “I have a 
cough, what can you give me?” No underlying cause is explored and the 
diagnosis is not made, they just treat a symptom. These people end up 
getting treatment for symptoms and signs, but the real cause is not 
discovered. So they are not trained”. 
- Nurse, HCII, Lira 
 
“They are just drug vendors, they just sell them. People from the NDA 
(National Drug Authority) pass through these big trading centres, but 
deep in the villages they have not gone there. But even if they pass 
through here at a big trading centre, you find people are well co-
ordinated. The moment they know they are coming the information has 
already circulated, those selling drugs illegally close their shops and 
disappear. So when the NDA go back they just open again. Those 
operating illegally tend to be very cheap, so you find instead of people 
going to the clinics which are expensive, they dash to the cheap ones 
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where people are not qualified and sell at low prices. They are situated in 
the communities, so it is not so far for people to travel as the health 
centre. The whole time the NDA have no realistic data on where clinics 
operate and how many. It is very difficult for them to determine. The data 
they have will be of those that are legally operating only”. 
- Clinical Officer, HCIII, Kaberamaido 
 
These comments pose some particular challenges to introducing new 
products, such as drugs, diagnostic tests, or HAT awareness training to 
private clinics. Firstly, this appears to back up my findings from the West 
Nile, that patients primarily visit informal providers to bypass ostensibly 
unnecessary and potentially costly diagnosis and gain immediate access 
drugs. The likelihood of a patient going to a private clinic to purchase drugs 
for their suspected malaria induced fever is unlikely to interested in paying to 
undergo a stage of testing in order to gain access to treatment. This removes 
incentive for informal vendors to provide these products and encourages 
presumptive treatment. Secondly, if many private clinics are indeed operating 
outside of regulation, then the logistics of introducing and rolling out 
diagnostic devices and being able to monitor their usage and results would 
be highly challenging given their ‘off the radar’ status in the local health 
infrastructure. Reporting mechanisms utilised by state facilities, such as the 
mTrac, are not mirrored in the informal sector, and therefore local and 
national data on rarer diseases like HAT would likely be skewed or 
unrepresentative. Given that the elimination targets requires careful 
monitoring and accurate data to be paramount, it seems incorporating private 
drug shops into the elimination assemblage would be highly divergent from 
the programme’s priorities. 
 
 
Health staff training and capacity 
 
An under-detection model developed by Odiit and colleagues calculated that 
for every reported death of HAT, 12 deaths go undetected (i.e. 92% of 
deaths are not reported). Furthermore, a deterministic model based on the 
possible routes of a HAT infection to either diagnosis or death (via the health 
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system or outside of it), showed that of a total of 73 undetected deaths, 62 
(85%) entered the healthcare system but were not diagnosed, and 11 died 
without seeking health care from a recognized health unit (2005). Notably, 
mortality rates in newly affected districts in central Uganda (See figure 17), - 
in which diagnostic and treatment delays are higher, and from where an 
increasing proportion of HAT cases are originating- have also increased from 
an average of 5% in the early 2000s to approximately 10% in later years 
(Berrang-Ford, Wamboga, and Kakembo, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 14: Locations of Health Centres surveyed.  
Kaberamaido and Dokolo districts have experienced outbreaks of HAT with reactive screenings and 
sensitisation in the last 10 years, whereas Lira and Alebtong districts are newly affected by 
rhodesiense HAT cases. Shapefile and point data retrieved from Ministry of Health and Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics, ArcGIS depository, 2018. 
 
Two hypotheses are considered to account for under-reporting of sleeping 
sickness in central Uganda. The first is that infected individuals do not 
present at hospital, meaning cases are not detected and therefore not 
reported. This has primarily been addressed by actively seeking out cases 
 174 
from high transmission areas using mobile medical teams. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, in the absence of active screening, patients take many 
pathways to diagnosis outside of the formal health sector before presenting 
at public facilities. 
 
The second is that people are going to hospital but are not being diagnosed 
when they present. As rhodesiense HAT has a severe onset of symptoms, 
presentation at hospital may be sought more quickly, but immediate 
diagnosis is not guaranteed. The knowledge base for sleeping sickness 
among health workers, and the capacity to manage cases determines 
whether cases are diagnosed and reported (Acup, 2013). Based on my 
findings described in chapters 1-3, I suggest that both explanations 
contribute to under-detection, but that ‘capacity’ ought to extend beyond 
laboratory diagnostic equipment to the people expected to utilise them in 
challenging environments. 
 
My own encounters with health staff across the public sector revealed a 
shared resolute pragmatism displayed by staff in the face of biomedical 
uncertainty in a fragile system (Street, 2014). Most of the health workers I 
interviewed claimed they had not had the opportunity to attend HAT training, 
and so the lack of remuneration cited by Serena and others was not raised 
as a practical issue by those in my study.  High staff turn-over is however a 
frequently cited problem underlying the sensitisation of health workers in the 
region, as many claimed that of the few personnel who had once been 
trained at their facility, very few remained. Those who left had not passed on 
their knowledge from their HAT training to others at their facility before 
leaving. Of those who had been invited to attend this training, all had gone 
voluntarily, but none of these individuals had gone back and carried out 
CMEs (Continued Medical Education) to pass on this knowledge to anyone 
else at their facilities. Additionally, most who had attended any form of 
training claimed it to be of limited use. 
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“When you look at the number of these staff, we are about 8 or 9, out of 
them it was only 2 who attended that [HAT] training I mentioned before, 
and the sessions are not in depth, they are about identifying the patient 
initially. After coming back from the training the staff are supposed to 
train the other staff, but the health information changes from time to 
time.”  
- Clinical Officer, HCIII, Kaberamaido 
 
 
“When we used to be in Lwala they trained the staff in the lower health 
units, but of course we have had new staff who have not been trained. 
Staff are transferred in the district, so there is a high turn-over […] There 
are new staff – sometimes every three years new staff arrive. Because of 
the new recruitment, others were transferred to other facilities. We need 
to be trained all the health staff should be trained, they know the Sleeping 
Sickness is a large topic, just one to two weeks or training. We know the 
symptoms but we need more knowledge, because misdiagnosis for 
malaria is so common the symptoms are so similar”. 





Decentralisation and healthcare delivery 
 
The distribution and frequency of funds and resources delivered to primary 
health care facilities was regularly cited as an on-going challenge to 
delivering adequate care at the local level. 
 
“With medicines we always get stock outs because what we receive is just 
a push system, they just send us [drugs], we don’t order, so what they 
bring is not enough. What happens is there is a fixed budget for each 
health centre levels, so if for HC III or HC IV, they are going to receive the 
same amount of drugs. These places vary in terms of populations and you 
find the consumption rate may not be the same, some other places drugs 
get through faster than the other side. The state we are in there is nothing 
we can change because the budget is fixed”. 
- Nurse, HCII, Dokolo 
 
Furthermore, budgetary allocations of public funds may not always reach the 
intended facilities as expected due to competing priorities at various levels of 
government or in some cases misuse of public funds (Ablo and Reinikka, 
 176 
1998). The central government is mainly responsible for the salaries of health 
workers, the majority of whom are central government staff. Most (non-wage) 
funds for health facilities are largely transferred in the form of drugs and other 
supplies. At the district level, locally recruited health workers are paid out of 
the district’s own resources, while health units are directly supplemented with  
funds and in-kind resources (in terms of equipment, materials and drugs) 
from donors and the government (Acup, 2013). 
 
“Stock outs is a big complaint from patients. Medicines come, and when 
communities know the medicine are there like today they come in big 
numbers, when they run out they go away again. There is a specified 
quantity we supply but whether it’s enough or not is the issue. Also 
training issues come again somewhere, because you are having very 
many people managed by very few staff. When you run out you prescribe 
and tell them to go and get it themselves. Even if you explain that to them 
you always feel so bad, they say we steal drugs! They don’t know there is 
a specific quantity to be delivered to the health centre”. 
- Enrolled Nurse, HCIII, Dokolo 
 
 
While a handful of respondents (5) claimed they were relatively well 
supported as a facility, all of them went on to describe what they saw as 
deficient infrastructural necessities in order to function properly as a facility.  
 
This rarely related to particular objects or equipment per se, rather more the 
underling conditions and spaces in which such objects could be made 
possible, such as buildings, new labs, or having a constant electricity supply. 
 
“We need infrastructural improvement, we have machines now like our 
microscope uses electricity and then we have the pima machine, we also 
have the audio visual equipment to help with health education, but what 
we are lacking is power, so we need electricity even for light. We have 
solar system but it’s not very reliable.  It is very difficult to manage 
patients in the dark”.  
- Clinician, HCIII, Kaberamaido 
 
“If there was a way of getting a separate laboratory block, the examination 
room there is now part of the ward. That plan was for those days when 
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the population was still very small, but now the number has gone up and 
general attendance. There is no space for mothers, they just sit in the 
corridors and we get worried about infections, even TB is also high in this 
area. We have a fridge here but the gas maybe for one month is not 
there. We supplement the lack of electricity with gas sometimes, we try to 
make it happen”. 









Throughout my survey, I noted two facilities in particular that drew me back 
for regular visitations. One, a HCIII in Dokolo district, the other a HCIII in 
Kaberamaido. These both had what would generally be considered to be 
functioning laboratories, but were notably understaffed - comprising of one 
lab technician (Dokolo) and one lab assistant (Kaberamaido). Only the 
technician in Dokolo had received formal HAT specific training in 2014. The 
assistant in Kaberamaido had only ‘‘learned about HAT on the job”. Over 
several visits to both facilities I would spend part of the day in the lab to 
observe their daily interactions with patients and record keeping practices. By 
10 am each day patients would be forming long queues outside the lab, and 
by midday I would find myself clambering through swathes of people 
gathered outside the laboratory door, some laying on the ground or propped 
up against the wall.  
 
On one such morning at the Kaberamaido clinic, I recluse into a corner while 
things are reaching a crescendo outside. The lab assistant, Jacob, is working 
his way methodically and briskly through a pile of patient test slips issued by 
the clinician on duty. He bellows down the corridor the name of the next 
patient in line, and there is some commotion as a young woman hauls herself 
up off the ground and tries to make her way through the crowd balancing two 
children on each hip. Jacob takes her patient booklet, and after deciphering 
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the clinician’s instructions he swabs and takes a pin to the infant’s finger. 
Before the child is barely aware of this and begins to wail, Jacob drops the 
sample onto a small white rectangular pallet and ushers the woman back out 
into the conundrum outside. After a few minutes of shuffling through papers 
and test request slips he looks over at the small queue of RDTs lined up on 
the workbench. “Ah! These are all negative except one.” He scribbles the 
results in the patient note books and calls out their names down the corridor 
to come forward and retrieve them. Meanwhile I’ve been pouring through and 
noting the number of malaria RDTs performed each week. 
 
“Do you get much time to discuss the results with the patients?” I ask. 
 
Jacob laughs, nodding to the growing crowd outside, an absurd notion. 
 
As the day trudges on, the stream of patients coming and going seems 
relentless, and Jacob hasn’t had a break for several hours. I’m resolved to 
enduring the shift with him, but am visibly beginning to falter in the afternoon 
heat and he is taking some professional pride in watching me founder. “You 
are glad you do not have my job, eh?” he chuckles.  
 
By around 6pm the crowds have ebbed away, and Jacob begins to tidy his 
work space. I seize on this lull to follow up on some observations I’d made 
throughout the day. Opening the lab record book, I point to one of a few 
examples I could have chosen at random. 
 
“The malaria test result here is negative, but the microscopy column on 
this entry is blank. The first few lines have zero entered, but the rest are 
blank…does that mean microscopy wasn’t performed, or it was and the 
result was negative? Are positive results recorded elsewhere?”  
 
He cranes his head over my shoulder. 
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 “Yes. This is our form from last week. See, the date is there, I even 
signed it. That means no microscopy done. I just stopped entering the 
zeros eventually” he remarks nonchalantly.  
 
I hesitate for a moment considering the numbers populating the other 
columns. 
 
“It says here 153 malaria RDTs were performed last week, of which 92 
were negative?” I point to the corresponding column. 
 
 “Mmmhm. That’s right” he nods.  
 
“So of those that were negative, what was the next step for these 
patients? 
 
“I cannot say” he shrugs, “these people will have been tested because 




Being an endemic country, malaria is widely treated presumptively in 
Uganda, but research has raised concerns that this had led to its over-
diagnosis, the over-prescription of malaria medication, and the under-
diagnosis of other infections (Reyburn et al., 2004). This was the first time I 
had considered its very real potential impact on HAT case detection. 
 
 “So even though they tested negative with the malaria test?”  
 
Jacob looks uneasy now, as though I am trying to catch him out.  
 
“I’m just trying to understand under what circumstances a microscopy 
examination would take place, theoretically”. His shoulders fall back and he 
smiles.  
 
“Ah, well now! Theoretically it should be when there is a negative malaria 
RDT, but practically…you saw how many we have of those in a week, 
can you imagine” – he leans over to re-examine the entry – “doing 92 
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microscopies that week? It is just me here - that would be back breaking! 
It would never get done”. 
 
“So how often would you, on average then, manage to perform 
microscopies?”  
 
“I do them, it is just malaria is the most common here, so it is easier to 
treat and send away, and it makes the patient happy. If we suspect 
sleeping sickness then I will do blood smear yes. Of course.” 
 
 
I ask if they have recently had any such incidences. Jacob shakes his head. 
“It is not really a problem in these parts, we don’t see cases”. I inquire how 
this can be known if no symptomatic cases are ever tested for HAT. He 
reflects for a moment. “That is true, but this is the problem. We do not expect 
cases here because we have no data to suggest it. But there will be no data 
if we are not looking for cases. It is really up to us [health workers], but what 
can I do?” He gestures at our surroundings. “It is just me here”. 
 
 
Microscopy performance and HAT data 
 
 
Aside from the obvious parallels regarding point of care interactions and 
communication with the previous chapter, Jacob’s lab gives us additional 
insights into the patient-health worker relationship. Patient’s bring 
expectations of treatment, and this is something staff want to help them fulfil, 
sometimes by contravening protocol and overriding negative malaria RDT 
results. This feeds into a wider collective perception of the local health 
priorities, one where HAT features very little. Similar to findings from a study 
in South Sudan, few health workers in my study performed microscopies of 
made routine HAT referrals, either because diagnosing HAT was perceived 
as something that should be done by larger hospitals and mobile screening 
teams, or because they did not realise the magnitude of the problem in their 
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region, and hence would not suspect HAT as a possible diagnosis (Palmer, 
Surur, Checchi et al. 2014). 
 
My few days spent in Jacob’s lab were early on in my study, and so I was 
able to explore this further throughout the health centre survey. By the time I 
had concluded my survey of 13 health facilities across four districts (see 
figure), 11 had working lab facilities (level III). Of these, 8 reported to ‘rarely’ 
carry out microscopies on malaria negative patients, while 2 responded that 
they ‘never’ performed microscopy. Aside from the implications of this under-
usage of microscopies on HAT case detection, respondents highlighted a the 
problem of test sensitivity, and inconsistencies in RDT data within the 
existing system that potentially muddies the epidemiological picture. 
 
“People will think they have malaria, they will not even come and ask to 
be tested now. Now they just come and they say “I have come for the 
anti-malarials”. But most of the time it is just malaria so we give. 
Sometimes we test malaria and it comes back negative, but I might still 
suspect and just give the treatment for it anyway, and they improve. I 
think those RDTs are not so sensitive, they miss a lot of cases […] the 
data can be misleading. We might perform a number of tests, some will 
be positive, some will record negative, but really that will not be the real 
case. Sometimes we see cases and treat them, but don’t record a 
diagnosis even - you can’t record a case of malaria without a positive test 
result. So the numbers do not match reality”.  
– Lab Technician, Health Centre III, Dokolo 
 
“The challenge with this system in Uganda is that the RDT they are using 
is not perfect; we have patients who have been negative then turned out 
to be positive. Also they are just specific to p. falciparum, but not the other 
malarias. There are how many…five now? Our tests will only react to 
falciparum I think, so they miss people who are infected with other 
strains”.  
- Lab assistant, HC III, Dokolo district 
 
 
At the HCIII in Dokolo, I found the same issue of over testing for malaria 
arising out of the RDTs convenience where insufficient and overstretched 
laboratory staff are under pressure to serve a large population. While juggling 
the everyday constraints of operating in an under-resourced environment 
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with little support, the RDT has been convenient, but has ultimately re-
shaped diagnostic practices to the extent where previously routine protocols 
such as microscopy have become marginalised.  
 
“The RDT issue is making the use of microscopy disappear, every month 
we get very many RDTs, those kits, over 200 you find they accumulate. 
Even the lab person, you might order for blood smear and they do an 
RDT instead, but they have not enough time to do regular microscopies, 
most of people who come here present with fever. It is much quicker for 
them to do an RDT for malaria, then if it is negative we can go from there 
in suspecting other things. Patients get treatment from home first, when 
they come here they want a test. So you find the number who come for a 
test at the lab is too big for one staff to get through. It just goes back to 
staffing numbers and the number of patients and how many of those 
tests you need to do in a day. The majority of patients come here with 
fever. We only identify suspected cases [of HAT] and refer to Lwala 
hospital”. 
- Clinical Officer, HCIII, Kaberamaido 
 
“To identify Tryps you have to use microscopy, but then the MOH 
recommended for malaria you use RDTs, so we may find that sometimes 
because of the many patients at the facility you may be driven for going 
for the RDTs and end up missing the haemo parasites because so few 
microscopies are being performed”. 
- Lab assistant, HCIII, Lira 
 
One technician at a level III facility in Lira tried to explain what was unfolding 
in more detail, producing a weekly report sheet from a pile of papers on the 
desk. The number of RDTs performed three weeks ago is shown as 52, of 
these, 15 are negative. I follow the line along to the column for ‘microscopies 
performed’ – 0. 
 
“You see? How would we find the Tryps, even if they were there if no one 
does the right test! The main problem is our health centres usually 
receive high volumes of out-patients and you find it may be very hard for 
the lab personnel to conduct microscopy in one day you can have 100 
people, you can’t make those 100 slides and examine them, someone 
might collapse! […] It is not common to routinely test patents with fever, 
headache, joint pains etc. for sleeping sickness – we mainly request for 
malaria tests. In most cases the moment the patient is suspected to have 
malaria even Tryps is supposed to be suspected, but now the biggest 
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challenge is the work load for the lab, so many come with fever and we 
only have one lab assistant and a small lab. So unless the patient was 
treated for malaria and has come back with no improvement then that is 
only when we might start thinking of sleeping sickness”. 
- Lab technician, HCIII, Dokolo 
 
 
The protocol described in the last quote enunciates the algorithm they use in 
practice to think of rhodesiense HAT as a possible diagnosis. This aligns 
perfectly with the gambiense RDT protocol which stipulates a HAT RDT be 
performed where malaria diagnosis is negative or malaria treatment fails. 
Therefore there is an existing diagnostic culture among health workers which 
prefigures the introduction of a rhodesiense RDT. 
 
Overall, routine performance of microscopies at facilities was determined 
largely by staffing levels, and therefore time constraints which were strongly 
associated with the level (and subsequently the resources) of the health 
facility in question, and the demands of the local population, in terms of 
patient numbers and number of trained staff available. This is resonant of the 
work of Chandler et al. that describes the ‘juggling exercise’ health workers 
must perform while enacting malaria throughout the diagnostics process, as 
they try to realise their own medical aspirations and reputations whilst 
managing the expectations of their patients in constrained settings (2012). 
This had led some of the staff I spoke with expressing wishes that their 
facility would soon be ‘upgraded’ above their current level in order to gain 
access to more resources, drug stocks, and staff. On average, Health Centre 
II facilities reported having anywhere between 900-1500 patients on average 
per month to attend to, figures frequently cited while justifying health workers’ 
wishes to upgrade their facility. Most Health Centre staff reported they could 
not cope with the sheer numbers of patients they have to serve, and that this 




“We’ve been told by the district they can’t provide any more, that the 
ministry only has the power to do that. There’s too few staff here and it 
makes them depressed, you can work for 24 hours and you have to rest, 
and yet they need to work all the time. And yet the only way to get more 
staff here is to promote this HC from II to III. Whenever we ask the district 
people there is no way they can help us. They say it has to come from 
the ministry. According to our numbers of clients we see and report, 
when you compare the numbers it is beyond the level of HC II” 





Implementing mTrac: information infrastructures and reporting 
mechanisms 
 
During my survey I would also ask who would collect data on tests performed 
and how often this would be collated. The lab personnel or records officer 
would usually then produce a book at this point, flipping pages and displaying 
the entries for each tests and the results. Initially my interest was primarily in 
seeing if they kept a register of HAT testing, but it soon became apparent 
that outside of the large referral hospitals and HAT treatment centres, no 
facility considered a need for any such HAT specific data entry system, 
owing to its low standing among a plethora of more pressing local health 
priorities. I asked one lab technician how they would usually report their data, 
and if I could see a copy of the report forms they used for this system. 
 
 “In terms of management of data when you come to analysis, we don’t 
have IT materials, we just do it manually and it makes it a delayed 
process. So we thought if there was a computer, printers, work would be 
made faster. It would help us process, and draw graphs, when that data is 
being sent by everyone, someone can say ‘why are we doing it like this? 
What are we lacking? How should we move forward?’ and so on. If it is 
manual sometimes you aren’t motivated to move on”.  
- Lab technician, HC III, Dokolo 
 
Convenience is not the sole benefit of digitising surveillance reports. The role 
of information technologies in this case are not limited to streamlining the 
data collection and management process, but also of facilitating feedback 
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and sharing experiences between colleagues. Feedback from facilities was 
repeatedly cited as something that health workers felt would be useful, 
particularly where suspected cases of HAT had been forwarded to a referral 
hospital and received no communication regarding the result. 
 
“We never got any feedback about any patient form Lwala. If someone 
maybe was identified from this sub-county and treated in Lwala hospital 
we have never got any feedback concerning that”. 
- Clinical Officer, HCII, Kaberamaido 
 
 
One records officer in Kaberamaido described some of the practical 
challenges associated with implementing IT infrastructures for data sharing.  
 
“Of course the computers are not there, but if they were then the other 
challenge is the connection part of it – like modems, if those ones are 
there then it is easier to share just within a click, without other expenses 
like fuel just within a second you are sharing information and it can be so 
helpful. At this facility we have no specified transport means, we just have 
to hire to move the destination you are ending at, maybe you are taking 
the monthly report – or you have realised you have a stock out so we 
want to cover that gap. We have to just hire a vehicle, so still we have that 
gap of transport, some expenses to and from with motorcycles, the 
problem is fuel which is not all there. Some report forms we are using the 
phones to send – the weekly surveillance reports and mTrac.” 
 
He promptly produces a two page document headed ‘mTrac Health Centre 
Surveillance Report Form’. The mTrac system had been described by 
records officers at a handful of primary healthcare facilities I had visited as a 
surveillance system for general health comprising a range of common 
diseases, though HAT does not appear to be captured in the form. I peruse 
the entry columns as he talks me through his weekly routine of texting the 
lab’s test results to the system.  
 
“We started implementing mTrac in 2013.  There are many challenges - 
it’s about commitment, you need to make sure the reports are ready on a 
Monday by midday to send, and you may have other things that need 
doing and finding the time is hard, but it got easier as we got used to the 
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new system. We still lack so many things on that, we face challenges on 
network [coverage]. Then there are gaps whereby you find only one 
person has most of the knowledge, in case that person is missing 
for one week then you find you cannot send your report, the whole 
thing breaks down”.  
 
Unlike the paper based system, the report is sent in a coded format and 
forwarded to the database where it is collated by the Ministry of Health and 
reviewed alongside reports from other local facilities. This is then collated 
into a report which is used for accountability and feedback during quarterly 
regional performance meetings. 
 
“We can all see each other’s results and say ‘why is it like this, what 
happened here? How can we make this such and such better?’ It 
prompts me to work harder and help me to supervise the screening for 
malaria or whatever. It is a motivation thing, it motivates you to work 
harder and manage the data, it helps you to move forward. If you don’t 




Funded by and coordinated through UNICEF, FIND, and the Ministry of 
Health, the mTrac (Mobile Tracking) system was conceived in response to 
complaints about shortages of medical supplies at its health facilities 
(Cummins, 2012). The system was designed to replace the slow and 
cumbersome paper-based reporting system and “allow electronic data 
capture at the community and lower health facility levels without the need for 
investment in heavy IT infrastructure” (Uganda Ministry of Health, 2011). The 
weekly ‘HMIS 033B Form’ health workers must submit form their mobile 
phone captures indicators on notifiable diseases, malaria treatment, and 
ACT/RDT stocks. Currently there is no mechanism to report unusual cases 
such as HAT in these reports.  
 
The programme claims to “create accountability for response and action by 
empowering each level with the information they need to effectively carry out 
their duties” (ibid). My interaction with the records officer whose motivation to 
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‘pull up your socks’ suggests mTrac has had a positive effect in this respect. 
However, despite the programme’s aims to circumvent gaps in ‘heavy’ IT 
infrastructures, staff in my study widely expressed a desire for more 
investment in the structural and relational apparatus of information systems 
at the local level. Problems of network coverage, purportedly resolved by the 
programme in a pilot report by UNICEF (Cummins, 2012) persisted at the 
time of my study. Meanwhile, the supposed streamlining of data reporting via 
an SMS-based system does not appear to have significantly addressed the 
workload of health workers as many reported they still struggled to find the 
time to submit timely reports to the district. The observation described above 
that when one person with ‘most of the knowledge’ is absent, ‘the whole thing 
breaks down’ raises important questions regarding the destabilising effects of 
the mTrac on the surveillance infrastructure which seemingly excludes HAT. 
As with the RDT which claims to fill a gap in laboratory diagnostic 
infrastructure, novel mobile reporting systems like mTrac risk creating more 
labour and bureaucracy for health workers, who still need to report other 
health data and compile reports on other health outcomes as well. This is 
another example of where technology, supposedly designed to circumvent 
gaps in infrastructural paucity, end up inadvertently creating more work to 








Devolving surveillance to the district 
 
Throughout affected regions, only certain hospitals are capable of diagnosing 
and treating HAT owing to the difficulty and training required to confirm 
diagnosis by microscopy, and potentially fatal nature of the treatment. In 
addition to physical infrastructure, a lack of trained staff can also be a major 
obstacle. One study found that 50% of rural health centres in Kabarole 
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district had microscopes, but only 17% had a trained technician that was able 
to use them (Tumwebaze, 2011). This problem is echoed, if not amplified 
when considering diseases such as HAT, which require specially trained 
laboratory staff to carry out lengthy and expensive diagnostics procedures. If 
the elimination of HAT is to be achieved, not only do frontline health facilities 
need to be equipped with dependable diagnostics, but must also be able to 
reliably recognise early clinical signs and symptoms of HAT, and understand 
the disease management and referral systems to manage diagnosed cases. 
 
Partly owing to the focal nature of sleeping sickness epidemiology, HAT 
control has always been closely entangled with disease mapping, with 
detailed maps of HAT distribution in Uganda published as early as 1903 
(Christy, 2013; WHO, 2018b). That elimination progress is measured using 
the HAT Atlas to calculate merely the distance between health centres 
equipped with diagnostic tools and ‘at risk’ populations is revealing of how 
the programme conceptualises the elimination landscape. It imagines that 
the geographical and material proximity of facilities to people increases the 
likelihood that symptomatic patients will follow treatment-seeking trajectories 
that align their symptomatic uncertainty with diagnostic capability to produce 
a case. However, as the previous and following chapters show, patients do 
not trace these predicted pathways to treatment. Nor (as the following 
chapter demonstrates) does presenting at an equipped centre necessarily 
lead to HAT tests being performed or a correct HAT diagnosis reached. This 
observation alludes to Farmer’s (2014) “Staff, space, stuff, and systems” 
idiom that captured the crux of the health infrastructures discourse 
surrounding the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. The alignment of necessary 
factors for this to happen requires more than the physical presence of 
diagnostic devices being closer to people. More than this, it needs to be 
culturally compelling (Panter-Brick et al., 2006) within local testing ecologies 




Measuring performance in a fragile assemblage 
 
The implementation of the mTrac system is a useful insight into how the by-
passing of old physical infrastructures through technologies are increasing 
the reach of state programmes throughout digital health infrastructures in 
novel ways. Mobile technologies and data reporting mechanisms create 
digital mirrors to hardcopy networks, allowing information to flow not just 
unilaterally and upstream, but between other actors within the health 
network. As one respondent pointed out however, the presence of 
technologies like computers are only one part of the ecosystem, and that in 
order to gain traction and have agency, connectivity is key. This it is the 
relational forces between technologies and people holding infrastructures of 
surveillance together stable enough to function. For example,  mTrac 
reporting relying on the knowledge and timely actions of a single person 
make the surveillance assemblage extremely fragile and unstable, or as our 
respondent put it, “the whole thing breaks down”.  
 
While this supposedly creates a more open distribution of information 
between stakeholders, it also allows for state and vertical programme 
managers to hold individual actors and facilities to account. Through the 
socio-material relations of health workers, patients and medicines (Rose, 
2007), the health centre, the laboratory, and the private clinic emerge as 
sites of governmentality upon which the state seeks to install particular 
regimes of diagnostic practice (Dean, 2010). Through learning and 
performing these socio-material enactments as are introduced into the 
surveillance infrastructure, they establish themselves as new technical 
modes of ‘truth telling’ (Foucault, 1988; Besley, 2005). However, as the 
introduction of the mTrac surveillance system demonstrates, such 
interventions rarely transpire to be the ‘seamless bio-political disciplining 
project’ (Geissler, et al, 2012) that the Ministry of Health may have striven 
for, as East African healthcare contexts rarely allow for such a perfect 
implementation (Hutchinson et al, 2016). 
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The overlaying of new, digital, information infrastructures opens avenues 
through which data can democratised; through sharing, feedback, and 
learning. However it also opens channels through which progress and 
performance can be monitored, and become a tool of promoting 
accountability through public, mutual scrutiny. Indeed, ‘accountability’ has 
become a buzzword in international development discourses. Policy makers 
in government and NGOs acknowledge that infrastructural developments, 
drug provisions, or introducing diagnostic tools are not enough to save lives 
unless clinical staff in contexts like Uganda are held accountable for doing 
their jobs. But where health staff struggle to meet the demands of large 
populations with little support from central or local government, with whom 
should this accountability really lie? 
 
While such motivations for self-improvement and accountability are note-
worthy, the potential consequences of implementing such a system of 
surveillance onto already struggling facilities may have unintended 
consequences, as staff struggle to meet the demands of patients, and 
increasing pressure from the state to deliver national targets. Health systems 
and staff working under the pressures of reporting positive results therefore 
can result in the production of poor quality data about what is happening in at 
the ground level. Although the mTrac system promotes transparency and 
accountability through real-time reporting of drug stock and case data, it is 
not invulnerable to the unpredictable pressures this kind of performance 
measurement places on a decentralised health system. Furthermore, by 
prioritising only the most common health conditions such as malaria, there is 
less incentive to use the system to report conditions such as HAT, re-
inscribing its status as a neglected disease even further through socio-







Social proximities of surveillance 
 
In Uganda, around two thirds of medicines are procured from the private 
sector, mostly from drug shops (Chandler et al, 2011). Testing needs to be 
available where patients currently seek treatment, and HAT RDTs have been 
introduced into many government health facilities in T.b. gambiense affected 
areas of the West Nile. However, policy makers recognise the limited reach 
of such activities, given that much treatment is sought outside of public 
health services. The introduction of HAT RDTs at drug shops therefore has 
been suggested as a way make a significant contribution to targeting HAT in 
many hard to reach communities (Kovacic, 2015). This had been piloted in 
the West Nile with encouraging uptake (personal communication, 2016), and 
the identification of one HAT case in 2015 (Wamboga et al., 2017). However, 
for T.b. rhodesiense affected areas where there is no such rapid test 
currently available, it is difficult to know how well such an approach would 
translate from one local setting to another, or even be received initially by the 
individuals running these outlets, given how they are perceived and treated 
by the public biomedical sector. The malaria RDT has already undergone this 
process in Uganda before, and so some precedent exists that can be looked 
to. Indeed, even in the case of introducing the ubiquitous malaria RDT into 
private clinics laying on the peripheries of the regulated health infrastructure 
was not without its challenges. Drug outlets are seen by different actors as 
both a biomedical clinic and an unregulated vendor at once; legitimate and 
illegitimate; trusted and distrusted (Chandler et al, 2011). 
 
A number of patients treated at Dokolo had reportedly been referred from 
private drug shops where the staff had suspected HAT. It had been 
suggested to me by some clinical staff, most notably by Dr Serena Akello, 
that a sensible option would be to expand training to the individuals 
managing these private clinics where the majority of patients tend to present 
at initially, in order to expand the suspicion index beyond the boundaries of 
the formal health sector into the community via these pre-established links. 
Understanding the potential consequences of attempting to tap into a parallel 
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network that largely operates ‘under the radar’ of state regulation requires a 
critical analysis on what constitute these networks.    
 
In seeking to intervene upon the daily mundane practices of health workers, 
patients, and drug shop owners, state HAT control and elimination 
programmes could introduce a new technology of surveillance into an even 
more unstable, unfixed, and fluid infrastructure than which it already exists. 
The location of drug stores physically, being closer to remote villages and 
high risk populations is an attractive feature of this option. Moreover they are 
more topologically proximate too, being so close socially to sick individuals 
whose treatment seeking pathways tend to overlap far more frequently with 
these outlets. However the remit of the programme by definition is to render 
these connections and nodes visible, and integrate with them. The intentions 
of the programme and the system it seeks to tap into diverge in this respect, 
as many drug outlets that would be most accessible to patients would also be 
illegal and therefore unlikely to enrol into an exercise of state governance 
and monitoring. The quote describing how many stores communicate with 
one another to evade detection by the authorities illustrates the ephemeral 
nature of the private drug store infrastructure which inherently makes it a 
difficult landscape upon which to overlay interventions. It is an interesting if 
not paradoxical situation, where on the one hand health staff in the formal 
health system are lobbying to be seen by the state to access more 
resources, while the informal network of private clinical spaces operating 
parallel to this infrastructure actively seek to remain ‘beneath the radar’.  
 
Meanwhile, the national HAT Control programme aims to extend its reach 
into difficult to reach populations by inserting technologies into these 
controversial social hubs. Incorporating informal health providers into 
programmes would increase their social proximity to the public, particularly in 
remote regions. However, given the sentiments expressed by health workers 
in my study, integrating informal health providers into the biomedical 
ecosystem would require a challenging, if not unlikely cultural embrace. 
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Formally acknowledging the plurality of health providers questions 
authoritative claims on expertise and knowledge, and would require 
programmes to re-imagine infrastructure as a socio-material assemblage 
beyond the physical bounds of state health facilities.  
 
 
Impact of RDT culture on microscopy performance and HAT detection  
 
Surveillance relies on the awareness and training of health workers, and the 
resources to enact on clinical suspicion where potential cases present 
themselves to the clinic. Although microscopy is considered the gold 
standard for malaria diagnosis (World Health Organisation, 2010), it has 
been found to be impractical in many remote and resource-poor settings due 
to its requirements for trained personnel, equipment, regular supply of 
reagents and continued quality assurance supervision (Chandler et al. 2012). 
Investment in developing new rapid point-of-care (POC) tests provide 
particular appeal in health systems like Uganda’s, owing to their easy 
mobilisation and use. RDTs are designed for places with weak public 
infrastructure and laboratories networks, power outages and staff shortages, 
and as such are expected to enable quick diagnosis without needing to 
invest heavily in training, equipment or infrastructure associated with the 
development of laboratories (English et al., 2014; in Hutchinson et al. 2016). 
They are, in short, what Peter Redfield calls ‘solutions in a box’ (2012); a 
substitute for absent infrastructure (Street, 2014).  Small, nimble, modest-
looking technologies, such as the RDT for T.b. gambiense can detect 
antibodies in just 15 minutes, and embody the ‘promise of healthier, more 
economical and more equitable futures’ (Street, et al. 2014) that ascribe to 
the frugal innovation narrative of tackling complex problems with stripped 
down, simple technologies (Radjou and Prabhu, 2015).  
 
Diagnosing HAT is not just a biomedical procedure. More importantly in this 
setting – where practice frequently diverges from protocol owing to localised 
constraints and contexts – it is a social practice (Pool & Geissler, 2005). 
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Through these socio-material practices, assemblages of technology, policy, 
training, health workers and patients, and medication come together and 
create new meanings and relationships (Ong & Collier 2005). The diagnostic 
process as described by the health workers I met was one of struggling to 
reconcile policy with practice in the face of overwhelming patient loads and 
ever dwindling stocks. Managing expectations of care – both of the patient 
and programmes– in this environment led many health workers to opt for 
what will conveniently close cases and satisfy patients at the time of 
consultation, and donors in evaluation reports.  
 
The malaria RDT is just one example of how vertical disease-centric 
programmes which focus on magic-bullet solutions to seemingly isolated 
problems can exert unintended negative impacts on the health systems they 
seek to improve. RDTs were promoted as a solution to these diagnostic 
challenges in settings with no or poor quality microscopy, and as a result of 
their convenience have become the primary diagnostic tool in the vast 
majority of facilities. An unintended consequence of this of course, is that 
microscopies are no longer performed as a general rule, not least due to staff 
and resources constraints (hence the utility of the RDT), but now also 
because there is a preferred option for the patient as well as the health 
worker. RDTs have created -or at least greatly contributed to- a diagnostic 
ecosystem whereby microscopy is no longer performed, thus case detection 
is dependent on the suspicion index and vigilance of trained health workers, 
and appropriate referral to high level treatment centres. 
 
At a workshop on Global Health Diagnostics in Montreal, Canada in June 
2018, the crux of this particular issue arose during a panel on diagnostics for 
antimicrobial resistance, after one panellist remarked that, while centralised 
referral labs and trained staff were once commonplace in many Low and 
Middle Income Countries, the devastation wrought by HIV and the move to 
single disease testing ‘destroyed’ the central lab. However, as one 
representative from the diagnostic device industry who was present pointed 
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out, the climate created by global health agendas and donor missions limited 
the scope for industry to explore central lab strengthening; “The impact has 
been done by influential groups saying we need to do point of care, but not 
lab testing. So companies like us have had to de-invest in building lab 
infrastructures because it’s all RDTs, point of care, ‘in the bush’ diagnostics. 
So now we're going back to regional labs, and people are coming to us 
saying ‘so where are your [lab] tests?’ Well we de-invested in those tests 
because you told us to focus on RDTs!”  
 
An audience member then interjected and countered the point with a sharp 
rebuttal; “So did HIV kill the lab, or Bill Gates?” 
 
Focussing on the ‘local’ level of implementation as I have done can risk 
obscuring the structural factors shaping these issues. Donors and funding 
structures that have driven global health crusades have played a major role 
in transforming the diagnostic landscape today (Street, 2018). Much 
emphasis has been placed on developing high end technologies, but Point of 
Care testing and RDTs have come at the expense of investing in central labs 
in many countries that need them. Systematically focussing on RDTs has 
pushed investments in lab support to the margins. Even in 2018, cheap point 
of care tests continue to be framed as the solution for all low and middle 
income countries. We still think labs are too expensive, difficult and 
impossible to invest in, consequently pushing the issue into the future (Engel 
et al., 2016; Pai, 2018a; 2018b).  
 
 
Re-imagining infrastructure and the role of the centralised laboratory 
 
During each visit to health centres I would be taken on a ‘tour’ of the 
laboratory. Some of these would be large and well equipped, perhaps a run-
down but broadly recognisable as a working laboratory. Others would appear 
to be no more than a small box-room, bearing little resemblance to 
conventional western conceptions of a lab. While I found these spaces 
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notably ‘basic’ and ‘poorly equipped’ as I blithely remarked in my notes at the 
time, these transpired to be the far more effective examples to draw from, as 
by documenting the features which they lacked, I unwittingly found myself 
describing those necessary elements by which the laboratory is held together 
and can function across varying levels of capacity and accessibility. What 
was it about these seemingly deficient labs that allowed them to continue to 
work and meet the demands of the local population they serve? The space 
itself and how it was used possessed certain transposable features that 
determines its capacity to function as a ‘working laboratory’ (the function 
being to make disease, or the causative agents of disease, visible to the 
biomedical gaze). For example, the presence of certain items of equipment 
to conduct certain diagnostic procedures is expected within this clinical 
assemblage. Other physical elements; equipment through which to connect 
the subject of biomedical enquiry to these technologies such as rapid tests 
kits, syringes, capillary tubes, and glass slides are arguably necessary for 
these technologies to perform these diagnostic enactments in this system, 
but by all means are not always available. Not only is the presence of certain 
artefacts imperative for these relationships to hold meaning, but people and 
their interactions with these objects are equally critical (Whyte, van der 
Geest, and Hardon, 2002).  
 
Drawing on Farmer’s useful, albeit somewhat tick-box style formula of staff, 
stuff, space, and systems (2014), if health infrastructures are to be subject to 
scrutiny and targeted for intervention, then they must no longer be conceived 
of solely in material terms. The presence of material diagnostic technologies 
such as microscopes does not infer increased capacity for case-detection, 
where lack of staff (or lack of training), or diagnostic cultures introduced by 
RDTs create disincentives to perform microscopy and find cases in 
peripheral health centre facilities. Within the wider system of HAT referral, 
the clinic cannot be considered in isolation any more than the pot-hole ridden 
or flooded road that separates it from the patient, nor can RDTs or mobile 
reporting be conceived of as being introduced into a stable system of 
 197 
surveillance practices.  Each and every element within the wider assemblage 
of the health infrastructure, from pathogen to patient or from laboratory to 
homestead, are entangled in the same complex ecosystem of dynamic socio-
material relationships that govern the likelihood of a case being detected and 
treated. For these complicated regimes of surveillance and control to work, 
certain physical structures must be in place, but rely on these elements being 
held together as an assemblage recognisable as health infrastructures. In 
other words, “Infrastructures are relational”, they are “neither an abstract 
system nor physical stuff; it is the relationships between people, stuff, and 
space that enables health systems to work” (Street, 2014b). These are 






As shown in the previous chapter, patients entering the clinical space have to 
negotiate access to treatment through social and technological interactions. 
However, as this chapter has shown, health workers too must navigate these 
interactions and seek ways in which to make themselves visible to the state 
to gain access to resources whilst managing patients’ expectations of care. 
Meanwhile, it is difficult to estimate how much information can be realistically 
communicated at the point of testing where health workers are limited by 
time and resource constraints, are under pressure to meet program targets, 
and while managing numerous tasks and associated workloads.  
 
Decentralisation has led to a slow degradation of public health infrastructures 
in Uganda, where health workers must strive to reconcile standardised 
biomedical practice in contexts of ‘institutional instability and medical 
uncertainty’ (Street, 2014a. p.11). In the face of a dynamic population the 
local healthcare system is conceptualised to be static and outdated by health 
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workers. The notion that facilities need expanding, and ‘stepping up’ in the 
face of rapid population expansion has led to many workers lobbying to have 
their facilities upgraded to higher levels in order to access more resources, 
equipment, and buildings. The decentralisation of the health system has 
removed HAT as an item of national importance, and relegated it’s threat to a 
low priority for districts where it is not perceived to be a risk, therefore little 
training or resources are mobilised to these areas. Staff regularly find 
themselves having to manage the expectations of health service and disease 
control programmes, while being held accountable by their peers and local 
population whom they serve and treat on a daily basis amidst  budget and 
resource constraints. Delivering satisfactory care – both to the expectation of 
the patient and the clinician’s standards - within faltering infrastructures 
becomes a daily struggle against a backdrop of increasing demands from 
multiple vertical programmes. Without the substantial financial and material 
capacity to accompany them, the reality of achieving many of the objectives 
set out by such programmes becomes a Sisyphean task.  
 
Infrastructures –and as such, strong or weak health infrastructures- are not 
solely determined by the technical and material capacity that form their 
physical composition. Many HC IIIs are well equipped with working 
microscopes, but few have trained staff to operate them. Even where staff 
had the tools and training, few felt they had time or confidence to accurately 
perform microscopies for HAT. A study among diagnostic laboratories in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo found that performance of blood parasite 
microscopy, including Trypanosoma was poor, and that recent training were 
associated with better performance, being higher among those trained less 
than 2 years previously, compared to those who were not (42.9% versus 
26.3% respectively) (Mukadi, Lejon et al. 2016). Before the introduction of 
malaria RDTs, staff still had to rely on knowledge and clinical suspicion of 
HAT to look for it as they do today. The crucial difference however is that 
they would have been routinely performing microscopies and more likely to 
detect trypanosomes. Today in the RDT era where the routinisation of 
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practice has been transformed to circumvent microscopy, few health workers 
have the training or confidence to identify trypanosomes by this method.  
 
The pressures of time and high patient demand have been compounded by 
the introduction of RDTs. The culture of rapid testing that has grown up 
around the malaria RDT has negatively impacted on the HAT diagnostic 
ecosystem, weakening passive case detection for T.b. rhodesiense by 
reducing the performance of microscopies. Few staff had received any form 
of formal training for identifying or dealing with HAT cases, while many were 
unclear where referrals should be made and whether referrals should be 
followed up or reported elsewhere. Understaffing, high turnover of staff, and 
infrequent or limited training have created a low index of suspicion among 
health workers, further reducing the likelihood of microscopies being 
performed in frontline health facilities. Few regarded HAT to be a problem in 
their local area, though some admitted that local prevalence data could be 
skewed due to lack of microscopy. Meanwhile, digital reporting methods like 
the mTrac system have facilitated a mechanism for data collection and 
accountability to be built into local health services reporting to the district. 
However, poor communication between lower health facilities with larger 
regional hospitals suggests information is not fed back up the referral stream. 
 
Through enactments of HAT diagnosis, hospital infrastructures emerge as 
relational assemblages that, while on the whole appear large and monolithic, 
remain fundamentally fragile. The testimonies of health staff give a different 
perspective to the surveillance ecosystem, one that encounters the restraints 
of a decentralised healthcare system, the demands of target driven vertical 
programmes, and struggles of delivering care with little resources or 
structural support. Decentralisation has put HAT on a low priority setting for 
districts where it is not perceived to be a risk, therefore little training or 
resources are mobilised to these areas. Many health workers wished their 
facilities to be upgraded to a higher-level to receive more resources and 
support from the district.  Here, the presence of material diagnostic 
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technologies such as microscopes however does not infer increased capacity 
for case-detection, where lack of staff (or lack of training), and diagnostic 
cultures introduced by RDTs create disincentives to perform microscopy and 
find cases in frontline health facilities.  
 
Given the emphasis on case detection as the primary challenge in 
contemporary HAT control efforts, it is reasonable to assume that once a 
case is correctly identified and diagnosed, that treatment and discharge is a 
relatively straightforward and stable process. However, as the following 
chapter illustrates, this too is a fragile and complex part of the HAT 




























“The hospital was not particularly bad, but my life was hard there” 
 
- Patient 7, Apac District 
 
 
While remaining in the clinical space, this chapter shifts from finding cases to 
managing them. Here, patients have been re-configured from clinical 
suspects to confirmed cases through the alignment of diagnostic practices, 
such as parasitological demonstration in the blood and cerebrospinal fluid, 
lymph node examination, and in some limited settings, DNA amplification. 
With a confirmed diagnosis the infected body is transformed and subjected to 
violent biomedical intervention with potent drugs, and monitored throughout 
and after to confirm the success of treatment. Strict monitoring guidelines 
once required discharged patients to return for quarterly follow-up tests, with 
failure to complete referral posing similar dilemmas for those trying to 
reconcile epidemiological certainty with clinical pragmatism in the ISSEP. 
 
This chapter draws on data from a study exploring the diagnostic, treatment, 
and referral experiences of 25 HAT patients (24 treated T.b. rhodesiense 
survivors discharged from Lwala and Dokolo treatment centres, and 1 in-
patient admitted to Dokolo treatment centre at the time of study). It reveals 
the frustrating and  iterative pathways many take before finally receiving a 
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HAT diagnosis, the financial and social burden of long periods of hospital 
admission throughout treatment, and asks how potential novel oral drug 
regimens could transform this landscape. Drawing on testimonies from 
patients and health workers, this study reveals the fragility of the HAT case 
management ecosystem, and raises questions over the potentially 
destabilising effects of introducing new guidelines and treatment regimens. 
 
 
Treatment and referral experiences among T.b. rhodesiense 
survivors 
 
The first cases of rhodesiense HAT were reported in Kaberamaido and 
Dokolo districts in 2004, and the continued presentation of new cases 
indicates active transmission in both districts (Bardosh, 2016). In 2014 an 
outbreak of zoonotic T.b. rhodesiense HAT in Dokolo, Kaberamaido, and Lira 
districts prompted a national response co-ordinated through the Ministry of 
Health and COCTU. This included a number of public sensitisation 
campaigns which highlighted signs and symptoms of HAT to look out for, and 
encouraged the continual spraying of cattle with pyrethroids to tackle the 
outbreak. Around 18 months later, I arrived in Dokolo to explore the lasting 
effects of the outbreak and the subsequent public health campaign in the 
region. During this time, I conducted a study to examine survivor’s 
experiences and perceptions of HAT, HAT testing, treatment, and post-
treatment referral to explore the scale of referral completion and perceptions 





13 out of the 25 (52%) patients interviewed were male, representing an even 
sample between sexes. The median age of people interviewed was 30y 
(range 12-80). Only 10 could recall how long the period between the onset of 
symptoms and finally receiving their HAT diagnosis was. Of these, the 
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Awareness of HAT and perceptions of risk 
 
 
Rashid leads us under the shade of a long timber framed shelter where he 
makes bricks for a living. He dumps his heavy load, two buckets of murky 
brown water he has scooped up from the river bank, onto the ground and 
reclines into a restful crouch.  
 
“You know I heard something very interesting. I remember we had some 
missionary who came early in Uganda, and that person was killed within 
Busoga. In this time they believed because they killed him, the Europeans 
now decided to bring those tsetse flies to come and torture us and give us 
that disease. Actually the way they killed him, it was communication problem, 
they consulted the Buganda king and he instructed them ‘you go and leave 
him’ - you say ‘mu-te!’ (leave) - but in Busoga that word means killing, so 
instead they killed the man! So they believe because of that mistake it 
brought that very dangerous disease and is torturing us”. 
 
He laughs and pours some water into his hand and rinses the residue of clay 
from his face. 
 
“It’s just a story, because the disease is there, you know? I know it is the 
normal way of transmission. The tsetse fly, they like the places where cattle 
go to take water, and the swampy areas” - He gestures to the embankment 
he has been filling his buckets from- “My work is majorly based in swampy 
areas where you can get water nearby and mix the mud and make the bricks, 
so I believe during that time when I was in Gnkwalakwala I may have gotten 
that disease that side. But also on my observation, generally the tsetse are 
many in this community also.” 
 
When Rashid fell sick in September 2014 he attended his local health centre 
III in Lira district. When the malaria drugs that were prescribed to him failed 
to work, he feared that he had contracted HIV. At this time he had been 
preparing bricks for a member of lab staff, who suspected he may be infected 
with HAT and took him for testing at Lira Hospital. After several failed 
attempts to find parasites in his blood, the persistence of the lab worker’s 
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suspicion paid off, and his sixth microscopy result was found positive for 
HAT. He was transported straight to Lwala Hospital, where after a painful 
lumbar puncture he was admitted for 10 days with early stage HAT and 
treated with Suramin. “They gave a certain period to go back, but during that 
time I felt so well, and also I was fearing the lumbar puncture, so I didn’t go 
back. I feel I am completely healed!” 
 
 
HAT awareness among my sample was generally high (only two respondents 
claimed to have no prior awareness of HAT before diagnosis), due to 
repeated outbreaks in recent years. Most respondents expressed good 
knowledge of symptoms and understanding of how HAT is transmitted. The 
majority of those interviewed had some personal knowledge of HAT, having 
known relatives or people in their village who had suffered or died during 
previous outbreaks. Both collective memories of past deaths from HAT in the 
community, and personal experiences among close social networks of 
friends and family accounted for most HAT awareness.  
 
“I had heard about it but I did not know about how it presents. I heard that 
the disease was transmitted by omele (tsetse fly) from a friend who had a 
bite once and was told to get tested. They advised me to go for other tests 
for Sleeping Sickness” 




“Yes that been information was parading around, and we had some 
relative who had died of that, but people only realised later on what it was, 
when we saw also other people suffering the same way. In the clan down 
there, people thought they were bewitched, only after they died we heard 
of other cases of this sleeping sickness and realised that was what it 
was”. 
-rHAT patient 20, Dokolo 
 
 
Radio campaigns also contributed, but these messages were rarely delivered 
in local languages. During one interview outside a patient’s homestead in 
Lira we overheard one such radio broadcast, in English, describing the signs 
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and symptoms of HAT and promoting the clearing of tsetse habitats. When 
asked what the interviewee thought about the message, they replied “I do not 
know what they said, it is not Lwo”. Those who could follow broadcasts and 
cited radio as a source of HAT knowledge (6) did so alongside circulating 
knowledge among community members and personal social networks as a 
key source of knowledge. 
 
“Yes I used to hear about it but didn’t know about how the disease would 
take you. I heard from here [points to radio], and because even my 
grandfather had a bite. They are speaking Kumam sometimes, mostly 
English though which I do not speak”. 
- rHAT patient 24, Apac 
 
 
It is reasonable to assume that some of the circulating community knowledge 
about HAT came from sensitisation campaigns initiated by the Ministry of 
Health in response to local outbreaks, however only two cited HAT 
sensitisation activities by medical or veterinary professionals as a source. 
Even during testing and treatment for their own infection, some claimed to 
not have learned anything about HAT throughout referral. 
 
“From the community and through radio talks. I used to hear that it is 
transmitted from person to person by a tsetse fly. But I do not know 
exactly how you catch it. Health workers at Dokolo did not explain it to 
me”. 
- rHAT patient 25, Dokolo 
 
At the time of interview, nearly all respondents claimed to feel there was a 
risk of HAT in their area. Peoples’ perceptions of risk were discussed in 
terms of their proximity to areas with high densities of tsetse flies, such as 
rivers, swamps, and  uncultivated bushy areas where lantana camara (locally 
known as obelewinyo, or ‘tick berry’) grew. Others referred to these habitats 





“You used to cut the grasses for roofing the house, during that time I 
could see the tsetse flies coming and eating on me”. 
- rHAT patient 18, Dokolo 
-  
“The tsetse fly that brings the disease are very many here and the place is 
bushy and we are very close to the swamp. People are keeping cattle, 
and then these children they go for fishing in swamps, those are the risks. 
Then also going to fetch water from there because it is near to the 
swamp”. 
- rHAT patient 9, Kaberamaido 
 
 
“I fear I got it from the bush. I feel I maybe had the bite from the bush 
because I used to go and collect firewood from there”. 
- rHAT patient 13, Kaberamaido 
 
 
Despite most (17/25) saying they felt they were exposed to risk of being 
infected with HAT, none claimed to have suspected HAT when they first 
became sick, although as shown below, some later developed suspicion 
following treatment failure and rapid progression of symptoms, leading to 5 
individuals eventually requesting to be tested for HAT. 
 
 
Pathways to treatment 
 
All interviewees reported having experienced symptoms consistent with HAT, 
particularly headaches, fever, or excessive sleeping during the day prior to 
their diagnosis. Many also complained of muscle weakness or ‘paralysis’ and 
difficulty walking, as well as cognitive impairment.  
 
“He had a headache for so long. He would be looking at someone from a 
distance as if there are two people. The boy complained he would be 
seeing very big animals with red eyes, and he was talking in an un-
coordinated manner. We continued from the private clinics until November 
when he got his diagnosis at Lwala at our second try there”.  




While all described symptoms matching the HAT syndromic screening 
profile, most assumed that they were suffering from other locally endemic or 
high profile diseases such as malaria (9), HIV (3), Brucellosis (2) or typhoid 
(2). 5 individuals suspected they had been bewitched, as described in the 
following responses.  
 
“Before this onset one night as I was sleeping something landed on the 
roof of my house, then I picked a spear and pierced the thing from inside 
and it fell down, I came out and there was nothing. Then from there all the 
signs and symptoms started, so I thought that somebody sent for me 
something, and because I tried to pierce the thing, it turned against me 
and from there the symptoms set in and my sickness started”. 
- rHAT patient 5, Dokolo. 
 
“Because he was studying I thought maybe some jealous person had 
bewitched the boy, I thought it could have been somebody from within this 
place bewitching him”.  
- Father of rHAT patient 6, Apac 
-  
“Some people were saying maybe some person has bewitched me, or 
maybe it was myself, my own witchcraft disturbing me. But the issue of 
witchcraft stopped when the medical workers made the diagnosis of 
Trypanosomiasis.” 
- rHAT patient 18, Dokolo 
 
 
Others were unsure of what could be causing their symptoms and attributed 
them to kidney problems, possible infection from the tsetse bite (chancre), or 
in one case symptoms of pregnancy.  
 
Patients took a variety of pathways leading up to their HAT diagnosis (see 
figure 18). The majority of respondents initially presented at local health 
facilities (16/25). This is likely to be motivated by the rapid onset of severe 
symptoms described by many. Others visited private ‘clinics’ (6), attended 








“10 am they [symptoms] started, I started feeling the headache […] By 
10pm the thing worsened and it started affecting all the joints, all my joints 
were paining me. I lost consciousness by that time. Then I was carried out 
by the children, they took me outside and bathed me but now I was not 
aware of what they were doing, I had lost consciousness. I even went and 
called the catechist to come and pray for me, I thought I was on my way” 
 
- rHAT patient 18, Dokolo 
-  
 
“We tried these malaria drugs before we took him Dokolo, but there was 
no improvement. That’s why we took him. We had taken him to the clinics, 
the clinic tested him for malaria but it was negative. After this we were 
very worried we did not know what was happening, he was becoming 
weaker and weaker. He got worse very quickly 
 






















Figure 15: Places first visited seeking treatment for symptoms by rhodesiense HAT patients.  
Patients reported presenting at public health facilities (blue and orange) immediately owing to the 
severe and sudden onset of symptoms. ‘Ajok’ is a local term often translated as ‘witchdoctor’. 
 
Figure 16: Treatments taken by patients prior to receiving HAT diagnosis.  
Nearly half of those who took treatment before diagnosis were taking antimalarials, most frequently 
identified as Coartem, often given alongside the painkiller Panadol. All ‘unknown injections’ were 
performed by private clinic personnel, while unknown tablets were prescribed by both private vendors 




Most individuals (19/25) reported having taken treatments before being 
diagnosed and treated for HAT (see figure 19). 
 
“We were buying drugs locally from a private clinic within this place, the 
kind of tablets we don’t know. But there was no improvement so 
eventually we took the boy to the health center.. After this treatment there 
was no improvement and the boy stayed home for more than one week 
and we had to take him back, and from there he was diagnosed” 
- Mother of rHAT patient 6, Apac 
 
 
“I was being given drugs, some people were saying I had a disease of the 
meat (brucellosis). Tablets, even injections, but no improvement. Then I 
was taken to Lwala Hospital, I was about to die”. 
- rHAT patient 7, Apac 
 
“I was given some injections from the private clinic, but I don’t know what.  
Then from Lwala first they removed some water from my back, but they 
didn’t find anything”  
- rHAT patient 11, Kaberamaido 
 
 
Some health workers reported that witchcraft is widely held to be a common 
cause of sickness in the region, and many sleeping sickness patients will 
initially visit the ‘shrine’ of a witchdoctor, only presenting at a health centre 
during the late stage or when it is “too late”.  Suspicion of being the victim of 
witchcraft was more common among this sample than in West Nile, with 5 
individuals reporting they initially attributed their symptoms to ‘bewitchment’ 
or being ‘charmed’. However, only 1 respondent (the mother of a young 
patient) had claimed to have gone to several traditional healers before 
presenting at a public health facility. In addition to the deviation toward drug 
shops observed in the West Nile, treatment seeking pathways among 
Rhodesiense HAT patients also included consultations with what were locally 
termed ‘Ajok’, or ‘Ajoki’ (pl), commonly referred to as ‘witchdoctors’. 
Treatments given by these practitioners ranged from providing herbal 
treatments in the form of liquid drinks, or therapeutic cutting procedures. 
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Piercing the body to introduce healing substances or remove sickness, 
through making cuts or several incisions to the skin to rub in medicines is still 
a widespread practice in many African settings (Whyte, van der Geest, and 
Hardon, 2002).  
 
The popularity of consulting with Ajoki appeared largely due to their local ties 
within the community, their ease of access, and their suitability in treating 
symptoms considered to be supernatural or spiritual in nature as opposed to 
biomedical. These consultations and treatments are often financially costly, 
and were widely criticised by local health staff for significantly delaying in 
patients presenting at public health facilities. In contrast to the West Nile, 
where traditional healers rarely featured as part of the diagnostic landscape, 
many rhodesiense HAT patients were forthcoming in describing their 
experiences in seeking therapy from such practitioners. 
 
 
“My body started swelling, then the first place for help was the witch 
doctors and they did the cutting because I was swelling in the legs, then 
I was brought back in some improved state. But suddenly I went back to 
all those other symptoms and I was not able to walk […] There after I 
was taken to Dokolo health centre IV after failing with the traditional 
way […]  until then I was purely on herbs”. 
 
- rHAT patient 5, Dokolo 
 
Of those who visited Ajoki and drug shops for a long time before presenting 
to a health centre, many spoke of the high financial cost of paying for 




“We thought maybe the child was bewitched, we took her to four 
different Ajoki. One was in Kaberamaido, another in Amolatar, another 
was around 4 km away in Abalang. But we were defeated with 
traditional, so eventually we took the child to Dokolo HC. They [Ajoki] 
move around, they are mobile. When they are coming they advertise 
over the radio and you go to the place when they say they will be there. 
There is one we took her to though who is settled. The one in Amolatar 
district, he is called ‘Agwech’. My brother in law told me about him […] 
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They were giving her traditional herbs for oral taking, and doing these 
therapeutic marks, cutting where you cut the skin using razor blades, 
and applying local herbs over the wound […] It cost close to 300,000 
shillings [approximately 80 USD] all together, for all four”. 
 
- Mother of rHAT survivor 22, Dokolo 
 
 
While community perceptions of ‘tor omele’ (the fly disease), or ‘tor anino’ 
(the sleeping disease) were mostly grounded in biomedical, mostly symptom 
or tsetse oriented explanations, some recalled how circulating beliefs that 
HAT had some supernatural aetiology or mechanism played a role in their 
treatment seeking decisions.  
 
“The people here, the feeling is they fear the disease that is so terrible 
and at times they feel it is caused by some traditional behaviours like 
witchcraft. For example when I was taking him to the health centre and he 
was mentally confused, someone said “is that the sort of thing you take to 
be treated at the hospital? Take him to the witchdoctor and he will be out 
with it”. 
- rHAT patient 2, Dokolo 
 
 
However, even where patients mostly chose to go straight to a public health 
facility and were tested for HAT, it is not always guaranteed that health 
workers will immediately suspect HAT and test for it. Even then, a low 
parasite load in the blood may prevent trypanosomes being detected even by 
microscopy at first. 
 
“After failure we went to Dokolo HC five times without detecting the 
parasite in blood, then the last 6th time they detected the parasites in the 
blood of [x] and also the other boy [x’s sibling]. All these five times they 
were testing for sleeping sickness but they failed to get a positive result 
until the sixth”. 
- Father of rHAT patient 2, Dokolo 
 
 
This pattern of being referred back-and-forth from one facility to another 
several times before diagnosis was common among my sample, leading to 
delayed diagnosis for 8 cases. 
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“I went to Kaberamaido HC and was negative, then to Lwala where I was 
told I had typhoid fever then back to Kaberamaido, it wasn’t there, was 
negative. Again I went to Lwala that is when it was detected.” 
- rHAT patient 15, Kaberamaido 
 
“I was taken to Dokolo health centre. But there the attendants they told 
me I had problems with my intestines. I was referred to Lira, unfortunately 
people did not have enough money to take me to Lira. I was brought back 
that very day, but people took me to Lira the following Tuesday. From Lira 
hospital they got the parasite in my blood. I was then brought back to 
Dokolo HC IV. I was now just being carried on a stretcher, from Dokolo I 
was admitted and they confirmed my diagnosis and they started working 
on me and treating me. […] The people doing the testing didn’t do well 
because they said it wasn’t there then shortly it was discovered from Lira. 
If it was just Dokolo I went to then I would have died, it was Lira who 
found the parasite. Even the intestine problem they spoke of at Dokolo 
was not even there at Lira, it was false.” 
- rHAT patient 18, Dokolo 
 
 
This suggests case detection can be delayed by poor access to transport or 
funds to reach referral hospitals, but also that in some cases poor knowledge 
and awareness of HAT, and thus low index of suspicion among health 
workers in this region contributes to misdiagnosis and delayed detection of 
HAT cases. As shown in the previous chapter, few health workers in frontline 
health facilities feel confident in recognising HAT symptoms or trypanosome 
identification by microscopy. Furthermore, few considered HAT to be a 
problem in their area, reflecting the low priority of HAT at district level and a 
lack of surveillance data  available to staff at lower level facilities. The net 
effect of this is low suspicion and delayed, or even no detection, of some 
HAT cases. 
 
Furthermore, while patient led referral (i.e. patient’s, or guardians requesting 
health workers to test for HAT) was higher among this sample (7/25) 
compared with the West Nile, many shared the concern that health workers 
would not receive such requests well and feared being ‘sent away’. The 
following quote is a particular example of how relationships of power 
between patients and health workers, and informal health providers produce 
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differential outcomes in access and care, as this patient describes her 
referral being made through a private practitioner who brokered their request. 
 
“We feared the health worker would not understand if we ask for tests, 
and they think that we are thinking we have more knowledge than them. 
They might send us away with nothing. From there the other person, the 
private practitioner made a request.“ 
- rHAT patient 25, Dokolo 
 
“When I went there Lwala they tested a blood sample from finger-tip, it 
was negative. Then my husband complained that we came here and we 
want the test for Tryps, then you say its negative. Then the nurse came 
and requested the doctor to take water from the back [LP], they tested 
and it was positive. Then they started treating me”. 
- rHAT patient 23, Apac 
 
 
Patients negotiating HAT tests with medical staff suggests a low vigilance of 
HAT among health workers, however the majority of patients reported that 
their diagnosis was made under the suspicion, or ‘initiative’ of health workers’ 
to test for HAT based on symptoms or patient history, though this only 
followed repeated failed treatments for malaria or typhoid for example.  
 
The majority of health workers I interacted with during my time in this region 
regularly expressed dissatisfaction with the current passive system and its 
unsuitability for local treatment seeking contexts; 
 
“We get few cases, but those will come in the late stage and in some 
cases you end up missing them. Sometimes you might not be able to treat 
them, it’s too late.  I think the challenge is mostly two ways; sometimes 
they take long to seek our treatment, sometimes they are sick but 
diagnosis is not made early, so people are thinking of other things, after 
you finally find it 2 or 3 weeks have gone and the disease has 
progressed”  




Admission and treatment experiences 
 
 
The vast majority of patients described some difficulty in reaching hospital for 
admission, whether they were brought in an incapacitated state by others, or 
presenting themselves, many faced challenges in accessing transport. For 
those cognisant enough at the time to remember it, the treatment itself in 
some cases was uncomfortable 
 
“The challenge was that I had problems in transport, the place is far and I 
was very weak so couldn’t get myself there. But eventually a woman rode 
me on a bicycle there” 
- rHAT patient 4, Dokolo 
 
“It’s not easy, people need to hold you in order to get the sample [CSF 
sample via lumbar puncture], you will never forget that, it was terrible. 
One day they wanted to give an IV administration but failed to get a vein, 
that day I didn’t get the medication because all the health workers there 
tried to trace a vein and it was not accessed, and it was so terrible, they 
tried everywhere. ”  
- rHAT patient 1, Kaberamaido 
 
While some of the experiences described by patients related to the treatment 
itself, the majority focused on the associated experience and knock-on 
effects of being admitted to hospital, from arranging child care, to raising 
funds for food and medical supplies after health centres had stocked out. 
 
 
“Other than distance, there was frequent visiting to the hospital, we had to 
travel there a lot, we took things like foodstuffs, it was a challenge. It 
affected our studies so much, he was behind on his studies”. 
- Brother of rHAT patient 6, Apac 
 
“The hospital stay is not easy to stay there is always problems. Water is 
distance from the place, collecting water isn’t easy, also looking for 
firewood from distant places, but the foodstuffs are sold nearby the 
hospital. The problem of getting money for purchasing those is the 
challenge”. 
- rHAT patient 14, Kaberamaido 
 
“I was treated well in terms of treatment, the problem I had was leaving 
home for 1 month - I had left rice in the garden and the daughter in law 
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was struggling to harvest and had difficulties. Also raising money for the 
upkeep was also difficult”. 
- rHAT patient 18, Dokolo 
 
 
Despite the Ugandan government’s policy to provide “free care,” undergoing 
treatment at public sector hospitals can result in a severe economic burden 
to patients and their families, as frequent stock-outs and broken equipment 
require patients to pay for large portions of their care out of their own pocket 




Fire in the veins 
 
 
There is no lighting in any of the hospital blocks - the power has been out in 
Dokolo town for three days now and there is no back-up generator to cover 
these intermittent and indeterminate periods of blackout at the hospital. 
David, Dr Serena’s most recent HAT in-patient is well enough to stand, 
though very quiet and lethargic. The Nursing Officer, Constance, saunters 
nonchalantly along the veranda and ushers our patient into the examination 
room where she directs me to a chair behind the consultation desk. Dr 
Serena then appears in the doorway and greets us apologetically. “Sorry, 
sorry. I was in theatre. It will be a bit dark now, but we will manage”.  
Constance pulls a mobile phone from her pocket and instructs David to take 
a seat on the bench and roll up his sleeve. Aiming the phone’s torch for 
guidance, she inspects the inside of his forearm arm and straps it below the 
elbow, searching for a vein under the weak light emitting from the screen. 
Meanwhile, Serena pulls out the small glass vial of Suramin from its box and 
places it carefully onto the table in front of me, narrating the procedure 
instructively as she prepares the drug for administration.  
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“Suramin is given weekly over the course of one month, and the dose is 
given at 20 mg per kilogram of body weight for seven days. It is very 
important to calculate the patient’s weight very accurately”.  
 
Serena unsheathes a syringe to draw up some saline from a plastic ampoule 
- a fiddly task in poor lighting – and snaps the needle in the bottle’s neck. 
“Ah! This one is spoiled now”. She throws the syringe into the sharps bin with 
an exasperated sigh. Constance calls over David’s wife Christina, who has 
been hovering attentively from the doorway, and gives her an abrupt 
instruction in Acholi to bring a new syringe. Christina, visibly irked, marches 
off to the private drug store across the road that provides most of the 
equipment and drugs the hospital regularly stocks out of. After a few minutes 
she re-appears with a new syringe and delivers the packet to Constance. 
Serena laughs and takes up the new syringe for the second attempt. “This 
one she complains now, after spending so much money on taking him to 
witch doctors, that she cannot afford the 300 shillings for a new syringe!”  
 
Total darkness has fallen, and the three of us are now fumbling with mobile 
phones and torches from different angles to illuminate the scene as Serena 
prepares the patient and the drug. With the second syringe loaded, she clicks 
the needle into the cannula and resumes her clinical narration of the 
procedure, placing particular emphasis on how cautiously the drug should be 
administered. “We need to inject very, very slowly, and carefully. Then we 
must flush it.” She fills the next syringe with more water, and flushes the 
Suramin through David’s veins. Once the procedure is done, she scoops up 
the packaging off the desk and throws it into the clinical waste bin, “We are 
done!” she claps triumphantly. David looks fairly unfazed, if a little bewildered 
by the whole experience, as Christina lifts him up by the arm and shuffles 
him out and back to bed. 
 “That’s it, once a week for a month, then he will be walking out of here and 
so happy. The patients, they are so happy when they wake up and recover 
from it. It is very rewarding”. 
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I’m surprised by how relatively undramatic the procedure itself was, having 
heard so many accounts of painful treatment regimens during patient 
interviews. “Ah, that is not the one you are thinking of”. Serena beckons me 
through to the drug store and produces another box, this one containing 
slightly larger vials labelled Melarsoprol B.  
 
“This is the drug that is very painful, it is what you hear stories about 
when people complain of the pain when they are treated. David is in the 
early stage of disease, so we only need to treat with Suramin. That is 
rare! They usually come too late and we have to administer Mel B.” 
 
 
Melarseprol B (or ‘Mel B’) is an arsenic derived compound that is only 
administered to patients in the late, meningoencephalitic stage where the 
Central Nervous System is infected (confirmed by identifying trypanosomes 
within the Cerebro-Spinal Fluid (CSF) via a lumbar puncture procedure). 
Serena goes on to explain how the Mel B treatment can be toxic and in some 
cases is fatal to some patients. 
 
 “The compound can also cause tissue necrosis, so you must be very 
careful to get the IV line right, otherwise a patient can even lose an arm 
[…] Suramin is just fine, there is no problem giving this, but Mel B is so, 
so painful for them because the drug is so viscous and thick. It’s like 
vegetable oil, and it needs a lot of force to push it through the vein, that is 
why it is so painful for them. Some say is like having fire in their veins”. 
 
 
David’s symptoms had been scrutinised by the health worker at his local 
facility after his malaria RDT had come back negative. Suspecting HAT, they 
referred him immediately to Dokolo hospital. Upon arriving he had undergone 
a lumbar puncture procedure to determine which stage the infection had 
advanced to, a painful and miserable experience as he later recounted; “I am 
glad to be cleared of that disease, but I wish to no longer have that needle in 
my back! I could not bend for a long time, it is so painful”. Fortunately for 
David, he was in the early haemolymphatic stage of disease, which can be 
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treated with a 10-day course of Suramin injections to clear the infection in the 
bloodstream. Had trypanosomes been located in the CSF however, he would 
have been in the late stage of infection, whereby the parasite has permeated 
the blood-brain barrier. The invasiveness of the parasite in turn requires an 
adequately invasive course of treatment of Melarseprol B, a lengthy two-
week regimen of painful intravenous injections with a toxic and potentially 
fatal compound.  
 
Aside from the unpleasant nature of treatment, lengthy hospital admission 
periods present further burdens on patients and their families beyond the 
physical debilitation caused by lumbar punctures and intravenous injections 
of toxic compounds. David’s wife Christina later confided some of the 
difficulties they faced.  
 
“David is my husband and he is sick and I am the one looking after him, 
so home is left behind with my siblings. Feeding is a problem for me for 
this long, at home we have our cassava garden and vegetables, but here 
there is no forest here for collecting firewood from. If we go back again we 
need transport which becomes costly […] I would prefer him to be treated 
from here, but If there is treatment I could carry home then I would prefer 
that”. 
 
Health workers too acknowledged the struggles faced by patients during 
treatment and expressed hope for the benefits of a potential oral treatment 
patients could take home 
 
“I think that would be better to manage them from home, because the 
society we live in and the services we have, I think our community prefer 
being with their people at home, staying in hospital is an inconvenience to 
the patient and the family, but only if the condition can be managed from 
home “ 







Fexinidazole as an emerging alternative treatment 
 
 
The painful lumbar puncture procedure and potentially toxic drug regimens 
HAT patients currently face may soon become redundant, since new oral 
drugs effective against the both stages of the disease look promising 
(Kovacic, 2015). Fexinidazole (or ‘Fexi’ as it has come to be commonly 
abbreviated) is a well-tolerated oral treatment that can be given for 10 
consecutive days (Torreele et al., 2010; Tarral et al, 2014; Jones and Avery, 
2015). At the time of study, Fexi was in stage 3 trials in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), and was being considered for trials at Lwala 
Hospital in Kaberamaido. Since then, although no trial took place in Uganda, 
the drug has completed phase II/III clinical trials in the DRC and Central 
African Republic, with treatment success rates of 91.2%, enabling Sanofi, 
DNDi’s industrial partner, to take steps forward for regulatory approval 
through the European Medicines Agency (EMA) (HAT Platform Newsletter, 
2018). With such a transformative technology on the horizon, I invited staff in 
my health centre surveys, and the patients in my referral study to reflect on 
the staging process and treatment they had described during their interviews. 
This explored perceptions and concerns of an alternative oral treatment, 
which could be given on the basis of a positive microscopy, without requiring 
lumbar puncture, and which potentially could be taken home. 
 
Almost all preferred the idea of an oral treatment, though only one mentioned 
the appeal of circumventing these painful staging and treatment procedures; 
“If there side effects are not there, yes. The pain during injection time is so 
painful, I would prefer getting oral treatment that I can take from home” (rHAT 
patient 5, Dokolo). Interestingly, two respondents felt the tablet option would 
be ineffective as a treatment for such a serious condition, as “the disease 
was so terrible that it just needed injection; the tablets could not do it.” (rHAT 
patient 1, Kaberamaido). As Whyte et al. discuss in their examination of 
pharmaceutical injections in Uganda, injections are widely considered iconic 
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of “the powerful substances and procedures of biomedicine” (Whyte, van der 
Geest, and Hardon, 2002: 111). Like the ‘therapeutic cutting’ procedures 
described by patients performed by traditional healers, injections elegantly 
perform a more thorough form of an already well established practice, by 
introducing a healing substance directly into the body through piercing the 
skin. As certain sicknesses are thought of as moving through the blood, then 
injections into the bloodstream “put medicine where it can attack the sickness 
directly” (ibid:112). This perception of bodily processes can be extended to 
the need for more potent and invasive chemotherapeutics such as 
Melarsoprol B, which can permeate the blood-brain barrier to directly attack 
late stage HAT infection in the cerebrospinal fluid. This ‘localization’ of 
illness, in the flesh, blood, or brain, as opposed to the individual as a whole, 
is important when considering predisposal towards the acceptance of 
injection, intravenous, or oral technologies. Gauging perceptions of an oral 
drug that could be taken home is particularly important as this is an aspect of 
the new drug’s features that has proved to be a particular selling point in the 
global health community, and one which I expected would be received 
positively given the widespread dissatisfaction associated with long hospital 
stays for patients, such as the following response: 
 
“I would prefer taking drugs at home because staying at the hospital is 
expensive and even going for treatment there we had to sell land to pay 
for it”  
–  rHAT patient 3, Kaberamaido 
 
Indeed, on the whole, almost all patients in this sub-study (23) and many 
health workers with whom I discussed Fexi agreed that an oral regimen 
would be preferable to IV injections. 
 
“The good option would be a tablet because the injection as it is entering 
it burns and needs to go just slowly, otherwise the tablet would be better if 
they are doing the same thing. I could continue with it myself because I 
need my life. Also that CSF test [lumbar puncture] is so, so terrible”.  
- rHAT patient 1, Kaberamaido 
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“You give the first treatment, they improve –but you need to monitor, you 
are expecting there to be some drug reactions, but the patient feels okay 
they want to go home, it is always hard to keep them in the facility – they 
feel they can be at home, they have no reason of being here, they think 
you are wasting time, as health workers we feel we need to observe them 
as the treatment is going on for some time. Oral option would be the best 
because if it has few side effects then they could manage it from home. 
The other one has been hard to manage because imagine you are the 
patient and you are just here every day. They say today ‘you are not 
getting drugs but you are around’ [having to stay]. It is frustrating for the 
patient, they want to go home”. 
- Health Worker, HCIV, Kaberamaido 
 
 
Surprisingly however, reactions to a potential oral drug treatment that could 
be taken home were mixed (see figures 20 and 21). Of the 25 respondents, 
nearly half (12) would prefer to be treated in hospital under close observation 
(with either the current treatment or an oral regimen). Much less enthusiasm 
was expressed for the proposed environment of delivery (i.e. taking 
treatment from home) than expected. 
 
“I would prefer to be given at the hospital by the health workers. The oral 
treatment to be taken, it is possible that I will forget what time and how 
much I should take, but the health workers at the hospital will give the 
right drug at the right time.  I would trust the health workers”  
- rHAT patient 4, Dokolo 
 
Figure 17: Patient treatment and administration preferences 
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92% of patients would prefer an oral drug regimen (blue) over the intravenous injection (IV) treatment 
they received. However, nearly half (48%) claimed they would prefer to remain admitted to hospital 
(blue) as an in-patient under observation throughout treatment, regardless of treatment type. 
 
 
As one might expect, some patients claimed that this would be highly 
convenient, and circumvent some of the inconveniences and ‘burden’ of 
prolonged admission and long journeys to and from hospital. However, many 
health workers did not share this idea so readily, and felt uncomfortable with 
not being able to physically oversee the patient’s treatment through to 
completion. Some felt it might be convenient to patients, but in order to work 
and not put the patient at unnecessary risk there would need to be some 
extension of the clinical gaze in place to monitor drug adherence. A popular 
model often referred to was one similar to the DOTS (Directly Observed 
Treatment) protocol implemented by TB control programmes.  
 
“I think hospital for treatment is good because they can be constantly and 
professionally monitored, home might not be a good environment. But if 
they can be observed at home, like the DOTS, it would be preferred.” 
- Nurse, HCIII, Lira 
 
“I think it is better they stay in hospital where they can be monitored. Also 
if you give patients drugs, where will they store them? They will be sitting 
out like this, in the sun, and say to someone ‘you bring me those drugs’. 
They will bring them out, take one, and then they will sit there next to 
them in the sun. Where is there for people to store drugs properly? 
Something like DOTs could work I think. Although if the system of 
treatment were to change like that then the community would again need 
to be sensitised before-hand so they understand the new protocol”. 
- VHT worker, Kobulabulu, Kaberamaido 
 
In spite of the associated costs and inconveniences of being admitted as an 
in-patient, nearly half would prefer to remain in hospital throughout the 
course of their treatment, even in the scenario of having an oral drug option. 
Most echoed health worker concerns about monitoring, and mentioned 
feeling as though they were being acknowledged, seen, and ‘well looked 
after’ when admitted to hospital. Some patients expressed equal concern that 
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they may fail to oversee their drug regimen properly and fail to get better if 
the onus to complete treatment were on themselves.  
 
 
“I would rather be at the hospital, it is good treatment because when you 
are there the people there are full time. There you get regular reviews, 
because it’s always close to the health workers and the observation is 
very close. At home you might forget your time and take the treatment 
wrong”. 
- rHAT survivor, Dokolo 
 
In this sense, it is possible to see Fexi as a novel technology, or even a 
biopolitical project, through which the state HAT control programme seeks to 
govern the treatment of patients beyond the confines of the clinic, placing the 
responsibility of diagnosis through the introduction of RDTs in private drug 
shops and frontline facilities, and even treatment, through take-home oral 
drugs. However, as Brives writes in her account of phase III clinical trials for 
a preventative HIV drug, case trial participants, or in this case patients, must 
be apprehended in their multiple roles; “they are both trial participants and 
research subjects, and they are also subjects inscribed in domestic space” 
(2016: 17). Doctors in the hospital and VHTs at home may advise patients as 
to the correct protocol for administering Fexi under controlled conditions, but 
it is very clear that “the design becomes markedly more complex when one 
takes into account the use of therapeutic drugs in the everyday context” 
(ibid). 
 
The struggle for patients to be seen by those around them continues beyond 
the diagnostic phase into treatment, where both health workers and patients 
alike express concern that being ‘sent away’ with drugs were symbolic of not 
being adequately acknowledged or taken care of by the state healthcare 
system.  
 
“For me I appreciated that it was good for me to be there, because after I 
got the injection sometimes I could not understand myself, so I think it 
needed me to be near under supervision”  
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- rHAT patient 1, Kaberamaido 
 
In T.b. rhodesiense affected regions, awareness is less of an issue owing to 
recent outbreaks and various livestock mediated control campaigns. Where 
Rhodesian HAT is more acute and likely to result in health centre referral, the 
problem lies in what happens after HAT. That is, the uncertain post-treatment 
phase of potential relapse where protocol, until very recently, required a 
series of follow up appointments to confirm the clearance of infection to be 
completed before clinical closure can be achieved. The following illustrates 
some of the frustrations that health workers face in seeking to gain clinical 




Dropping off the radar 
 
Serena invites me to review the HAT records in her office, and drops the 
register onto the table with a heavy thud. Serena reflects on the stories of 
individual patients as she turns the pages, recounting the circumstances of 
each case vividly. Notably, her accounts referred very little to the period of 
time these patients actually spent in her care, but their life histories and 
struggles that brought them to her and the aftermath of HAT. 
 
“When these people fall sick, by the time they come to the health centre 
and by the time they are diagnosed they have wasted a lot of resources. 
Some have gone for witchcraft, or moved from health facility to health 
facility, so they have wasted a lot by the time they are finally diagnosed. 
And then the other thing is by the time the diagnosis is made, you find 
when they have been sick for so long, it means other activities could 
have been done. If they are a peasant farmer, that whole period when 
they are sick and looking elsewhere for what, there is no farming being 
done. Most of the time you are sleeping in the day, and awake at night, 
and you are sick. Then it has left orphans, because of those who have 
died they leave behind the children”. 
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She speaks at length about one case that visibly troubles her, of a child who 
had been brought to the hospital with what she described as “therapeutic 
cuts, all over his chest […] he had been tricked into being taken to a shrine 
for prayers there instead of travelling to Dokolo [treatment centre]”. The boy 
was gravely ill by the time he had reached the hospital, but eventually 
received treatment and been “saved” after all.  
 
“Well, that is a good outcome”, I say reassuringly, assuming this conclusion 
represents some medical, if not moral closure for Serena’s difficult work. 
Instead, she sighs and rubs the furrow in her brow agitatedly. Thumbing 
through reams of pages of the HAT patient register she eventually reaches 
entries for the year 2014. Sliding her finger down the column, she arrives and 
taps forlornly at entry no. 13.  “That is him, the boy. I do not know what 
happened to this one. He never came back as he should, for testing. He just 
dropped off our radar. I cannot follow up such patients.” 
 
International policy and clinical protocol has long stressed the importance of 
following up patients for up to 24 months after treatment with laboratory 
examinations of body fluids, including cerebrospinal fluid, as parasites can 
remain viable for long periods and cause relapses (WHO, 1998; Büscher et 
al. 2017). However, the challenges to systematic follow-up described in this 
chapter have rendered this policy intractable and forced it to adapt to 
accommodate the socio-material complexities of referral. In view of the fact 
that such patients are more likely to present themselves for follow-up 
examinations, systematic follow-up after treatment for HAT is no longer 
recommended in the policy literature; “follow-up, including CSF examination, 
should focus on symptomatic patients” (WHO, 2013a). Although patients 
should be encouraged to present themselves only when clinical symptoms of 
HAT re-appear, health workers like Serena continue to enact relics of policy 
and strive for systematic follow-up of patients.  
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The stabilising properties that policy and protocol instil in the HAT 
assemblage also make them difficult to dismantle, both in the clinic and in the 
community. Authors of a study in the Bandundu and Kasaï Oriental provinces 
of the DRC found that old recommendations and rules dating from old 
medical textbooks from the 1970s and even Belgian colonial law had 
transcended over time to take on new ‘meanings’ (Mol, 2003) as social 
prohibitions and taboo. For example, medical advice suggesting one should 
rest for 6 months after treatment still circulated as common knowledge 
among communities, despite being a dated recommendation left over from 
old guidelines. This advice and knowledge went on to take on and live its 
own social life, the six-month period becoming socially reinforced in the 
community. While not the original intention of the medical guideline, because 
of the serious side-effects of melarseprol, an association had been drawn 
between side-effects and not observing the correct rest period.  As a result of 
‘strict social control’, patients are compelled by their close social network to 
adhere to these restrictions throughout treatment and the full six months 
post-treatment rest period. Moreover, “the community condemns a patient 
that violates these taboos”, and as a cohesive social network ensures that 
patients respect and adhere to this resting period (Mpanya et al., 2015: 9).  
These are the ways in which technologies (which can be structural and 
bureaucratic apparatus as well as discrete objects) are “an association of 
methods, techniques, and equipment […] together with the people using 
them” (WHO, 1978, in Whyte et al. 2002: 104). They not only disrupt and 
transform local ecologies, but are shaped by the ecosystems they are 
introduced into, and once socially embedded into practice, technologies like 
protocols and algorithms take time to adapt or dismantle. 
 
 
Post-treatment referral experiences 
 
 
Of the 24 participants who had been discharged from follow up (one, David 
was still an in-patient at Dokolo HC IV at the time of study) the vast majority 
of patients (19/24) had been given a follow-up appointment and attended at 
 228 
least one referral examination. 5 of these had returned for multiple follow-
ups;  “I kept on reporting and reporting and they performed negatives every 
time” (rHAT patient 20, Dokolo). Two had, per the new protocol, been 
advised not to return unless they experienced symptoms again; “I was told if I 
am not getting improved then I should go back but if I am improved then 
there is no need” (rHAT patient 3, Dokolo). Three patients had been advised 
to return for follow ups, but had not since undergone any follow-up 
examination. In two of these instances, a break-down in communication 
between health services and patients appear to have led to confusion over 
appointments. 
 
“I was given a date but I went back and did not get a doctor and no one 
attended to me” 
- rHAT patient, Dokolo 
 
“We have never taken him back. We were told we would be informed 
when to take the boy but they did not inform us”. 
- Mother of rHAT patient 6, Apac 
-  
 
Most of those I interviewed (14) claimed to be fully recovered and symptom-
free after treatment, with one citing this as a factor in their decision to not 
present for further follow up tests; “They gave a certain period to go back but 
during that time I felt so well, and also I was fearing the LP so I didn’t go 
back” (rHAT patient 1, Kaberamaido). Meanwhile, the persistence of 
symptoms also prompted one patient’s wishes to continue follow-up 
examinations; “I was given a date twice and I went, but now I still want to go 
because I’m not feeling well so I feel I should go and be tested again” (rHAT 
patient 14, Kaberamaido). Even in the absence of symptoms however, some 
wanted to be re-tested for peace of mind. 
 
“I feel that I still don’t have the thing in my blood, but still I want the test to 
confirm”. 
- rHAT patient 14, Kaberamaido 
 
“I don’t have any problem after the treatment, my concern is that I still 
want to go back to re-test. There are no symptoms, but the first time I 
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didn’t even have any symptoms, so still I may have no symptoms and the 
thing is there still”. 
- rHAT patient 19, Dokolo 
-  
 
One respondent claimed that their granddaughter’s follow-up examinations 
had been positive after treatment (contrary to our records), which had led the 
family to believe she had not been treated properly at Dokolo and were 
considering taking her to another hospital.5 This suggests some possible 
miscommunication at the point of testing. 
 
“She took a lot of time there. The other challenge is the child is being 
taken there to detect the parasites and even now they are saying it is 
there. The treatment hasn’t cleared the infection. We are thinking of taking 
her to Gulu hospital because she is not being treated properly at Dokolo” 




Even with such a high referral completion rate as observed in this sample, 
the vast majority still faced transportation issues and additional healthcare 
service charges. This made referral completion, particularly in the absence of 
motivating symptoms, a challenge. 
 
“I went so far for four times. All these subsequent reviews through testing, 
and they were all negative!” 
- rHAT patient 18, Dokolo 
 
“She was given appointment date, she went but had transport challenges, 
but we struggled and went on the exact date” 
- r HAT patient 22, Dokolo 
 
“It’s about 15 km, it disturbed me a lot, we had problems with 
transportation”  
- Father of  rHAT patient 2, Dokolo 
 
 
                                                 
5 The patient was subsequently taken with the research team for testing at Dokolo and found 
negative by microscopy. 
 
 230 
Like RDT-positive gambiense HAT suspects in West Nile, the financial costs 
of returning for further tests become burdensome when individuals must 
anticipate associated healthcare costs and travel, particularly when results 
repeatedly come back negative. However, while it is true for many that follow 
up is a costly and challenging part of referral, it is clear from patient 
testimonies that, in contrast to the sample in the West Nile, confirmatory 
examination was understood to be important and complied with. The gravity 
of the experience of being infected and treated for HAT is likely to be a key 
factor in motivating patients to be sure of their ‘status’. However it was also 
apparent that, contrary to respondents in the West Nile, health workers had 
communicated the importance of returning for follow up, even though this is 
no longer required in the absence of symptoms.  
 
Finally, it is evident that, as Kovacic et al. have pointed out, communities 
‘remember’ certain socio-material practices performed by programmes 
(2016), from compensating blood samples with soda, to enacting dated 
policies out of habit. They have become routinized and left their mark on the 
collective conscience of those old enough to recall them, and it became 
apparent at the end of interviews in this study that one such ‘memory’ 
prompted some patients to inquire after the financial assistance they had 
heard was offered at one time. 
 
“People said there is some kind of assistance given to people with this 
disease, is this true?” 
- Father of rHAT patient 2, Dokolo 
 
“It used to be back in the days when people were treated at Serere 
[hospital] that those who were treated for this disease were given support. 
When did this change?” 
- rHAT patient 7, Apac 
 
“I have been hearing people treated for this disease are being given 
support. The people at the hospital , they said that they are giving 
money”. 





The policy of paying HAT patients during and after treatment to compensate 
the losses incurred by travel and admission expenses has been implemented 
during past outbreaks, but have long since ceased. However, the ‘memory’ of 
such financial schemes have persisted to circulate and influence the 







Diagnostic landscapes and pathways to treatment  
 
This chapter corroborates and provides further evidence for some of the key 
arguments made thus far; that the landscapes of care imagined by the HAT 
programme are different to those navigated by patients, that the social 
proximity of care shapes treatment seeking decisions and diagnostic 
pathways, and that effective communication is an important factor in referral 
outcomes. Many patients in my study presented at health centres, but are not 
diagnosed with HAT for a long time, often not until infection has progressed 
to an advanced stage. National figures for HAT have historically been greatly 
underestimated in Uganda (Odiit et al., 2004; Odiit et al., 2005; Acup, 2017), 
with an estimated 30% of HAT cases dying undiagnosed (Odiit et al., 2005). 
This chapter demonstrates a number of factors influencing under-reporting of 
HAT in Uganda. Firstly, under the passive surveillance system, patients often 
fail to recognise symptoms of HAT and do not present at a hospital where 
they could obtain a diagnosis, thus are not detected or reported. Those that 
do attend a lower level health facility will likely be assessed for malaria and 
may only be referred to a higher-level facility if severe malaria, or in some 
cases HAT is suspected. Secondly, cases that do reach hospital often fail to 
receive a diagnosis, “depending on the knowledge, attitudes and practices of 
local health workers at the point-of-care, and the capacity for disease 
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management at the centre” (Acup, 2017:231). My findings suggest the latter 
plays a more significant role in HAT under-detection in this region. 
 
The spread of HAT places a significant burden on local health systems in 
affected districts, and have had a major impact on human health and 
economic development in central Uganda. Acute rhodesiense HAT has been 
introduced to 9 new districts in as many years (Welburn and Coleman, 2015), 
with many being ill prepared to diagnose cases and deliver the necessary 
specialist and complex clinical HAT management. Symptoms of cognitive 
impairment from damage to the Central Nervous System (CNS) associated 
with late stage HAT can motivate patients to seek solutions from herbal 
practitioners, with sufferers believing they may be bewitched,  thus further 
delaying early recognition of disease (Bukachi et al. 2009). While many 
respondents in my study presented to a public health facility first, it was 
evident that a number had initially suspected bewitchment to be the cause of 
illness, and had received advice from members of their community to enlist 
the help of traditional healers and medicines first.  
 
The stage of HAT infection at the time of diagnosis can be a good indicator 
for how effective healthcare systems are in recognising cases (Acup, 2017). 
High numbers of patients presenting in the late stage of infection indicates a 
low awareness of HAT in the community, or a reluctance of patients to seek 
state biomedical care until the illness has become severely debilitating. In a 
rural context of material poverty, as in most HAT-endemic areas, patient 
motivation to continue treatment seeking or complete referrals can be 
significantly diminished by high transportation costs, direct health care costs 
of recurrent treatment-seeking, and competing family and agricultural 
responsibilities (Hasker, Lumbala et al. 2011, Palmer, Surur et al. 2014). 
Thus, treatment seeking is both an economic and social process (MacKian et 
al., 2004), and it is important to examine decision-making processes 
occurring in the social landscape. Good (1987) found that patients in Kenya 
turned to ‘significant others’ - a social network of parents, relatives, or 
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neighbours - when their initial choice of treatment turns out to be ineffective. 
Many of the participants I interviewed in this study, and in my RDT referral 
study,  reported having been influenced by the advice of family or loved ones 
when making treatment-seeking decisions, such as the father of one HAT 
rhodesiense patient who had been cajoled by his community to take his son 
to a traditional healer rather than hospital (patient 2, Dokolo).  My findings 
speak to models of treatment-seeking that place emphasis on social 
networks and the significance of such lay referrals. Such a model 
corroborates my own observations and acknowledge fluidity among various 
treatment pathways, where informal health providers are substantial features 
in the diagnostic landscape.  
 
However, diagnosis at late stage of infection is not only an outcome of 
‘undesirable’ treatment seeking behaviours from a biomedical perspective. It 
is also indicative of a low index of suspicion among health workers, leading 
to failure to identify early stage symptoms at lower health service levels. 
Many in my study reported being referred back-and-forth between facilities 
for weeks and even months before finally receiving a HAT diagnosis, 
sometimes to the point where patients were incapacitated and close to death. 
Poor surveillance has been framed as a function of  unskilled medical staff, 
poorly equipped and functioning diagnostic laboratories, and gaps in the 
knowledge of clinical staff (Odiit et al., 2004; Bukachi et al., 2009; Acup et al. 
2017). However as the previous chapter has shown, it is important to 
recognise that ‘unskilled’ staff are also often unsupported and untrained, and 
the efficacy of diagnostic facilities does not solely rest on the equipment they 
house. Therefore, strong surveillance - passive surveillance in particular – 
relies on awareness and communication, both among and between health 
workers and communities. Technological capacity at frontline facilities is 
important for confirming and referring suspected cases of HAT, but dialogue 
between programmes and communities can bring this capacity closer by 




Introducing Fexi: a quick fix for case management? 
 
Regarding the difficulties patients in this study faced in being admitted to 
hospital for treatment suggest that the potential introduction of a new oral 
drug for HAT may address many problems with current case management, 
particularly if they can be administered at home, and without the need for 
lumbar puncture, a painful procedure which deterred many patients from 
returning for follow-up. Other studies have also reported that with fear of 
repeated lumbar punctures during follow-up, most patients stay away from 
post-treatment controls (Robays et al., 2007; Tong et al., 2011). However the 
introduction of Fexinidazole into the therapeutic assemblage will likely be 
disruptive in other ways in terms of how different types of treatments are 
perceived (such as between oral and injection administration), and how 
existing home-based drug taking practices may affect the safety and 
adherence of a new HAT drug. In a recent review of the anthropology of 
pharmaceuticals, Hardon and Sanabria approach pharmaceuticals as being 
never finished, and as “always on the way to becoming something else” 
(Ingold 2011: 3). This approach follows the ‘matter flow’ of pharmaceuticals 
(ibid, 433), in that ‘matter’ is “always in movement, being molded and 
transformed by human and nonhuman processes and practices” (Hardon and 
Sanabria, 2017:119). As Craig says in her study of Tibetan medicines, “one 
cannot really know whether a medicine or therapeutic approach is efficacious 
until a practitioner makes and/or prescribes it, a patient uses it, and then 
reacts to its use” (2012, p. 7). Pharmaceutical practices continue to be 
actualized, modified, and re-actualised in care settings, stabilising the 
treatment assemblage. We see this where communities in the DRC continue 
to enforce post-treatment ‘rest periods’ for patients, and health workers 
continue to enact old guidelines that require quarterly referral examinations, 
and feel their failure to do so creates ‘environments of uncertainty’.  
 
Guidelines made by international organisations, governments, district offices, 
and vertical programmes aim to regulate and stabilise treatment practice and 
 235 
to discipline patients. However, many ethnographic studies have shown that 
these sites of stabilisation can simultaneously become sites of innovation in 
response to patients’ health concerns. I have found health workers echoing 
and advocating patients’ concerns about being ‘sent away’ home with tablets, 
suggesting a direct observation treatment model to ameliorate patient 
concerns about not ‘being seen’ by medical staff or not taking their 
medication properly. Similarly, Kyakuwa & Hardon (2012) describe how HIV 
positive nurses in Uganda resist biomedical guidelines that advise against 
the use of traditional medicine by teaming up with patients to incorporate a 
traditional cream into the AIDS program to alleviate side effects of 
antiretroviral treatment. Integrating biomedical innovations into the pluralistic 
ecosystem of healthcare is a part of the daily struggle health workers 
navigate to provide locally adapted, patient-centred care in their 
communities.  
 
The likelihood of HAT cases being detected early and managed effectively is 
largely dependent on the social proximity of diagnosis and care. Kamat and 
Nichter (1998) argue that pharmacies serve as primary care providers, where 
pharmacists position themselves as first-line carers with pharmaceutical 
expertise. Indeed in my sample, informal health providers such as traditional 
healers and ‘private clinics’ offer a much more socially proximate source of 
care to that of public health facilities. Global health technologies are never 
introduced as discrete objects into static, passive systems of care, but as 
ongoing projects of expertise and governance into a dynamic set of complex 
and fragile ecosystems. As the following and final empirical chapter 
demonstrates, the social lives they take on and live beyond this point is 
largely a matter of where they are positioned topologically, and how socially 













































This chapter presents my final empirical case study on the actors and 
networks involved in implementing two tsetse control interventions; the ‘3V 
network’ of mobile spray teams across central Uganda, and the mass 
deployment of small insecticide impregnated nets called ‘Tiny Targets’ in the 
T.b. gambiense endemic West Nile region in North west Uganda. Qualitative 
data compiled from 25 in-depth interviews with entomologists, veterinarians, 
and community animal health workers, alongside responses from 9 
community focus group discussions with smallholder subsistence farmers 
explored: knowledge and awareness of HAT and transmission; local history 
and perspectives of tsetse control amid other human and animal health 
priorities; collaboration between key stakeholders; and prospects of 
programme sustainability.  
 
Drawing on the testimonies of programme managers, implementers, and 
farmers, these encounters reveal how discordant priorities between 
programmes and the communities whose behaviour they seek to change 
inhibits sustainability. They also show how the precarious One Health 
assemblage of veterinary, entomological, and public health staff breaks 
down, as decentralised and under-resourced district offices struggle to 
maintain operational cohesion amid competing health priorities . It reveals 
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the vulnerability of implementation staff facing uncertain funding futures, and 
their centrality as gatekeepers of local knowledge and trust in social 
networks. 
 
This final chapter highlights the social proximity of interventions as key 
determinants of sustainability, and the empirical value in approaching global 
health interventions as evolving ‘social experiments’ (Bardosh, 2016). This 
problematises how technologically sophisticated but socially distant 
interventions shift the responsibility and costs of referral, treatment, or of 
preventative spraying, onto poor communities in post-conflict subsistence 
settings. Introducing interventions and expecting vulnerable communities to 
continue their implementation long after using their own resources is shown 
to be unsustainable, and questions the extent to which community 
‘engagement’ or ‘participation’ is centred in programme designs. 
 
 
Driving Data:  intervention informed evidence on trial 
 
We arrive at Kibuku secondary school in Pallisa district just before 8am. 
Schools are a logical location for holding mass spraying activities, being 
located more centrally to multiple communities and more accessible by road, 
having water points to constantly supply spray mixtures, and of course plenty 
of room to host hundreds of cattle descending on them at once. Many 
farmers have arrived before us, and Robert, one of the freshly graduated 
young vets from Makerere University recruited by the Stamp Out Sleeping 
Sickness programme, estimates 100 cattle are already roaming the school 
field as we pull in. A row of faces peer out from windows overlooking the 
courtyard, while those not in class gather curiously around the cattle crush 
now being hastily dismantled as we arrive on the scene. 
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 “This is no good” the field team manager sighs, defeated. “We came here 
last week, and we showed them the dimensions, the height, everything!” He 
gesticulates with theatrical dismay. “We gave them the tools and the nails, 
everything to build the crush for us coming today. But they have not done it 
correctly. You see this” – he grabs a loose post standing at the exit of the 
crush, jostling it from side to side within a wide and shallow hole in the 
ground – “This is no good! The first cow will come and just push it over, the 
whole thing will collapse the moment they step in”. Part of the mobilisation 
plan, meant to sensitise communities and increase turn out on treatment 
days, had been to mobilise villages to build their own temporary crush. The 
lack of permanent crush structures across rural Uganda meant the 
responsibility of preparing the infrastructure needed for the arrival of 
treatment ‘brigades’ were to be placed on hosting parishes. Today, the 
standard of the crush had been such that treatment is postponed, and so 
everyone – including farmers, programme staff, school teachers, even pupils 
– were pitching in to rebuild the crush and make up for lost time. 
 
The spraying methods being tested were optimizing the technique of 
selective application of insecticides known as RAP (Restricted Application 
Protocol) (Muhanguzi et al, 2014). As research had shown tsetse flies 
preferentially feed on the legs and belly of cattle, restricting treatment to 
these areas is considered more cost-effective (Torr et al, 2007). RAP was 
deployed by SOS as an evidence-based, efficient and cost-effective 
alternative to pour-on application, or all-over treatment of cattle (Welburn and 
Coleman in Zinsstag et al, 2015).  
 
When I accompanied the programme in September 2014, nearly a decade 
on from the first intervention, SOS was conducting a feasibility study for a 
proposed third phase of mass treatment and insecticidal application. The 
style and approach of the campaign was militaristic in its organisation, rigid in 
its implementation and, owing to the justification it needed to demonstrate to 
investors, highly data-driven. I had been invited to participate in the 
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‘treatment trials’; field experiments comparing the efficacy and throughput of 
two methods of mass spraying, either by guiding cattle through this 
temporary ‘crush’ structure to be sprayed and injected in batches, or by 
moving around and spraying individual animals in situ as they were tethered 
to a fixed point or held by their owners. Treatment in Kibuku eventually got 
underway around 10am, and soon hundreds of cattle were being herded into 
the ‘boma’, a wide opening at the entrance of the structure where farmers 
heaved, flogged, and pushed their apprehensive animals into the mouth of 
the crush.  
 
“Why are they only spraying the legs!” one perturbed farmer berated Robert, 
as he collected the owner’s registration ticket for his cattle. Robert recites the 
rationale behind the RAP method, and how it was proven to save the amount 
of spray being used by focussing application where tsetse preferentially land 
and feed. This did not appear to satisfy the farmer, whose primary concern 
was not for tsetse, but the ticks that visibly riddled his cattle. “But you are not 
even treating half of the cow, what is the use? The ticks are there [waving his 
hand over the spine], under the skin, on their back”. This was not an isolated 
complaint, as many farmers throughout the trials in other areas expressed 
discontent, largely at being encouraged to continue the intervention 
themselves and buy the particularly expensive brand of insecticide (Vectocid) 
effective against both tsetse and ticks, but which was discernibly being used 
by SOS to exclusively target tsetse and trypanosomiasis, and not the tick-




Cattle queuing in the crush before receiving a trypanocidal injection and insecticidal spray 
treatment. 
 
My role was to assist in the pilot trial of a mobile data collection application 
for collecting, monitoring, and analysing data from the treatment trial to 
inform the intervention’s final design and create the evidence base for its 
investment case. At the exit of the crush, Robert’s colleague Mohammed had 
been tasked with entering the number of treated cattle leaving the crush into 
the mobile app. Comparing the number of animals injected and sprayed in a 
given time, and the rate of attrition recorded between the point of entry and 
exit would allow programme managers to assess the most efficient method of 
conducting mass treatment in settings where turnout was high. Despite the 
best efforts of farmers and staff, many cattle – either bolting through the exit 
before being injected, or being small enough to squeeze through gaps in the 
crush – were evading treatment, and thus reducing coverage. But 
Mohammed continued to record each animal as treated. When I asked him 
why he decided not to record the animals that had gotten free into the ‘not 
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“I know. I should record those ones as not treated, but the data is so 
important, as you know. If many cattle are getting away untreated then the 
method will look bad, or like we did not do our jobs well. The project might 
not get funded, we do not want to disappoint the donors. I do not want to 
disappoint [them]”. 
 
A representative from one of the DIBs partners who had travelled from 
London to co-direct the treatment trials had become a particularly 
conspicuous feature in the daily running of things. That morning, as a young 
and precariously employed group of vets climbed into their protective clothing 
and assembled their treatment kits, they declared that their presence and 
participation was to ensure that the programme was run like a well-oiled 
machine, frequently proclaiming the DIBs model would introduce the “rigour 
of the market” to public health projects, protecting them from the small 
“corruptions” that become cumulatively costly to large interventions. The 
focus on eradicating low-level corrupt practices, which allegedly marred 
previous phases of SOS, was evidently an issue of concern to investors. The 
concern was shared, and a collective focus on accountability was welcomed 
as a necessary and positive step toward building a strong investment case. 
However, some younger, local members of the team felt the accusatory tone 
of continual references to poor programme governance was not without 
demoralising side-effects.6 Mohammed’s comment was sobering, and 
revealed how the tone of an intervention can affect the very real ways in 
which people practice data collection, and thus evidence production, 
particularly in high-pressure performance monitored settings. It was a rare 
                                                 
6 Some individuals communicated privately that the tone of communications from management 
demonstrated low levels of trust the programme held for local staff, often undermining the 
treatment teams’ confidence and morale. 
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moment of clarity that rendered the socio-technical nature of these 
relationships starkly visible at the point of implementation, with profound 
implications for the evidence produced in these moments. 
 
 
Re-examining SOS: reflections on an intervention  
 
Performance measurement is assumed to change behaviour, and it is 
generally accepted that there will be some gaming in any system (Bevan & 
Hood, 2006). ‘Gaming’ holds negative connotations of deviancy, and while it 
may be a very deliberate choice, it may simply be a means for meeting the 
required targets in difficult circumstances (Lewis, 2017). Unsurprisingly then, 
performance measurement, as demonstrated by Mohammed’s actions, can 
have unintended consequences that negatively influence performance.  One 
study in India found that this kind of focus on numerical compliance and 
reaching targets may lead to Community Health Workers to developing 
‘gaming behaviours’, whereby strategies included falsification of evidence in 
order to hit particular targets (Mishra, 2014. p.971). Health systems and staff 
working under the pressures of reporting positive results therefore can result 
in the production of poor quality data about what is happening in the field. 
The kind of systematic exclusion of experiential knowledge of patients and 
healthcare workers described in Mishra’s study is a significant challenge to 
controlling NTDs like HAT, where funding is limited and staff like Mohammed 
and his colleagues face uncertain employment futures.  
 
As things transpired, SOS was unsuccessful in its bid to secure funding 
under the Development Impact Bonds initiative. Compared with the smaller 
projects that attained funding under this model, some have speculated that 
the vast sum of money SOS had sought made the operationalisation of such 
a large and complex intervention seem logistically unfeasible. One former 
collaborator on the programme later offered some reflection in hindsight, on 
how the SOS strategy may have been less appropriate in a non-epidemic 
setting than the outbreak scenario it was initially designed for. 
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“SOS the way it was, in an unscaled format, cannot take away sleeping 
sickness […] SOS was more or less a fire brigade approach, it isn’t one of 
the best approaches you would want if you had to systematically control 
the disease. Back then we were faced with an outbreak fuelled by 
livestock movement northwards […] there was a need to do a fire brigade 
approach then, to stop the merger of the Gambiense and Rhodesiense”. 
 
After it’s ‘brigades’ had momentarily ‘put the fire out’ as it were, the 
withdrawal of SOS had left the door open for tsetse to return. But the scaled 
up and sustained effort needed to maintain low prevalence would not be 
funded solely by their initial backers, DFID. After their application for the 
Development Impact Bond was unsuccessful, some local partners viewed its 
failure as a symptom of being a low political priority for Ugandan and foreign 
governments, and that a changing political landscape in the UK had 
scuppered the proposal’s chances. 
 
“The country that you see is still on its knees in terms of development, 
and the national priorities, sleeping sickness doesn’t come very high. We 
had I think almost succeeded to get the outcome funders, but the main 
guarantor was DFID, and after the politics and voting [UK election in 
2014] I think they said ‘I think our appetite to invest in Uganda is quite off 
for now’. So we made all this nice evidence, put a business case which 
was very attractive to the department in London. But every time it goes 
there of course the politicians don’t seem to be interested in Uganda for 
now, so we will hold our peace, maybe in future” 
- Former SOS collaborator 1 
 
At this time it is difficult to know precisely why the bid was unsuccessful, but 
one individual involved in the original collaboration later gave me their own 
take on the process and outcome of the SOS-DIB endeavour: 
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"It just died. I think looking back there were a few things about it that 
made it a bad proposal. SOS was looking to pour a huge amount of 
money into advanced technologies into a setting where, for example, 
people aren't accustomed to using smart phones etc. So it was already 
less sustainable than the other more modest interventions being 
proposed”.  
- Former SOS collaborator 2 
 
Had it been successful, another reason SOS ver. 3.0 still might have 
struggled to sustain impact, was the lack of local capacity it had built in, and 
poor co-operation with in-country partners. On more than one occasion, 
members of staff from COCTU expressed disappointment at the way the new 
phase of SOS had been conducted, effectively cutting local partners out of 
the proposal altogether. One said of the failed DIB application that “I honestly 
could not tell you what went wrong, because they did not consult us in any 
way about it. We were never involved”. Given that SOS had been lauded as 
the poster child of One Health, it is surprising that such a large intervention 
could be conceived or implemented without extensive consultation or 
involvement of Ugandan stakeholders. Michael and Madon (2017) critique 
the “now long established paradigm in conducting and delivering global 
health interventions”, whereby decision making and power are leached away, 
or “hollowed out”, from national governments to ‘global epistemic 
communities’ that frame problems, and generate the knowledge, solutions, 
and strategies to deal with them (2017: 2). While the One Health model may 
be built on a philosophy of intersectoral collaboration, questions over 
expertise, ownership, and power still hang over one health interventions 
while these epistemic communities continue to undercut local stakeholders 
and state actors. 
 
The concerns expressed to the young vet Robert throughout the treatment 
trials in 2014 were by no means solely on the part of farmers alone. Nor were 
they simply in response to the nature of the SOS strategy, but part of a wider 
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constellation of economic and animal health priorities. The suitability and 
efficacy of RAP was a subject of particular contention among veterinary, 
entomological and farming communities. 
 
“When SOS came in I was not supporting spraying the legs. For me I 
would prefer spraying the whole animal, it doesn’t cost much. If someone 
has brought his animals, if you say to the farmer ‘we are spraying legs 
only’, then the turn out will be low. There is no harm in spraying the whole 
animal because it gets rid of the ticks, it is like a one stop centre. I still 
advocate for spraying the whole animal as an entomologist, and as a 
commissioner in charge of tsetse control”.  
- Government Entomologist, MAAIF 
 
Although an advocate of RAP, the perception of efficacy to farmers was also 
a consideration Dr Muhanguzi later admitted as a potential short-coming of 
the SOS strategy: 
 
“I tend to believe also that farmers are researchers in their own right, 
because they see things happening every day. Now it actually might not 
be very effective, because farmers don’t see tsetse flies. But they 
permanently see ticks, and the kind of arrangement we were using for 
tsetse control is [spraying] once every 28 days, and that is not necessarily 
very effective on ticks”. 
 
Interested to know how these assumptions reflected livestock-keepers 
perceptions and priorities, I conducted a small sub-study to investigate how 
the small-hold subsistence farmers targeted by SOS perceived the need for 





Farmer Focus Group Discussions 
 
In April 2016 I conducted 9 Focus Group Discussions (FDGs) with small-hold 
subsistence farmers in Lira, Alebtong, and Kole, the most recently T.b. 
rhodesiense affected districts due to the unregulated northward trade of 
infected cattle (Selby et al., 2013; von Wissman et al., 2014). FDG sites were 
selected to sample a mixture of locations that had locally experienced 
confirmed cases of HAT and areas where no HAT cases had ever been 
reported. Focus group size ranged from of 6-9 individuals, comprising 53% 
male and 47% female participants on average (table 4). All identified 
themselves as being subsistence farmers, keeping a range of animals 
including pigs, sheep, goats, chickens, guinea fowl, and ducks. Every 
participant owned cattle, the median number of cattle owned was 2 (range 1–
9).  The vast majority kept local breeds (mostly zebu), citing their low sale 
price (to buy), draught power, and relative resistance to disease (including 
trypanosomiasis) compared to exotic foreign breeds. 
 
Table 4: Focus group discussion participants 
FDG 
Location 
District No. of 
participants 
Male Female 
Ogur Lira 9 3 6 
Amach Lira 9 4 5 
Aroma Lira 7 5 2 
Barr Lira 7 4 3 
Alito Lira 7 6 1 
Apala Alebtong 9 5 4 
Aloi Alebtong 8 4 4 
Abongdero Kole 8 3 5 












During focus groups, discussions explored the agency of farmers as part of 
the human-animal ecosystem of HAT, such as the prioritisation of diseases 
of concern farmers had for their animals, spraying and treatment practices of 
livestock, and how these are influenced by local knowledge and awareness 
of human and animal trypanosomiasis. 
 
 
Local Health Priorities and Experiences of Healthcare Services 
 
When asked the open-ended question of which local human health problems 
affected participants, of all those identified by participants, HAT was 
mentioned only once by one respondent. Other health priorities ranged from 
well-known and endemic diseases such as malaria, HIV, Hepatitis and TB, to 
worms and diarrhoea (see figure 18). 
 
 
Figure 18: Local health problems identified by focus group participants 
 
Satisfaction with local healthcare services were largely poor, with responses 
referring frequently to drug stock outs, poor relations with healthcare staff, 
and overstretched facilities. 
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“The clinical officer has written the forms, but there are no staff to record 
and give the drugs, that is because of the absence and late coming” 
 
- Focus group participant, Amach, Lira district 
 
 
“They will chase us away on Fridays, on weekends we go to health 
centres in town. When you come here there is no one to support you, you 
are supposed to wait until Monday. And disease does not wait for the 
weekend”.  
 
- Focus group participant, Amach, Lira district 
 
 
“Sometimes they come so late some arrive by 11am, like for instance my 
child and I came here at 6 in the morning. Unfortunately I had not got any 
person to attend to them. I brought my child here for help but the child 
passed away because those people refused to attend to him” 
- Focus group participant, Apala, Alebtong district 
 
 
“This health centre is providing services for five districts. That is Oyam, 
Pader, Gulu, Kole, and five Lira. All of them from here to access the 
services!” 
 
- Focus group participant, Ogur, Lira district 
 
 
While participants from 3 focus groups reported to be generally satisfied with 
their local healthcare services, all groups complained of regular drug stock 
outs and health worker absenteeism which contributed to a widespread 
preference for using private clinics. 
 
“We go to the clinic because they offer services very fast compared to that 
of the health facility”.  
- Focus group participant, Aloi, Alebtong district 
 
 
“When we fall sick we go to the health centre, that is where we get the 
RDT diagnosis then we go to the clinic to buy the drugs”. 
- Focus group participant, Aroma, Lira district 
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Knowledge and Awareness of HAT  
 
HAT knowledge was generally low for all groups. While approximately half of 
the participants indicated an awareness of the disease, only a handful of 
respondents demonstrated an understanding of signs and symptoms in 
humans, or the zoonotic connection between AAT and HAT. Even among 
those aware of HAT where outbreaks had occurred in recent years, some 
cited the absence of screening as evidence that HAT was not a problem 
locally. 
 
“Since the disease is not there, there is no testing. We have not thought 
about it” (Amach, Lira) 
 
“Generally sleeping sickness at this place is not very common, I have 
witnessed them in Kaberamaido, however on this side I have not 
witnessed any yet”. (Aroma, Lira) 
 
 
Awareness of HAT was most commonly linked to local cases that occurred in 
their own or neighbouring parishes (4 out of the 9 FDG locations had 
reported cases within the last 2 years).  
 
 “We know someone but not within this area, they are in a village called 
Luolango in Aiyra parish, in Barr sub-county” (Barr, Lira) 
 
 “I saw it from one person who was infected from it here and they passed 
away” (Aloi, Alebtong) 
 
Tsetse flies were considered to be a problem locally for many respondents, 
mostly in relation to environmental features known to be natural habitats for 
tsetse.  
 
“It’s a problem to us, when the animals always gather around the centre 
and the water catchment areas around there”. (Apala, Alebtong) 
 
“Yes there are many, especially at the swamps where we get our drinking 
water from”. (Akeca, Kole) 
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“We get bitten, it brings about the swelling”. (Amach, Lira) 
 
“Mostly when we go grazing it bites us”. (Barr, Lira) 
 
 
One person mentioned the deployment of tsetse traps and their connection 
to HAT, while others claimed they had not been made aware of their 
purpose. Overall, few said they were aware of any tsetse control activities in 
their area. 
 
“They have brought a lot of nets around here so it has reduced that illness 
around this place, but they are still present” (Apala, Alebtong) 
 
“Yes they have brought some nets but we are not aware that’s what they 






Animal Health Priorities and Awareness of AAT  
 
 
On the topic of knowledge and awareness of Animal African 
Trypanosomiasis (AAT), responses suggested that farmers in areas 
previously affected by HAT outbreaks (Aloi, Abongdero, Amach, and Barr) 
were largely aware of AAT (commonly referred to as ‘nagana’), and attributed 
this knowledge to local cattle spraying interventions conducted by SOS and 
the 3V community spray network. However, nagana was only identified in 
three focus groups as a priority disease among their livestock, and were 
ranked lower in priority to other diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease, 
Lumpy Skin Disease and East Coast Fever (theileriosis) and ‘tick’ diseases, 




Figure 19: Local animal health concerns among small-hold farmers 
 
“We also have a problem of ticks, you continuously treat the animals but 
when they have ticks they are continuously sick. I don’t know what the 
sickness is”. (Ogur, Lira) 
 






Livestock Treatment and Spraying Practices  
 
 
Only in those areas covered by 3V mobile community spray teams did 
participants claim to see an incentive in treating for trypanosomiasis and 
have their animals regularly or semi-regularly sprayed with pyrethroids 
effective against tsetse. In these cases however, it was only on the condition 
these would be effective also against ticks and preventing tick-borne 
diseases, which farmers were primarily concerned with. The vast majority of 

















Ticks Nagana Diarrhoea Liver Flukes Babeosis
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“We do not have any access to these services, and they are expensive. 
It’s very hard to access the vet personnel and they don’t easily turn up 
(FDG participant 1, Ogur, Lira) 
 
“And they don’t even know us” (FDG participant 2, Ogur, Lira) 
 
 
“Sometimes they could be available, however those who are 
professionally trained are not present so we usually use the [government 
volunteer] para-vets” (Abongdero, Kole) 
 
 
Focus group facilitator Joel Ekol (left) records a lively discussion on local animal health 
priorities. Photo taken and published with participants’ consent. 
 
As a result, most claimed to self-diagnose their animals and purchase drugs 
from informal vendors at livestock markets. Here they can purchase only as 
much as they can afford, taking advice from drug vendors as to dosage and 
administration, as few knew anything about the compounds used or how they 
should be administered. Those who demonstrated some knowledge of drug 
preparation, dosage, and administration reported to have learned this from 
3V vets or their own spray workers who had treated their animals. No one 
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had their livestock treated prophylatctically at the point of sale at livestock 
markets per the national policy.  
 
“When the animal is ill we diagnose ourselves, get the medicine, then the 
person who knows how to inject will teach us how to inject the medication” 
(Amach, Lira) 
 
“You go to the place where they sell the drugs, you describe the condition 
of the animal to the salesman, then he will tell you which drug to come 
and inject with” (Alito, Lira) 
 
“If the government could look at the perspective that we are poor and do 
not have money, perhaps they should come in and help us to treat the 
animals” (Aloi, Alebtong) 
 
 
At the start of the outbreak in this previously unaffected region, HAT cases 
were clustered around the local cattle market trading a high proportion of 
cattle from endemic T. b. rhodesiense areas (Selby et al. 2013). Cattle 
trading outside of markets is commonplace, and the activity of purchasing 
cattle from markets and other locations in high risk districts threatens to 
introduce greater numbers of cattle infected with T. b. rhodesiense into the 
northern districts where prevalence is currently low and HAT is absent 
(Miller, 2016). Government policy now requires that all cattle sold at official 
markets are to be treated with trypanocides at point of sale (Wendo, 2002), 
however, this has not been effective regarding unregulated trade outside the 
market system, thus unofficially traded animals are a greater risk factor for 
disease spread (Fèvre et al, 2006). Therefore, the treat-at-point of sale policy 
cannot be implemented into the complex cattle trade networks that operate 
outside of state control, thus failing to prevent the continuing spread of 
disease northward (von Wissmann et al, 2014).  
 
 
The challenge of preventative innovations 
 
Preventative innovations such as spraying cattle to prevent HAT have a 
particularly slow rate of adoption, as their advantage is not so readily 
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apparent at the time. The sought-after consequence is distant in time, and so 
the relative advantage of a preventative innovation is a delayed reward, 
compared to incremental innovations which provide a desired outcome in the 
near future (Rogers, 1995). Acaricides are a major private market in rural 
areas, and both pyrethroids (effective on both ticks and tsetse flies) and 
amidine-based products (effective on ticks but not tsetse) are sold widely. 
Preventing reinfection of cattle with T. b. rhodesiense after mass cattle 
treatments in Uganda requires the sustained monthly application of 
pyrethroid-based products, thus the availability of appropriate veterinary 
services, targeted education campaigns and access to acaricide at the 
village level is also necessary (Bardosh et al., 2013).  
 
Treating an animal visibly affected by ticks with pyrethroids leads to the 
improvement of their condition and avoids the productive loss of their death. 
This occurs in a period of time short enough to associate the causal link 
between treatment and the rewards. Rewards of adopting preventive 
measures are not only delayed in time, but uncertain as to whether they 
actually will be needed. Furthermore, the unwanted event that is avoided by 
adopting a preventive innovation is difficult to perceive because it is 
essentially a ‘non-event’, the absence of something that otherwise might 
have happened (Rogers, 1995, p.217). It cannot be known at the time of 
paying for spraying, that not adopting this measure will have caused the 
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Figure 20: Preventative HAT control through trypanocidal cattle spraying.  




Measurable indicators for evaluating behavioural change and impact is 
complex and difficult to define, and as such has been notably low on the 
agenda for research on Neglected Zoonoses. One dimension of the 
compatibility of an innovation is the degree to which it meets a felt need 
(Rogers, 1995: 228).This is largely the case for rhodesiense HAT, where 
farmers may not see the need to continually treat livestock for a disease that 
does not appear to affect their animals, or indeed themselves. “It is important 
that people make a link between the animal disease and the human disease, 
but it’s not an easy message” (Franck Boué, 2014. ICONZ Magazine, Issue 
7: 4). Instead, the incremental benefits of spraying their cattle to prevent ticks 
for example, which transmit visible and devastating diseases such as East 
Coast Fever, have proven to be far more affective in promoting adoption. 
One study found that cooperation with National Malaria Service spray teams 
Prevents potential HAT 
infection being passed on 
by tsetse to infect other 
humans 
Prevents potential 
infection with human 
infective 
trypanosomes 
Pay for cattle 
spraying 
Prevents tsetse bites 
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in Guatemala might be improved if malaria workers would emphasize that 
“house spraying reduces the numbers of nuisance mosquitoes and other 
pest insects, rather than focusing solely on malaria prevention, which most 
informants believed was less important” (Klein et al., 1995). Likewise, 
framing cattle spraying as a method to prevent AAT, which causes sickness 
and production losses in livestock may also be more successful than framing 
it as preventing HAT. It is evident from these findings that the perceived need 
to invest in preventative treatment for HAT and nagana, both low priority 





Community spraying in Kaberamaido 
 
Dr Odongo and I leave his shop at around 6am to meet one of his community 
sprayers, Julius, who had arranged to spray the cattle of several villages in 
his catchment in Kaberamaido. Julius has already began work before we 
arrive, and I approach him spraying a young bull tethered to a small tree. The 
animal flinches and tugs its horns from their anchor as Julius pumps the 
insecticidal mist around it’s ears. Eventually the sapling buckles and the bull 
brakes free. Julius puts in a half-hearted chase, but conserves his energies 
for the remaining herd. “Ah! These young ones are stubborn” he chuckles, 
sojourning over to greet us. By the end of the morning all the cattle that are 
sprayed are recorded on a data entry sheet, which Frederick collects at the 
end of each month from his sprayers. I ask him how many on average a 
district will spray in a month. “It’s not uncommon for 10,000 cattle to be 
sprayed across Kaberamaido in one month, but it varies throughout the 
year”. Uptake is seasonal, and there are generally two peaks; one after 
harvest, as people have more money to invest in spraying their cattle then, 
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and one after rainy season, when there are more ticks and farmers are 
particularly motivated to spray their animals. 
 
The Local Chairman tells me his community was glad of the spraying service 
3V and the mobile sprayers were providing, but the only problem was 
affording the treatments since the cost had increased from 300 to 400 
shillings that month. Despite this, many continued to turn out their cattle for 
regular spaying, citing the close relationship they had with their own local 
‘spray person’. “Julius is a member of our parish and community” […] “we 
would trust him in all things.” Others praised his professionalism and 
dedication to the role, saying “he is very good at what he does, and very 
punctual.” While Julius’ personal connections to his community made him a 
trustworthy provider of animal health services, his employment by Frederick 
also seemed to lend him professional legitimacy by association. “It is good 
that these activities are monitored by Dr Odongo, to ensure we are getting a 
good service,” the LC confides quietly to me, “it is a good arrangement we 
have with them, they are not quacks”.  
 
The following morning Frederick and I ride to a location the other side of 
Lwala town, not far from the HAT treatment centre. We pull up to the side of 
the road, which is densely populated with obelowinyo7. Here we meet a man, 
dressed in a distinctive bright orange boiler suit, who beckons us to follow 
him into the thicket. I can make out a pair of large Ankole horns swaying in 
the bushes, and on approach come upon 4 cattle in a small clearing. One is 
tethered and being sprayed attentively by an elderly looking man. I turn to the 
orange suited gentleman and ask if he is the LC here – “Oh! No, I am the 
spray person” he replies. “I am Daniel”. He tells me that the man spraying is 
actually a farmer, and that sometimes they show customers how to spray 
their own cattle when they prefer. The farmer is measured and meticulous in 
his technique. He has had the RAP taught to him by Daniel, and 
                                                 
7 The local Lango translation of ‘Obelowinyo’ is ‘tick berry’, the colloquial term for lantana camara, 
a bush habitat considered favourable for tsetse. 
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demonstrates the procedure in a textbook manner. He takes his time, making 
quiet and slow movements, ensuring that the animal is covered thoroughly 
on the belly, legs and behind the ears, before moving on to his other animals.  
 
 
Community Animal Health Officer Daniel sprays a local zebu cow in his 
parish 
 
Returning from Omot livestock market one morning, Frederick and his 3V 
colleague Ronald talk at length about the economic benefits of the initiative 
for community sprayers, but complain that many people decide to invest this 
by opening shops or other lines of business and give up spraying. Ronald 
remarks that there is a saying locally about money being where you eat it 
(referring to a hand-to-mouth existence), saying “these spray people we 
recruit can be short sighted, or not willing to do the fieldwork”.  
 
Daniel used to be a soldier, and like many here grew up nearby through a 
tumultuous period during the LRA’s insurgency. He has been spraying for 
some 14 years since then, and working with Frederick for the last 7 since he 
recruited him 6 months after he arrived in Dokolo. Frederick tells me he is 
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one of his longest serving sprayers, and that it is uncommon for sprayers to 
work with him for so long, but that Daniel has built up a large network of his 
own. Under the 3V vet initiative, sprayers recruit and build their own network 
of farmers who they then train to spray, operating as independent ‘micro-
entrepreneurs’ with support and training provided by their local 3V vet 
(Welburn and Coleman in Zinsstag et al., 2015). Farmers pay them for the 
acaricides which they can provide from Frederick and his colleagues’ stores 
in the town centres. Mobile sprayers have come to be known locally as 
‘animal doctors’ to their communities in some areas, and are generally held 
in high regard. Their position is respected, and they are generally considered 
to be knowledgeable persons whom people seek all manner of advice from, 
from where in town is best to purchase certain goods, drugs, or equipment, 














“The SOS is where you find that the science is put to use in a simple and 
easily acceptably way to the community. The technologies are the ones that 
the community really wanted, and it was solving other problems like tick 
borne disease, so you find that the farmers were very receptive to the 
technology being used. Compared to others, SOS was being a bit higher in 
the level of acceptability of other approaches because it trains the local 
persons, the Community Animal Health Workers, the farmers. The effect of 
the interventions can still be felt after some time, once the farmer learns to 
use the technologies they keep using them and it doesn’t need expert 
knowledge to keep doing it”  




Dr Ronald Were in his 3V Vet Drug Store in Kaberamaido District 
 
 
While Frederick remains, as a veterinarian, the expert authority on animal 
health that locals may seek advice from regarding their animals’ health and 
treatment, the community sprayers can also administer vaccines and other 
treatments. Frederick often advises his sprayers on the correct course of 
treatment to give an animal for them to communicate to their owners, so as 
to enhance their trust in the sprayers expertise and thus ensure their 
continued custom. In some cases, farmers may often trust the expertise of 
their own local ‘animal doctor’ over Frederick’s – even where the advice they 
offer comes directly from Frederick. One young farmer shared with me he 
would not believe what Dr Odongo told him about the medicines he should 
buy for his animals, or trust the prices he quoted, but when “our own” Daniel 
advised him and quoted the same prices he would take him on his word, 
saying “I am more happy to phone home and request the money be 
transferred there and then when Daniel tells me”. Above all else it seems, the 
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success or failure of these social interactions, and thus interventions, hinges 
on relationships of trust and respect.  
 
As a point of contact between remote rural communities and the larger 
trading centres and towns, people like Daniel become central nodes in their 
communities’ social networks, and the role comes with certain levels of 
prestige and responsibility. A sprayer becomes established as a respectable 
and trusted local group member, providing goods and services to his peers. 
This makes individuals like Daniel and Julius important nodes in a socially 
complex socio-economic system. Where customers, like many of those in my 
focus groups, cannot afford to follow ‘proper’ treatment recommendations, 
most farmers may care more for price over quality (Bardosh, 2016). Here, 
drug vendors, or in this instance, community sprayers/’animal doctors’, invest 
in building reputations and relationships of trust with local customers 
(Kingsley, 2015) to build livelihoods.  
 
After several months travelling with Frederick’s 3V colleagues and mobile 
sprayers, I returned to where this journey began, to observe another 
relatively innocuous technology take on a life of its own through a socio-
















Emmanuel takes a log of our position on the GPS unit of the location of the 
target we have placed. This ‘geo-tag’ waypoint data will be used to update 
the programme map to show where we have placed the target. “It is good for 
monitoring, it means they can see when one of us is not laying enough traps, 
or putting them in the wrong places. We get feedback and that keeps us 
motivated to do the job well, or else you might get sent back to do it again!” 
One of several ‘entomological assistants’ recruited to the programme, 
Emmanuel is responsible for deploying targets across a relatively large area 
of west Arua district. The work is demanding, with each deployment taking 
many hours of travel and physical work along hundreds of the Nile’s vast 
network of tributaries.  His jovial disposition conceals an otherwise serious 
enthusiasm for his work, his investment in the project’s success is quite 
personal. “My uncle died from sleeping sickness when I was quite young. It 
was terrible, many people were dying then. MSF came and they took over, it 
helped a lot. But this place has always suffered from tsetse, we must fight it 
at its root”.  
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During the project’s early days in Arua, local staff were incorporated into a 
dialogue early on. 
 
“When they come in the region, they reactivated this coordination, they 
hosted us in Moyo and Arua as they were rolling, they are leaving a good 
legacy”  - District Entomologist, Yumbe 
 
However, despite investing in community sensitisation for the pilot study, 
initial deployments of the tiny targets did not go as smoothly as planned. 
 
 “Within 3 months we realised there were quite high losses and damages 
to targets, so basically they’d still be in the field, but the central metal pole 
would be gone. So then we obviously realised that the value is in the 
metal itself so it turned out about seven of the individual metal poles can 
be sold on the scrap metal market for the cost of  about loaf of bread or 
bag of maize meal, but it was also useful for making arrows and fish 
hooks and all sorts of things. So this was all Vanja, the social scientist 
looked into all of this. So then we turned to a wooden design, replacing all 
the metal parts with wooden sticks”. 
 (Field manager, Dr Johan Esterhuizen) 
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Various iterations of the tiny target design as it evolved through field testing and pilot 
studies hang in the office of the LSTM field station in Arua. 
 
 
For example, during deployment they found that community members 
perceived baits very differently. Villagers who had never seen traps before 
expressed fear, anxiety and panic when they first encountered them. This 
was related to associations with witchcraft and “ghosts from the river” which 
are traditionally linked with physical or mental illness, death and misfortune 
(Kovacic et al, 2013). 
 
“Initially we were just walking along rivers to see what the habitat looks 
like and if we could actually deploy these things right next to water, and 
quite often would come out of a water bed or out of a river valley and 
people would just scream and panic, especially women working in the 
field, they would just throw down their tools and run screaming back to the 
village. One guy just completely took off his gumboots and started 
running, you know, just so he could run faster! Eventually Vanja found 
out, because I was there maybe, big bearded guy with a hat and panga, 
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and the ghosts come out of rivers, the water spirits you know, and you 
see this guy! [himself]” 
- Dr Johan Esterhuizen, Field site manager 
 
 
A study on sustainable vector control and management of Chagas disease in 
Argentina found that sustained community participation grew out of 
establishing a trusted relationship with the affected communities and the 
local schools, particularly through close cooperation with locally nominated 
leaders (Gürtler et al., 2007). 
 
Elsewhere, an study on mosquito control in Guatemala noted the 
participation of women in malaria control, emphasising a need to understand 
“how women influence their environment, particularly the family habits, 
hygiene, and the interaction as a family unit with local health and education 
systems” (Klein et al., 1995: 111). To this end, making the Tiny Targets as 
socially proximate as possible by engaging naturally organised groups of 
women – who are predominantly responsible for water management at the 
household level in many countries in Africa (Sorenson et al, 2011; Stevenson 
et al, 2012; Baguma et al, 2013) and thus are more exposed to HAT – likely 
enhanced the acceptability and sustainability of the programme overall 
(Gunn et al., 2017).  
 
 
Technology as advocacy: awareness of HAT from tiny targets 
deployment among RDT-positive HAT suspects 
 
During my interviews with rapid diagnostic test (RDT) positive HAT suspects 
in the West Nile, awareness of HAT was very high. Some cited active 
screening in the past and public health awareness activities as the source of 
this knowledge, however a prevailing source of information appeared to be 
local tsetse control activities, with frequent references to the tiny targets 
deployments. Some claimed programme staff members had informed them 
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of their purpose, however most appear to have discussed the tiny targets 
with other members of the public, and learned about their purpose through 
these informal interactions. The knowledge they received this way 
heightened awareness of HAT locally.  
 
“I saw them [targets]. There is something in the valley there I am told that 
thing when it bites you, you get this sleeping sickness. And so these 
targets I’m seeing in the valley, I heard it from public. I keep asking “why 
are these things hung here”, they say “these things are to prevent tsetse 
flies”. (RDT+ suspect 17, Kerwa, Yumbe) 
 
“I have seen it. I heard they are placed there to prevent tsetse fly from 
increasing. I asked people whom I know why that thing is hung there, and 
they tell me it is there to catch tsetse flies” (RDT + suspect 16, Drajini, 
Yumbe) 
 
“We are told that it is hung there to prevent sleeping sickness. It works 
because in Kochi there were so many tsetse flies when you go to wash 
clothes by the river, you would be bitten by many of them. But since last 
year when these blue targets have been hung there, when you go and 
wash clothes you don’t experience tsetse fly bites, so it has controlled the 
number of tsetse flies in the area”. (RDT+ suspect 14, Kochi, Yumbe) 
 
“I knew about sleeping sickness the first time when the government 
started deploying some things at the riverside that it is for preventing 
tsetse flies. That is where I heard about HAT”. (RDT+ suspect 19, 
Koboko) 
 
“I have fear in my hut, I have seen tsetse fly nets being hung up. The 
person who deploys these things tells us we should not remove them 
because it prevents the tsetse flies in that area. They work, this time the 
tsetse flies are not so many” (RDT+ suspect 19, Ayipi, Maracha) 
 
 
These anecdotes show that targets have stimulated HAT awareness among 
communities through these unsolicited conversations. In doing so they reveal 
how information travels through informal social networks, and how socially 
proximate technologies can be used effectively as tools of advocacy for 
tsetse and HAT control. A study on Indoor Residual Spraying teams for 
malaria control found that, although malaria knowledge was poor, knowing 
the benefit  of  indoor  residual  spraying  was  associated  with  a reduction 
of mosquitoes and other pests such as rats and cockroaches in their 
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homesteads made IRS more acceptable and compelling (Klein et al., 1995). 
In the West Nile, I found that the Tiny Targets became a compelling 
technology, particularly among women who spent much of their time close to 
the river banks and were frequently bitten and bothered by tsetse. This 
tangible benefit opened a space for conversations about tsetse’s relationship 
with HAT which acted to heighten awareness about HAT and improve 






As Emmanuel and I pull into the courtyard of the field station we meet 
Edward, one of the project’s two lab technicians, who has also just arrived 
back from his fly collection in Maracha district. Having visited several 
monitoring traps, he has brought back around a dozen flies. Not many these 
days, compared to the veritable harvest they would have been collecting a 
few years ago at the beginning of the project. “Ah, you are back early!  
You are just in time” he says, gesturing toward the lab. “I am about to begin 
the fly dissections”. 
 
There are few trained technicians that can dissect tsetse as skilfully as 
Edward and his colleague Victor. The lead entomologist and field site 
manager, Dr Johan Esterhuizen, trained them both himself in the early days 
of the project. Previously they had worked in local hospital labs where they 
had been more familiar using microscopes to search for helminths or malaria, 
not so much for dissecting tsetse. Soon they were processing hundreds of 
flies a week, all the time creating ginormous archives of data on trypanosome 
prevalence in local tsetse populations. The piles of record books stacked on 
the lab workbench were satisfying to me in their tactility. Having become 
accustomed to scrolling through reams of digitised spreadsheet data made 
the voluminous tomes of handwritten records markedly more enthusing, like 
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antique artefacts of entomological history. I cannot say that this sentimental 
appreciation is likely shared by any of the Ugandan entomologists who have 
to compile and search these records on a day-to-day basis. Each book is 
filled row on row with data. Species, sex, age, blood meal status, presence 
and location of trypanosomes, and each row book-ended with the 
corresponding fly itself, adhered to the page with a square of Sellotape. I’m 
surprised to learn from Johan that this wealth of information is not fed back 
into programme’s operational strategy, given the number of District 
Entomologists and District Veterinary Officers I had interviewed who 
lamented not having detailed data on infection rate among local tsetse 
populations.  
 
Edward loads his first fly under the microscope and makes himself 
comfortable, signalling me to pull up the chair next to him. He raises his hand 
abruptly and hushes me to attention. “Watch. I am going to first remove the 
head” he whispers, adjusting his fine tweezers delicately like a seamstress. 
His steady hand makes the smallest of movements carefully and deliberately. 
“Come look now, I have already removed the mouth part”. He rolls his chair 
back and invites me to peer down the scope. Indeed, the head is quite 
separate from the abdomen, and yet looks otherwise untouched, as though it 
were carefully picked apart at the seam and unstitched. He resumes the 
delicate procedure, explaining at each stage of dismemberment and 
inspection that seeing trypanosomes in different parts of the body indicates 
the stage of infection in the fly, as the parasite moves throughout the body in 




Dissected tsetse fly and its constituent parts assembled on separate slides for 
inspection by microscopy. 
 
In tsetse, the parasite permeates and inhabits different spaces in the fly’s 
body, something that entomologists can observe to deduce the 
trypanosome’s strain and infection status (Bouyer et al.). During dissections, 
I observed how Edward and his colleague carefully dismembered flies under 
the microscope, using fine tipped tweezers to pluck the heads from the 
thorax, before gently teasing apart the key components of the tsetse 
anatomy; the mouth part, the salivary glands, the midgut and ovaries. Only 
once each part of the body was systematically disassembled in a sequential 
process and separately neatly on one slide would the parasite be rendered 
visible to the investigator and located spatially. The trypanosome’s position, 
whether in the salivary glands or the midgut, point to a ‘diagnosis’ in the fly, 
which is then translated into a number and entered into a data sheet, 
recording the sub-species of tsetse, the sex, age (determined by examination 
of the ovaries), and the presence and position of trypanosomes found.  
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Left: Lab technician Edward performs dissections on tsetse flies in the Tiny Target’s 
field station laboratory, Arua. Right: Opening the abdomen of the tsetse fly (Photo: W. 
Yoni & C. Bila, in Bouyer et al.) 
 
We do not find any parasites in the fly, nor any of the others in today’s catch. 
Edward tells me that there are very few infected tsetse collected these days, 
and as it turned out it would be two weeks before they found another.  
 
 
Contesting control: discordant narratives on the role of evidence for 
elimination 
 
Was the dramatic reduction of tsetse that Edward and many of my 
serological suspects observed a direct result of the tiny targets? The data 
emerging from the lab in Arua seemed to support the association between 
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the deployment of impregnated targets in North West Uganda and the 
significant reduction in the tsetse population by over 90%. With fewer flies 
the probability of infected vectors circulating also reduces dramatically, and it 
has been calculated that a drop of 72% in the tsetse population is sufficient 
to break transmission (Tirados et al, 2015). It is understandable then, that 
many of the local entomologists I interviewed expressed deep concern at the 
prospect of losing the rare and highly specialist skills of people like Edward, 
and the capacity to conduct laboratory analyses on tsetse once LSTM 
completes its handover to COCTU and withdraws. 
 
“I’m not so sure if LSTM will leave the lab for us, if they do we will be able 
to analyse the flies, otherwise the district doesn’t have a lab. It is 
important, those analyses will help us to eliminate the existence of the 
parasite in the environment in the tsetse flies, that one can only be done 
in the laboratory. So if we realise one incidence of trypanosomes in a 
specific location or village, we can shift our efforts and put more activity 
there, targets in that place to wipe out the existence of the trypanosomes 
[…] We could do that with the lab, so we can keep on monitoring 
trypanosome presence in tsetse flies. If we register zero, zero, zero, then 
it would be good prevalence”.  
- District Entomologist, Arua 
 
“When LSTM leave the problem in our department is one of the 
equipment, we don’t have the equipment to use for dissecting. I think also 
the personnel, in most of the districts - if not all - entomology is a one-man 
section. Even if we came to some arrangement before LSTM left that we 
could continue using their lab, we would not have the staff”. 
-  District Entomologist, Moyo 
 
The concerns raised by local government entomological staff that poor lab 
capacity prevented them from establishing where tsetse populations were 
infected seems pertinent to a situation where numbers are high. However in 
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settings where tsetse numbers are very low, the practical utility of this 
information becomes limited. The issue then becomes one of discordant 
conceptions of what kind of intervention is being conducted, and to what 
ends. Tiny Targets managerial staff dampened the importance of such 
information beyond the purpose of research, and appealed to a pragmatic 
framing of the intervention.  
 
“It’s probably not really necessary, and in fact we get quite a low infection 
rate and most of that is in the animal tryps, so that is really, really low. So 
we just do it because we’re a research institution and have the facilities 
and the capability of these guys to do it […] But it’s not essential for the 
control” (Dr Johan Esterhuizen, Field Manager) 
 
“Entomologists always catch flies and dissect them, and why are we doing 
that? We do it for research purposes. But we do not need to do it for this. 
We did it for the last project because we wanted to look at impact, you 
expect numbers to go down, so it’s a research exercise. We’ve got 
infection rates of about 1 in 10,000, so when they say ‘we want to 
measure infection rates’, and you’re catching less than a fly per day… So 
they have asked us that, and we are happy to train them to do that, but do 
we think it should be part of monitoring? It should not”. (Prof Steve Torr, 
Programme Director) 
 
As one programme staff member remarked, a mismatch in how Tiny Targets 
is perceived within the broader landscape of interventions and how its 
objectives are framed need to be made clear. 
 
“It’s sort of managing the expectations, this is not a research project, 
we’re moving towards a routine intervention. And lots of the things that 
entomologists like to do are not relevant, and expensive! So we have to 
be frank […] Does entomology need to have an entomology lab? I would 
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say they do not need that capacity, and that would divert them from the 
things they do need to be investing in”. (Programme staff member). 
 
Indeed, results elsewhere appear to demonstrate that target deployment 
could be sufficient in achieving a significant impact on HAT cases. In the 
focus of Boffa in Guinea, a pilot elimination programme combining medical 
screening and tiny targets was launched in 2012. During the Ebola outbreak, 
HAT active screening activities were suspended, and passive surveillance 
was also significantly diminished. However, tsetse control using the 
insecticide impregnated targets could be maintained. The disruption of 
screening activities over a two year period led to a dramatic increase of HAT 
prevalence where vector control was not implemented, whereas control 
levels were maintained in areas covered with impregnated targets, with no 
cases found in 2016 (0/799) (Kagabadouno et al, 2018). Ebola in Boffa 
revealed the fragility of the screen and treat strategy, as rapid outbreaks of 
HAT occurred once operations were disrupted. It also added to evidence that 
augmenting medical activities with vector control using impregnated targets 
can reduce human-tsetse contacts, and even implemented alone, provide an 
effective level of protection against infection (Mahamat et al., 2017). 
 
It was clear there were differences in how the tiny targets were 
conceptualised between groups. To local entomologists, the programme 
could, and ought to be part of an integrated control effort that incorporates 
data on infection rates in flies to help target medical screening in human 
populations. However, managerial staff were keen to stress that Tiny Targets 
is exclusively a vector control intervention, “we are in fact intentionally trying 
not to say that our intervention is a human health intervention, that’s all its 
about, the targets, that’s all that they do” (programme director, Prof Steve 
Torr). While this framing makes a pragmatic argument for limiting the scope 
of what evidence from the programme could be mobilised for, it fails to 
address the loss of empowerment local entomologists fear when LSTM pull 
out of the West Nile. 
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Trypanosomiasis and tsetse control in Uganda has often been portrayed as a 
success story of One Health (Bardosh, 2016), but the Tiny Targets’ singular 
approach does not chime well with the holistic paradigm. “I don’t think 
anyone thinks of it as a one health intervention that we are doing […] In the 
previous project we knew we were never going to be able to monitor impact 
on human tryps” (programme staff member). In contrast, it was noted by 
interviewees that the SOS intervention, despite clearly targeting the vector, 
had been ‘dead against any entomological monitoring’ of its impact on local 
tsetse numbers. In the same way Tiny Targets being framed as a vector 
control intervention centred tsetse numbers as their outcome variable, the 
framing of SOS as a public health intervention prioritised tracking the 
prevalence of T. brucei s.l. and human infective T.b. rhodesiense in the 
livestock reservoir. This could be viewed as a political decision, given funding 
apparatuses may favour explicitly human health interventions. As one 
interviewee pointed out, “[another] element is about a quite contentious area, 
it’s about ownership […] I would think quite a lot of it, there’s a lot of 







Sustaining interventions through social proximity and enterprise 
 
The issue of health program sustainability has received attention 
over recent decades as a central topic in both academic and policy literature. 
The concept of sustainability broadly refers to the acceptance and continued 
use of program components and activities beyond the initial intervention or 
funding period, usually toward the achievement of desirable or intended 
health outcomes (Shediac-Rizkallah and Bone, 1998; Scheirer and Dearing, 
2011). However, the issue of what is to be sustained precisely has been a 
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recurrent and contentious theme (Madon et al, 2018). Within a medical or 
health systems framework, emphasis is placed on tracking the long-term 
impacts on health, and their ‘institutionalisation’ within the pre-existing 
structures and processes (Pluye et al., 2004; Shigayeva and Coker, 2015 in 
Madon et al, 2018).   
 
Tracking the effects of ‘One Health’ interventions are inherently tricky 
however, given that the trajectory of outcomes being measured depart from 
multiple species, under the remit of separate disciplines and programmes, 
creating evidence toward diverging interests and ends. The political 
landscapes that forge these divisions, through networks of neoliberal funding 
structures and pedagogical siloes, ultimately splinter the HAT control 
assemblage in ways that prevent the One Health philosophy from being 
realised in practice. They also tend to re-inscribe and reproduce the steep 
power gradients embedded in these structures (Sariola et al., 2017), 
inhibiting intersectional collaboration between stakeholders in the Global 
North and South. Ideological shifts from one techno-fix solution to another 
over the past century have been facilitated by framing HAT as a disease of 
singular origin; of tsetse flies that must be eradicated through scorched earth 
policies; of cattle that must be treated en masse in militarised campaigns; or 
of poor people, who must present themselves at government health centres 
and navigate convoluted diagnostic pathways at their own cost.  
 
This chapter has shown how relatively modest interventions differ in their 
approach to conventional interventions by promoting long-term, stable growth 
and impact through local partnerships and capacity building. Conventional 
public interventions (particularly where the overall objective is elimination) 
tend to prioritise creating high visibility success stories with demonstrable 
‘bang for your buck’ for donors. Yet tiny insecticide treated flags and mobile 
sprayers, while arguably less glamorous, have achieved results that are far-
reaching and sustainable over much longer periods of time.  
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“Something like what the 3V vets are doing is the only way. It might not 
get as high a return immediately, but over a longer period of time the 
small gains you get are long-term and sustainable, and you can build on 
that. If you think for example, you are at ‘A’ and you want to get to ‘B’, 
using something like the SOS you might get there quickly and see results, 
but it won't last very long and the impact will drop off. But with something 
smaller and more measured like [3V], you can move a small way towards 
B, but with less risk and more chance of sustaining, and it gives time for 
things like government, local government, staff and communities etc. to 
adjust and adopt it properly, so then you can build on that. It's slower, but 
in the long term achieves more. There was very little sustainability built 
into the SOS DIB from that perspective, nothing at the local level”.  
- Former SOS partner 
 
Reviews of past control programmes identified the inability to transfer 
responsibility for AAT control to cattle-owners once interventions had ceased 
as a key failing (Meyer et al. 2016). While the establishment of a network of 
community based spray teams provides a model of preventing parasite 
reinfection, ensuring reliable and affordable access to drugs is key to 
maintaining a commercially sustainable market (Zinsstag et al, 2015).  
Shifting the costs of maintaining mass treatment and spraying interventions 
onto poor populations in a post-war subsistence economy is ethically and 
practically problematic (Bardosh, 2016a). This ‘social entrepreneurship’ 
approach forms part of a broader move toward putting HAT control in the 
hands of ‘market forces’ to encourage sustainability from the ‘bottom up’. But 
in a socio-political landscape where disease control is felt to be the remit of 
government responsibility, placing the ‘public good’ of HAT control onto the 
shoulders of extremely poor individuals has had an understandably 
underwhelming reception among rural communities in central Uganda. 
 
My research in the West Nile found that community knowledge about HAT, 
and the link between tsetse and the disease is very high. This is in part due 
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to the organised sensitisation activities the Tiny Targets programme initiated 
before and during the initial months of deployment. However, another 
interesting discovery was that much of this knowledge circulating was 
communicated between members of the public via social networks, 
particularly between women who spent more time working in the vicinity of 
targets along river banks. It is interesting to note that, while the tiny targets, 
framed exclusively as a vector control intervention, achieved more 
sensitisation for local HAT awareness and vigilance among local populations, 
than the scaled introduction of HAT rapid diagnostic tests in primary 
healthcare facilities described in the first empirical chapter. The visibility of 
targets along rivers are almost certainly a significant element of this outcome, 
visually prompting conversations among local social networks about tsetse 
and the purpose of local control activities for HAT prevention. The RDT on 
the other hand was a largely invisible intervention, that achieved very little in 
the way of promoting HAT awareness among local populations.  
 
Across both tsetse control interventions, compared with large scale, vertical 
interventions of the past (such as aerial spraying, sterile insect technology, 
and SOS), more modest but socially embedded technologies such as Tiny 
Targets and 3V Village Spray Teams are more sustainable owing to their 
social proximity and community buy-in. A study on Inside Residual Spraying 
(IRS) in a rural area so Mozambique found that acquaintance with the 
sprayers was a significant factor associated with adherence, being “members 
of the communities, resulting in an unclear line between the intervention 
providers and the receiving communities, and this has acted in favour of 
rapport building between the two parties” (Munguambe et al., 2011: 11). 
Meanwhile, disagreement over procedures were a key driver of non-
adherence (ibid). Similarly, in my study disagreement over the efficacy of 
RAP in being able to target both ticks and tsetse was a point of contention 
between farmers and the professional veterinary community (and also 
contested within the veterinary community), while a key driver of pyrethroids 
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spraying adherence among farmers in my study was also familiarity with their 
local sprayers, or ‘animal doctors’ whom they trusted. 
 
 
Contesting tsetse control through the One Health lens 
 
Additionally, my findings corroborate those of previous chapters, and show 
that despite successful national and international commitments to One 
Health partnerships, collaboration between veterinary, entomological, and 
public health staff at the district level is limited. The devolution of governance 
and service delivery in the 1990s had far reaching consequences across all 
sectors, and many officials argued that decentralisation has degraded rural 
veterinary and tsetse control capacity (Smith, Taylor, and Kingsley, 2014). 
District officers complained frequently that decentralised and under-
resourced district offices often struggle to maintain operational cohesion, as 
a precarious assemblage of entomologists, veterinarians, and community 
animal health workers endeavour to align vertical programmes with fragile 
and fragmented control networks. Training, since it is presumed to convey 
information and skills that will ‘empower’ people to achieve goals for 
themselves and continue programmes after vertical management structures 
withdraw, is seen as central to the tenet of sustainability (Swidler and 
Watkins, 2009). Indeed, local entomologists and community sprayers I spoke 
with felt empowered by vertical projects and the resources and training they 
provided. However, these members of the community often went overlooked 
as key stakeholders or important sources of knowledge by national control 
programmes, as demonstrated by the Tiny Targets’ controversial withdrawal 
of lab capacity. It was evident from my encounters and conversations with 
community sprayers and farmers they served that these are key nodes in 
local HAT control networks whose knowledge and position in social networks 
ought to be utilised and valued by local government and the 3V intervention. 
Based on these findings, and in line with an eco-social approach to 
developing ‘culturally acceptable’ and ‘culturally compelling’ health 
interventions (Panter-Brick et al., 2006), I suggest that the definition of 
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‘community’ participation should expand to engaging implementation staff, 






Vulnerability and risk to HAT is dynamic and complex, and the people who 
disproportionally suffer the impacts of the disease are rarely involved in the 
design of control programmes (Holt et al. 2016). Many human and animal 
health interventions have assumed to be implemented onto passive 
populations and static networks. This is typified by an array of elegant 
mathematical modelling studies conducted to evaluate the impact and cost 
effectiveness of various interventions (Steinmann et al., 2017; Rock et al., 
2018). But as this chapter has shown, people are active participants in 
transforming their social landscapes (Perdue, 1994). Preventative 
innovations that target the tsetse vector must pay greater attention to the 
interactions of people (including social and cultural factors), patches 
(changing habitats and ecologies), and parasites (including spatial patterns 
of disease transmission) (Scoones et al., 2017: 643). Populations in these 
‘patches’ affected by HAT (ibid), have been subject to numerous 
displacements and inward migration, doubling the parasite’s ecological range 
in some areas (Selby 2013; Bardosh, 2016), from decades of military conflict 
in the northern and eastern regions, to the recent influx of refugees fleeing 
conflict in Gambiense HAT endemic South Sudan threatening elimination 
efforts in the West Nile (Picado and Ndung’u, 2017).  
 
By taking into consideration how people construct livelihoods in these 
landscapes and interact with tsetse and trypanosomiasis, adaptive and 
locally specific interventions that capture these complex socio-ecological 
dynamics can be devised (Booth and Clements, 2018; Michael and Madon, 
2017). A truly integrative One Health approach relies on this interdisciplinarity 
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being replicated on the ground however, requiring intersectoral efforts to 
dismantle the structural barriers preventing this implementation at the district 
level. Responses to HAT must therefore take these entangled socio-
ecologies into account, and address the social and political drivers of disease 
as well as the ecological. 
 
This chapter illustrates some of the key tenets of this thesis; that 
technologies do not exist and operate in a vacuum, nor do they work on a 
passive static ecosystem. They are part of a dynamic HAT assemblage, and 
rely on the interaction and agency of the population they are intervening on 
to adopt and continue to use them. They can be used as tools for advocacy, 
as highly visible and socially embedded interventions promote awareness 
and understandings of HAT among local populations. Conversely, relatively 
high tech but aloof interventions which shift responsibility of referral, 
treatment, or of preventative spraying, onto poor communities in post-conflict 
subsistence societies is evidently problematic. Introducing technologies and 
expecting vulnerable communities to continue their implementation long after 
with their own resources does little to promote trust or incentive, and is 
potentially damaging to communities and health systems. Thus, while 
modest and incremental, locally adapted interventions which are more 
socially proximate and integrated with ‘local ecologies’ achieve greater 
sustainability than some of their more elaborate predecessors, as they take 

















































“When we try to pick out anything by itself,  
we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe.” 
 




Boarding the last ferry across Lake Kyoga and nearing the end of my time in 
Uganda, I met a young man named Richard, a lab technician in a level three 
facility in Lira district. We passed an otherwise uncomfortable journey 
chugging across the water with conversation, in which he corroborated many 
of the problems he and his counterparts in other districts faced. He 
expressed interest in my study of HAT control, making regular references to 
the ‘disastrous’ culture of point of care testing and its effects on diagnosing 
other febrile illnesses. I shared my own observations from my research, and 
reflected on what I had learned throughout my fieldwork about sleeping 
sickness, the disease. Some from in-depth, probing interviews with 
programme managers and government ministers, or eloquent presentations 
by eminent researchers at meetings or conferences. But so much I had come 
to know of sleeping sickness was not just as discrete pathological events and 
the epidemiological patterns they form, but as a construct; systems borne out 
of decades-long demographic upheaval, conflict, and decentralisation, 
embedded through socio-technical performances and relationships between 
donors, governments, health systems and people. These entanglements had 
been revealed, in glimpses, by patients and health workers, or community 
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sprayers and farmers, often in snatched conversations in fleeting encounters 
with people like Richard. 
 
“For a long time, sleeping sickness had been a many number of things in my 
mind,” I wrote in my field diary during my final days in Arua. “A parasite, a fly, 
a symptom, a test, a number on a sheet”. These narratives had conjured a 
new version of HAT altogether, one outside conventional definitions of ‘health 
infrastructures’, and generally undetected by conventional epidemiological 
method, uncovering a hidden ‘ontological choreography’ of biomedical 
intervention (Cussins, 1998). As much a flagellate on a blood smear, or 
burning ‘fire in the blood’, HAT is a memory or a fear, a calculation of risks. It 
is known of, and yet a constellation of ‘fundamental unknowns’ (Checchi et 
al, 2008). 
 
It had been my hope that by the end of my time in Uganda I might have 
begun to untangle these multiple realities of HAT, and how these come to 
shape and are shaped by that most unquantifiable of parameters in 
epidemiological enquiry; of human behaviour. It wouldn’t be until much later 
that I reached the crux of this realisation, that the Trypanosomiases I sought 
to trace cannot be situated in fixed terms or specific ‘moments’ or ‘hotspots’, 
thus cannot be extricated from their environments or life histories, nor those 
of their hosts and victims. The version of HAT often problematized in board 
rooms and scientific conferences far away is a distilled caricature of 
properties demonstrated through risk maps and eloquent mathematical 
models. These may be good enough in their approximations of an 
epidemiological picture, that in an emergency outbreak setting may allow 
resources to be allocated and directed in effective strategies. In an 
elimination setting however, the importance of these models and the 
underlying data that underpins their accuracy becomes crucial, and much 
more sensitive to the effects of unquantifiable or less predictable parameters, 
otherwise too complex to capture or predict in reductive terms. The ‘wrong 
but useful’ axiom may help to negotiate uncertainties in disease modelling, 
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but the utility of models in the face of uncertainty is a function of ‘interpretive 
flexibility’ (Christley et al., 2013: 12). 
 
Contextual explanations of technology offer a great deal to the study of their 
impact on society (Perdue, 1994). The case studies presented here provide 
contextual analysis of contemporary innovations being implemented for HAT 
in the landscape of elimination. I have constructed this thesis as a 
biographical narrative, using technologies as departure points from which to 
explore the socio-technical ecology of sleeping sickness, tracing its 
permutations throughout the One Health assemblages of surveillance, 
management, and prevention. In doing so I have been able to draw out 
recurrent themes that trouble the techno-centric narratives that define 
contemporary global health interventions (Smith, 2011; Montgomery et al., 
2017). Much of this thesis explores some of the professional and 
humanitarian pressures placed on health workers at the most crucial point of 
surveillance, how these tensions play out during point of care interactions, 
and ultimately how these further shape the likelihood of patients completing 
diagnostic and treatment referral. By seeking out the ‘voices of the field’ 
(Okwaro et al., 2015) of health workers’ experiences across both T.b. 
gambiense and T.b. rhodesiense affected sites, I have presented some 
examples of the “endless tinkering of real people in specific circumstances” 
to establish a system that works within their own context (Cartwright and 
Hardy, 2012 in Biehl and Petryna, 2013: 9). 
 
The fourth and sixth chapters take a patient-centred approach and show how 
events leading up to the point where the infected body is identified, 
translated, and rendered legible to biomedical intervention ultimately govern 
the likelihood of diagnosis and referral success. Tracing Trypanosomiasis to 
these points of origin ‘at the end of the track’ reveal the myriad pathways that 
meander, stall, circumnavigate, and (sometimes) lead to diagnosis. The 
scale of such journeys that fail to reach this destination remains a troubling 
‘fundamental unknown’ (Checchi, 2008), with under-detection posing one of 
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the greatest challenges to HAT control and elimination. In heeding those who 
undertake these journeys, the pathways people navigate to access these 
technologies of promise, and where they fail to intersect with control 
programme infrastructures can be exposed. 
 
Here we also met some of those tasked with making this new enhanced 
passive surveillance strategy work, as district supervisors devise innovative 
compromises to retain suspects in referral. What the testimonies of 
practitioners and patients reveal is how the elimination programme’s 
imagined treatment landscape looks compared to that encountered by actual 
treatment seeking patients. Here, symptomatic individuals rarely seek 
diagnosis from government health facilities where RDTs are placed, or even 
seek diagnosis at all, instead opting for more socially proximate informal 
health providers such as private drug clinics where interactions are founded 
on acquaintance, trust, and the availability of drugs that can be accessed 
easily. Conversely, government health workers are perceived as aloof or 
dismissive, driven by negative experiences from social interactions at the 
point of care. The follow-up testing described in my vignettes ‘the bleeding’ 
and ‘circumventing microscopy’ typifies how these brief encounters, where 
little information is communicated between health workers and patients, can 
lead to a lack of understanding of how HAT referral works, and ultimately 
pose harmful effects on the wider health system by undermining important 
aspects of trust. 
 
In chapter five we re-located to the central Teso and Lango sub-regions of 
Uganda, where the zoonotic strain of rhodesiense HAT is less a subject of 
surveillance toward elimination, than an ongoing struggle to merely establish 
the extent of its scale. Here, case detection is framed as a problem of 
patients’ undesirable and ‘poor treatment seeking behaviours’, or inadequate 
laboratory infrastructures (often defined as a lack of diagnostic equipment 
like microscopes or PCR machines). However, as a survey of the material 
capacity of frontline health facilities to diagnose HAT revealed, the social 
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infrastructures of diagnosis are also important determinants of case detection 
at this level. We also met Serena Akello, who is a key node in a focal 
network in HAT case management, and whose personal ambition to leave 
Dokolo Health Centre to further her career is curtailed by the local HAT 
assemblage’s reliance on her experience and expertise in dealing with HAT 
cases. The fragility of this ecosystem is revealed by accounts of health 
workers who have never learned how to identify HAT in either syndromic or 
parasitological terms. 
 
In frontline laboratories, a shift toward rapid point of care testing has created 
a diagnostic culture whereby staff are no longer routinely performing 
microscopies, or investigating causes of febrile illness beyond what can be 
determined by rapid tests. Here, a lack of equipment (most health centres 
had microscopes but no staff that were skilled or comfortable in using them) 
was far from being the primary driver of under-detection. Instead, 
misdiagnosis is the consequence of a lack of confidence, or time to conduct 
more detailed diagnostic investigations, compounded by low awareness or 
appreciation of the local scale of HAT. Furthermore, few health workers 
understood what the procedure in terms of case referral and case reporting 
would be in the event they suspected a patient had HAT. This draws 
attention to many of the immaterial and unseen relational aspects of 
infrastructures that hold the surveillance infrastructure together. Health 
workers described problems implementing the mobile data reporting system 
mTrac, designed to replace slow and cumbersome paper-based reports. 
While this streamlines reporting for easily testable and high priority diseases 
like Malaria and HIV, this digital surveillance infrastructure excluded less 
common diseases with more complex diagnostic algorithms like HAT. This 
raises important questions regarding how infrastructures elevate and 
promote the collection of some evidence over others, entrenching the 
‘neglected’ status of diseases like HAT which have distinct reporting 
mechanisms at the national and international level. 
 
 288 
The sixth chapter re-centres the patient as a key agent and active participant 
in the HAT socio-technical ecosystem. While it too explores treatment 
seeking, and how passive surveillance struggles to detect cases in a 
pluralistic diagnostic landscape, focus shifts to the next stage in the lifecycle 
of HAT, to treatment and thereafter. Here, rhodesiense HAT survivors recall 
experiences of treatment and hospital admission, where many struggled to 
pull together money and social care to support them through their admission. 
Serena reflects on her work managing HAT cases, and her regret for not 
having the time or resources to adequately follow up patients once they leave 
her care - one example of how policies derived from medical guidelines at 
the global level struggle to be implemented in practice.  
 
Despite the hardship endured throughout diagnostic staging, treatment and 
hospital admission, the prospect of a new oral drug candidate into this 
experience poses some thought provoking considerations. Most patients and 
health workers agreed a course of oral tablets, that could be taken without 
the need for painful lumbar punctures or invasive blood drawing was 
preferable. However a significant proportion (nearly half) felt uncomfortable 
taking this treatment outside the hospital setting where they could not be 
monitored closely by medical staff. This concern was echoed by health 
workers who raised concerns over treatment adherence, where patients 
might fail to correctly take or store medications at home, or stockpile tablets 
(Cohen et al., 2015; Fitzpatrick and McClaren, 2017). This raises some 
points of consideration for the introduction of Fexinidazole. While Fexi will 
undoubtedly transform the HAT management ecosystem, the expectations 
formed by patients from treatment experiences can become embedded in the 
collective memories of communities (Kovacic et al, 2015). Introducing a 
different method of treating HAT outside of the traditional treatment centre 
space can cause unintended disruptive effects on the socio-technical 
ecosystem of HAT treatment and case management. This implementation 
ought to be accompanied by thorough social scientific analysis to gauge the 
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acceptance and integration of a new drug into socially embedded therapeutic 
landscapes (Gesler, 1992; Winchester, 2017). 
 
The seventh and final empirical chapter moves away from the medicalised 
configurations of HAT largely ‘owned’ by the public health sector, and turns 
to the various preventative strategies employed in intervening on the tsetse 
vector. Early on I describe a day in the life of a large and resdrugource 
intensive mass cattle treatment campaign. This militarised vertical operation, 
co-ordinated through public private partnerships operating parallel to 
Uganda’s control programme, becomes a site of contention for expertise and 
authority, where the RAP method and expensive sprays used to spray cattle 
cause disagreement between farmers, vets, and programme partners. While 
initially successful in interrupting transmission and reducing HAT cases, two 
phases of the intervention fail to sustain these gains and ultimately a third 
phase of the campaign is abandoned. This raised the importance of 
sustainability and led to the establishment of a network of privately funded 
veterinary drug shops and ‘micro entrepreneurs’ to provide mobile spraying 
services to communities (Bardosh, 2016). In accompanying these vets and 
their community sprayers, and interviewing key members of staff involved in 
previous SOS interventions, key issues of sustainability are identified that 
point toward the social proximity of the services provided by local community 
sprayers, and key aspects of trust and long-term co-operation that could not 
be fulfilled by as large and ambitious project as SOS. 
 
Finally in this chapter, we return to where this journey began, in the West 
Nile where efforts to eliminate gambiense HAT are being spearheaded by a 
new RDT and a novel technology for tsetse control. Here I draw on 
interviews and ethnographic observations of those implementing the Tiny 
Targets programme at a critical moment as it is handed over to the 
government control programme. Here, the previously donor funded vertical 
research project has been scaled up across the West Nile, and proven 
successful in dramatically reducing tsetse numbers in the region. However, 
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mismatched expectations of the remit and the future of the project between 
programme managers and local entomologists reveal how the framing of an 
intervention is as much about ownership as it is about the politics of 
knowledge and peoples’ jobs. Drawing on interviews conducted with RDT 
positive suspects earlier in the year, I also present the unexpected finding 
that the majority of respondents who had a high awareness and knowledge 
of HAT had learned about it, directly or indirectly through their social 
networks, from the Tiny Targets intervention. This can be partially traced 
back to the programme’s early attempts to integrate a local women-led 
initiative to improve acceptance and maintenance of targets. However much 
of the circulating knowledge about the relationship between tsetse and HAT, 
and HAT as a local problem, was reported to have come from informal 
conversations with other members of the public about the visual presence or 
appearance of targets along riverbeds where people congregate, long after 
this initiative had ended. The proximity of targets, physically, visually, and 
socially had not only improved the retention and sustainability of tsetse 
control, but had the unintended effect of enhancing local awareness and 
vigilance about HAT. This, alongside feedback from farmers about the 
importance of being acquainted and trusting of spraying services in central 
Uganda, highlight the importance of social proximity to the sustainability of 
technologies for HAT control. It also raised the importance of acknowledging 
the role of implementers themselves as gatekeepers of local knowledge and 
central nodes in social networks. While the resources and expertise provided 
by these programmes was empowering for local sprayers, target attendants, 
and laboratory staff, their views and feedback were rarely acknowledged or 
fed back into programmes. This may require a re-imagining of whom 
precisely comprise the ‘communities’ targeted by interventions advertising 
‘community participation’ as their modus operandi.  
 
In telling this story of course, I too have engaged in the kinds of knowledge 
politics that reproduce some of the power imbalances that govern global 
health (Montgomery et al., 2017). This is evident in the technologies I have 
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chosen, the partnerships I have been able to develop and foster, thus the 
perspectives and voices I have been able to glean and raise up in my 
analyses. In situating my analysis at the point of implementation, I have 
made a conscious effort to seek out perspectives less explored in the 
literature on One Health collaborations and the role of technology for global 
health and development. The narrative outlined above is not intended to be 
presented as an objective account of the state of HAT control and elimination 
today, but a catalogue of snapshots from selective vantages points across a 
vast and complex landscape. These ethnographic data points help to build a 
more comprehensive and grounded picture of how global health technologies 
become subjects of ongoing social experimentation (Bardosh, 2016). To 
describe everything is impossible, and with any case study there must be a 
focus and boundaries drawn. The outcome is more like a painting of a 
landscape than photograph; an interpretation rather than a mirror image (de 
Vaus, 2006: 225). This collage of vignettes presents a disjointed but rich 
contextual aid for an otherwise intangible and messy phenomena; the global 
assemblage at work. By ‘zooming in’ on these local enactments of the broad 
and ambitious promises made by technologies for HAT elimination, several 
key themes and contributions to the literature can be argued. 
 
 
Infrastructures are relational  
 
As much of Global Health and STS literature point out, it takes work for 
technology to function (Sariola et al., 2017), involving factors and elements 
that go beyond typical definitions of ‘health systems’ or ‘infrastructures’. 
Diagnostics for example are often regarded as replacing infrastructure 
(Street, 2018). However, rather than circumventing infrastructural deficits, in 
many cases we find they require more infrastructure (resources, supply 
chains, community health workers, the information required to make them 
work). To perform, RDTs effectively need precisely the infrastructure they 
were designed to substitute: the medical expertise, organisational 
 292 
mechanisms, and access to diagnostic and treatment options from well-
funded and functioning health systems (Beisel et al, 2016). Making 
technology function involves several layers of work; the work that patients 
have to do to reach health centres to access diagnostic tests and adhere to 
their drugs; the work of suppliers and distributors to ensure tests and drugs 
are in stock; the work of researchers, industry, and donors involved in 
developing these devices, drugs, and vector control methods (Sariola et al., 
2017: 3).  Assumptions that Global Health technological interventions exist 
independently of this wider assemblage of labour fails to capture the 
complexity of this dynamic socio-ecology (Michael and Madon, 2017).  
 
Another emergent issue from this line of inquiry is how infrastructures map 
onto subjective socio-ecological landscapes. In contrast to the mobile team-
led system which preceded the RDT, the diagnostic algorithm for HAT is now 
divided across different levels of the health system and geographic spaces, 
requiring patients to travel between institutions by their own means. Tracing 
patients’ experiences navigating these disjointed referral pathways raises the 
important question of who exactly is doing the unseen work behind the 
scenes to make this infrastructure ostensibly function. Tools will always be 
used in different ways than originally intended to suit changing intervention 
contexts (Palmer, 2018). For example, RDTs have largely not been used in 
the ways envisioned by Uganda’s elimination programme, or by humanitarian 
agencies responding to the unfolding humanitarian crisis spurred by ongoing 
conflict in South Sudan (Palmer et al., 2018). RDTs are more likely to be 
found in health facilities than on the backs of motorcycles, and rarely used in 
refugee populations at all (Palmer, 2018). Instead, the Ugandan control 
programme has reconfigured the referral system to integrate HAT screening 
into government health centres’ everyday work. However as accounts from 
health workers have shown, this everyday work is already performed in a 




This pressure has been reinforced by the global health community’s fixation 
on point of care testing, with unforeseen destabilising effects on laboratories’ 
capacity to investigate and diagnose non-RDT testable febrile cases. This 
phenomena can be viewed in two ways; as strengthening the case for 
developing an RDT for rhodesiense HAT (though this may likely be subject to 
the same issues encountered for the gambiense RDT-based referral system 
explored in the first chapter). The other perspective is that the global health 
community, including diagnostics developers, donor funders, NGOs and 
governments, must re-imagine the role of the central laboratory and re-invest 
in core lab capacity, including increasing health worker training and staff 
numbers to support the implementation of sophisticated devices. To argue 
that to keep up with the RDT revolution, HAT (as an assemblage of state and 
non-state actors) must innovate more point of care tests to keep up with this 
rapid cultural evolution, is symptomatic of a prevailing tendency to insert 
short-cut, single-disease solutions to shore up broader structural paucity and 
neglect. 
 
While accessibility is at the forefront of their design and specifically called for 
by the global health community, the introduction of the gambiense RDT into 
the HAT diagnostic landscape has paradoxically resulted in making the point 
of care test more socially remote, and in the case of refugee populations in 
northern Uganda, troublingly unavailable to populations most at risk of 
disease (Palmer, 2018). The irony is that this re-imagination of the HAT 
referral algorithm and the laboratory’s role in it was only made possible with 
the development of the RDT which now spearheads the enhanced passive 
screening approach to elimination. The hope that the sleeping sickness RDT 
would integrate seamlessly into an existing malaria diagnostic ecosystem 
was premised on a presumed similarity between the two RDTs that in fact did 
not extend beyond the physical features of the device itself (Lee and Palmer, 
2018). Diagnosis is a spatially and temporally distributed process that 
comprises a dynamic assemblage of infrastructures, including health 
information systems, supply chains, clinical expertise and, crucially, patient 
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decision-making (Lee, 2018). Overall, this study has revealed how socio-
technical ecosystems of surveillance are fragile as they are dynamic and 
complex, and that “the effectiveness of diagnostic technologies is inextricably 
linked to the social infrastructures surrounding them which make disease 
detection work” (Palmer, 2018). As I have argued in my second chapter on 
the role of the centralised laboratory in HAT surveillance, the gaps in these 
infrastructures of surveillance are not merely physical but relational, and 
inextricably political. We therefore cannot expect low resource countries, 
already subjected to the legacies of colonialism, structural re-adjustment 
programmes, and whimsical fashions of global health policy, to simply 
innovate their way around structural paucity and out of poverty (Babe, 2016). 
 
 
‘Communities’ are multiple and emergent publics 
 
 
Another cross-cutting theme has been that of ‘community participation’, the 
definition of who comprise these ‘communities’, and to what extent or end 
‘participation’ translates across programmes. ‘The community’ in question is 
rarely defined, generally taken to be the people existing in a given area, with 
whom researchers or programmes engage, mobilise or sensitise to facilitate 
co-operation (or retention in the context of referral systems). Communities 
are assumed to pre-exist programmes, to be timeless, homogenous wholes. 
In relation to public health interventions, it is more common to speak of ‘the 
community’ as a singular, static entity, than of ‘publics’, which are multiple 
and emergent. A conceptual shift from ‘community’ to ‘publics’ recognises 
these populations as dynamic and transient (Kelly, MacGregor and 
Montgomery, 2017), “situated at the intersection of various forms of inclusion 
and exclusion, both locally and globally” (Montgomery and Pool, 2016: 50). 
Findings from my studies highlight the need to form long-term models of 
engagement and participation which transcend the quantitative goals and 
individual timelines of specific interventions. 
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It is evident from the case studies presented throughout this thesis that the 
communities targeted by interventions are often conceptualised as 
homogenous, static, and predictable. Symptomatic individuals are expected 
to present themselves to public health centres upon falling ill, to be instantly 
recognisable as HAT suspects to health workers, and to follow the disjointed 
referral pathways set before them after testing positive with a HAT RDT. 
Farmers are expected to see the incentive of regularly spraying their cattle 
with relatively expensive pyrethroids from a limited network of outlets to 
prevent human infective strains of trypanosomiasis from circulating local 
animal reservoirs, and to comply with policies to treat at the point of sale. 
Meanwhile, the spectrum of concerns, collective memories from past 
interventions, negative experiences at the point of care, perceived risks, 
cultural beliefs, dissatisfaction with local healthcare delivery, and conflicting 
priorities all shape an alternative landscape in which communities conduct 
their daily lives. While they are potential HAT suspects, patients, and 
survivors, people are also subjects inscribed in domestic space (Brives, 
2016). 
 
Furthermore, programmes have often been too limited in their definition of 
‘communities’, restricted to those who are thought to passively receive and 
adopt, or ‘accept’ new technologies. Rarely do interventions expand their 
object of participation to those who implementing them, much to their 
detriment. Front line data collectors, health workers, community sprayers, 
vets and entomological assistants are key gatekeepers of local knowledge 
that can shape the social proximity and adaptability of technologies. 
However, the expertise and insights offered by these individuals working at 
the interface between programmes and people are largely overlooked or 
overridden.  
 
The faming of who falls outside and inside of the community is highlighted in 
Parker and Allen’s piece (2018) on the response to Ebola in the village of 
Mathiane in Sierra Leone, which describes the affected population as “those 
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on the receiving end of byelaws enacted by these customary authorities” 
(Parker and Allen, 2018). Boland and McKay (2018) argue that this creates a 
false dichotomy, categorising villagers as ‘insiders’ at odds with those 
‘outside’ their community, thus implying that the Ebola response workers are 
‘outsiders’. They argue no such delimitation should be drawn, given that the 
vast majority of response workers were Sierra Leoneans, who worked in their 
‘own communities’ to stop the outbreak (ibid). In many cases this was true, 
though Parker and Allen in their response defended their original claim, 
arguing that while many of those responding to Mathiane may have been 
fellow Sierra Leoneans, they were not ‘local’ in terms of priorities and their 
relationship with the population, which was often “distant or fraught” while 
being “primarily focused on supporting the enforcement of quarantine for 
known cases. Their personal loyalties were elsewhere”. (Parker and Allen, in 
Boland and McKay, 2018). Furthermore, far from being passive recipients of 
public health intervention during the outbreak, Parker and Allen go on to 
describe how they actively resist them too; “Although people in Mathiane 
heard about the public health regulations on the radio, they did not accept 
them, or even believe that they could possibly relate to them [...] Instead, 
they developed their own strategies to contain infection”.  
 
The above example speaks to my own observations, and considerations for 
what constitutes ‘local’ and comprises ‘communities’. It is evident that locality 
is more than a matter of drawing geographical, ethnic, and cultural 
boundaries, but factors in complicated relationships of trust between 
government and state actors or professionals with recipients of services and 
care. Just as farmers in Dokolo trusted their ‘local’ man Daniel over Dr 
Odongo, interventions are delivered through carefully cultivated social 





Social proximity is a tool for sustainability and advocacy 
 
It has become widely recognised in the literature that to be sustainable, 
interventions should build on existing local practices, target health messages 
at the most receptive community members, align with local priorities, 
recognise limits on human agency, such as time, economic, cognitive and 
social constraints, and feature community mobilisation (Panter-Brick et al., 
2006). The empirical examples presented in this thesis suggest that the 
extent to which interventions integrate and become socially embedded into 
the daily lives and practices of target populations is associated with their 
relationality, or social proximity, to people within the wider socio-technical 
ecosystem of HAT control.  
 
A growing body of literature in global health and development views 
community participation as an essential driving force for health program 
sustainability, based on the assumption that engaging with communities 
makes interventions more relevant to local priorities (Rifkin, 1986, 2014; 
WHO, 2002; Draper et al., 2010). However, the mechanisms by which 
community participation leads to sustainable health outcomes exactly, and to 
what end, are unclear (Hossain et al., 2004). My study suggests one 
mechanism by which the way technologies are introduced and integrated into 
local socio-technical ecosystems determines how socially embedded they 
become in daily practice. As my study on the introduction of the gambiense 
RDT found, devices situated in government health facilities would likely only 
be used where patients’ own treatment seeking from informal health 
providers had failed, and on eventually presenting to a health centre tested 
negative for malaria. Even in these interactions at the point of testing, it is 
unlikely that patients are made aware of what they are being tested for 
necessarily, much less which diagnostic device is being used. The fact that 
so few people were aware of a rapid test for HAT being available in their 
local primary facilities also highlighted its low visibility as an intervention. This 
is in sharp contrast to the Tiny Targets project, made highly visible and 
widely advertised through sensitisation activities. This suggests there is a 
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great deal of unseen work that technologies can do, and that they can be 
used, where deployed strategically and sensitively, as important tools of 
advocacy. 
 
As my final chapter on tsetse control demonstrated, the relationships of trust 
and reputation cultivated over time by community mobile sprayers increased 
access of spraying services to rural and remote farmers in high risk HAT 
areas. Their affiliation with the 3V vets franchise lent them the professional 
legitimacy to practice as mobile ‘animal doctors’, while their close ties to local 
social networks afforded them a level of trust and acceptance not extended 
to Dr Odongo and his fellow 3V colleagues. The establishment and growth of 
subnetworks from this organisation has allowed the mobile spraying initiative 
to grow organically, and become socially embedded as a routine part of 
preventative livestock treatment for tsetse and tick-borne diseases. As one 
informant described, such an approach may be a longer and more iterative 
journey to attaining intervention objectives, but the gains are more 
permanent and sustainable than the large and aloof approaches of traditional 
interventions. Being socially distant proved partly the undoing of SOS, as 
convincing farmers to take up the responsibility of spraying their own animals 
for a low priority disease was poorly argued and received. The social 
proximity of spraying services offered by the 3V network however allowed for 
important relationships of trust, political commitment from local government, 
and endorsement from local community leaders to develop naturally. 
 
 
Devolving One Health is constrained by structural barriers 
 
In her history of disease eradication programmes, Nancy Leys Stepan 
argues that, despite their scale and the vast resources they deployed, 
eradication campaigns can be historically singled out as being among the 
weaker determinants in health outcomes (2011). Although often initially 
resulting in sharp declines in the incidence of disease, campaigns like SOS 
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are often set up as autonomous operations, relying on specific, technical 
interventions organised independently of the country’s health system. This 
‘crowding out’ of the state from regional planning contexts and perspectives 
limits local knowledge and the consideration of different preferences for 
public goods. This can impact acceptance of interventions and potentially 
give rise to conflicts regarding potential benefits at multiple scales and 
between different actors (Michael and Madon, 2017). These are not always 
flexible enough to adapt to unexpected variations in the socio-technical 
ecosystems they encounter. This makes it difficult to sustain the political will 
or financial resources needed to maintain them, particularly where districts 
have many other competing health priorities. However, trying to measure the 
independent impact of elimination programmes on health is, perhaps, to miss 
the point; “it is the dynamic interaction between social, political, economic 
and public health activities and interventions that brings about population 
health” (Stepan, 2011: 31). The case studies presented here describe some 
of these dynamic interactions, hopefully providing a more grounded 
perspective of One Health as it is enacted through interventions at the district 
level. 
 
Much like the target of elimination, One Health is a handy conceptual tool for 
mobilising resources and galvanising political will and commitments across 
sectors and disciplines. However, its rise in popularity has been compounded 
by either a lack of understanding, or mismatched expectations of what these 
‘collaborations’ entail, which has limited its utility and application to practice 
(Lee and Brumme, 2013; Parker and Kingori, 2016). While this ‘conceptual 
fungability’ has made the model influential in capturing and coordinating 
complexity, this flexibility is limited, prioritising global contagions over 
regionally endemic diseases, emergency interventions above elimination 
contexts, and scale over locally adapted iterations (Smith, Taylor and 
Kingsley, 2015).  For many African governments forced to restructure and 
align health activities with the priorities of the World Bank, a ‘public’ health 
system has only ever been a theoretical concept, or one greatly 
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compromised by multiple social, material and political constraints (Kelly, 
MacGregor and Montgomery, 2017). Overlaying the One Health concept 
onto this fragmented and decentralised landscape has highlighted, and in 
places reproduced, some of these constraints by insisting district offices plan 
and manage their own HAT control in isolation from each other. As this study 
has shown, the translation of global notions of One Health down to national 
and district levels becomes problematic for a number of reasons: the failure 
of international, external actors to engage with the Ugandan state; 
interventions and activities being set up and operating parallel to those of the 
state; weak state capacity to coordinate Uganda’s own integrated response 
to HAT; and limited collaboration between core Ugandan sectors and offices 
in planning activities amidst a weak, increasingly decentralised district health 
system (Smith, Taylor and Kingsley, 2015). Chapter seven on tsetse control 
in particular highlighted some of the difficulties in implementing a One Health 
model of HAT control in practice, as a precarious and fragile network of 
district offices struggled to align programme objectives with local priorities. 
 
 
Promoting behavioural change for health outcomes requires a deep 
understanding of the various cultural and social contexts to which a 
programme is being implemented. As my seventh chapter shows for 
example, it is important to consider when appealing to the motivations of 
farmers who may not perceive the benefit of delayed preventive innovation of 
spraying their cattle to deter tsetse and thus free of HAT, particularly where 
local health priorities for their animals diverge from that of a specific, single-
disease intervention such as SOS or 3V. Where monitoring and evaluation 
protocols are designed with very specific targets in mind, the risk of 
selectively excluding important behavioural indicators and local knowledge is 
substantial, particularly where those setting the research agenda and 
enforcing intervention compliance prioritise maximum returns with minimal 
risk. This limits the room for creative flexibility and adaptability of intervention 
strategies on the ground, as health workers find themselves responding to 
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individual situations while confronting pressures of reporting particular data 
(Mishra, 2014). 
 
The micro-adaptations that District Supervisors in the West Nile had to make 
to follow-up ‘defaulting’ suspects and meet the elimination programme’s 
objectives are illustrative of these creative adaptations, and testament to the 
resilience of staff struggling to manage expectations and environments of 
uncertainty. However, I urge caution against fetishizing the ‘tinkering’ 
undertaken by implementers, as the conditions under which such measures 
are contrived by necessity is neither ideal nor acceptable. Glamourizing the 
resourcefulness of actors in resource poor settings overlooks the structural 
neglect of primary healthcare, and shifts incentive from making technologies 
locally relevant and acceptable, to forcing local actors to ‘make them fit’.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the environment in which programmes 
supposedly integrate global health technologies are fragile and immensely 
overstretched. A common theme throughout the thesis raised in this chapter 
was how the decentralisation of the health system has removed HAT as an 
item of national importance, thus making it a low priority for districts, meaning 
little training or resources for HAT control are mobilised to these areas. Staff 
regularly have to manage the expectations of health service and disease 
control programmes amidst budget and resource constraints. The 
introduction of digital surveillance infrastructures enables comparative 
accountability between districts, but also creates often unseen work for time 
and resource constrained health workers. Elsewhere, the high turnover of 
frontline health facility staff and intermittent training has left a significant gap 
in the structural capacity for HAT cases to be detected. The low index of 
suspicion among health workers feeds, and is fed by, a point of care testing 
culture that overlooks potential causes of febrile illness that cannot be 
determined by a limited selection of rapid diagnostic tests. It is also important 
to note that behavioural change extends beyond the target communities in 
question, but to the health workers and practitioners responsible for 
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suspecting and testing for disease in the field and clinical settings. Health 
promotion and education should not only target lay communities, but the 
network of professionals, some of which may not have received adequate 
training to recognise symptoms of HAT or suspect cases in their region.  
 
Attention must also be paid to the ways in which evidence is produced at 
these intersections between interventions and their intended publics, 
including those who are active participants in its creation. Data collectors 
play a vital role in producing scientific knowledge, and as my observations of 
Dr Mohammed’s dilemma in the SOS treatment trials underscored, they are 
also an important component in understanding the practice of public health 
interventions. Yet little attention has been given to their daily experiences or 
the context in which they are expected to perform these tasks (Kingori, 
2013). Incorporating these ‘voices of the field’ (Okwaro et al., 2015) are 
crucial to understanding how global assemblages of One Health and HAT 




The Socio-ecology of Sleeping Sickness is fragile as it is 
complex 
 
What can be learned from this study about the socio-ecology of sleeping 
sickness, and the relationship between policy and practice for HAT control 
and elimination? I would draw similar conclusions to David Mosse on 
implementing aid policy for development, that imposing policy prescriptions 
without taking local contexts into account is potentially irresponsible, and that 
policy change “ruptures informal systems supporting projects” (Mosse, 2004: 
230). The case studies presented here reveal some of the informal systems 
at work that support and stabilise the HAT assemblage as delicate and 
dynamic, held together by the daily struggles and tinkering of individual 
programme staff, state health workers, patients and farmers to make 
surveillance and control infrastructures function. My findings contribute to a 
growing body of literature that emphasise how the enactment of social 
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processes during the implementation phase of interventions have profound 
implications for programme sustainability (Pluye et al., 2004; Madon et al., 
2018). I have shown through this selection of case studies that ‘communities’ 
are often narrowly defined (Kelly et al., 2017; Montgomery and Pool, 2017) 
and assumed to be passive recipients of technological interventions 
designed to change their behaviour and integrate tools into everyday socio-
technical practices. However, the socio-ecological assemblages of sleeping 
sickness are as fragile as they are complex. They are sensitive and adaptive, 
lending agency to innovations as they integrate and take on social lives of 
their own in unpredictable ways. Others are poorly fitted and ultimately fail, 
being too large and monolithic, or socially distant.  
 
Technologies do not exist and operate in a vacuum, nor do they work on a 
passive static network. They are part of a dynamic HAT assemblage, and 
rely on the interaction and agency of the population they are intervening on 
to adopt and continue to use them. They can be used as tools for advocacy, 
as highly visible and socially embedded interventions promote awareness 
and understandings of HAT among local populations. Conversely, relatively 
sophisticated but aloof interventions which shift responsibility of referral, or 
treatment, or of preventative spraying, onto poor communities in post-conflict 
subsistence societies is evidently problematic (Bardosh, 2016). Introducing 
technologies and expecting vulnerable communities to continue their 
implementation long after with their own resources does little to promote trust 
or incentive, and is potentially damaging to communities and health systems. 
Thus, while modest and incremental, locally adapted interventions which are 
more socially proximate and integrated with ‘local ecologies’ achieve greater 
sustainability than some of their more elaborate predecessors, as they take 
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